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ECONOMY AND STRATEGY  
DECONSTRUCTION AS FEMINISM

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Infelicities, inaccuracies and bare-faced lies remain, of course, my responsibility.

## SUMMARY

This essay concerns the possibility of a critical discourse/practice that will not be immediately and unproblematically appropriated by that which it attempts to critique. Chapters one and two establish the problems of the possibility of such a discourse/practice as those of economy, traversed by relations of power and desire. They also explicate the matter of economy as a relationship between identity, difference and opposition. Saussure's work on linguistic economy is presented as a metaphysical phallogentrism and Derrida's work on Saussure's economics is presented as a critical feminism that is not appropriated by that which it attempts to critique.

In addition to being the constituent parts of economy, identity, difference and opposition are 'also' the ingredients of dialectics. Chapter three, therefore, begins the task of elucidating the 'origins' of this critical feminism in the works of Hegel and Nietzsche. The task of showing how such a critical position is possible by looking at its philosophical development is continued in chapter four by examining the work of Heidegger and Adorno. Adorno's inclusion in this chapter permits the comparison of contemporary French criticism with another strand of critical thought that has been influenced by Hegelian dialectics, German Marxist theory.

Chapter five recapitulates the themes of chapters one and two by looking again at the work of Derrida on economy. Chapter six deals with how power operates and is operated upon by looking at the work of Foucault. And chapter seven explains the workings of desire within and between phallogentric and feminist economy by looking at the work of Deleuze and Guattari. The various (Nietzschean) operations performed by these thinkers upon the manifestations of identity in economy, power and desire are shown to be feminist in that they are concerned to show how that which is irreducibly different ultimately escapes being reduced to self-present identity.

Having accounted, 'philosophically' perhaps, for the workings of economy that are labelled 'feminist' and 'phallogentric', the essay then looks at how the various issues raised are to be found in the more 'concrete' work of psychoanalysis on female sexuality. In order to do this, the 'tension' between centric and ec-centric economy, between phallogentrism and feminism, as it is found in the work of Freud and Gallop is examined in chapter eight.

The concern with more recognisably feminist matters is continued in chapter nine. In the light of the nature of economy, power and desire, the various strategies that are available to feminism in the attempt to critique phallogentrism are elucidated and their chances of avoiding being appropriated by that phallogentrism are assessed. Of the three forms of feminist strategy, only deconstructive feminism is seen to avoid being rendered harmless by phallogentric economy.

Chapter ten summarises the arguments used, provides an account of the second sense of 'possibility' and articulates the essay's own position with regard to a critical feminism.

PREFACE

The Examiners of this thesis, Doctor Christine Battersby and Doctor Christopher Norris, have suggested that both a 'Preface' and an 'Afterword' be appended to it. The 'Preface' is to clarify the relation between 'vulgar' and 'non-vulgar' feminism and to comment on the choice of such a vocabulary. It is also to refer forward to the points they suggest are made in the 'Afterword'. They suggest that the 'Afterword' deal first with the existence of other readings of Nietzsche and second with some more aspects of the relation between 'vulgar' and 'non-vulgar' feminism.

The distinction between 'vulgar' and 'non-vulgar' feminism is introduced on page one. The choice of such a vocabulary derives from Derrida's use of it in the essays "Ousia and Gramme", (where he refers to a 'vulgar' or metaphysical concept of time), and "Linguistics and Gram<sup>a</sup>m<sub>x</sub>tology", (where he refers to a 'vulgar' or metaphysical concept of writing). It cannot be, and clearly has not been, emphasised enough that, whatever the popular and unfortunate connotations of these words, 'vulgar' is not conceived in this essay as having any simple derogatory meaning and 'non-vulgar' is not conceived as having any simple superior status.

In "Linguistics and Grammatology", for example, Derrida is dealing with the treatment traditionally afforded speech and writing in Western thought. With a few significant exceptions, speech is privileged above writing: speech is considered to be 'better' in some way than writing. 'Vulgar' and 'non-vulgar' are not related as speech and writing.

One of the things Derrida is trying to do in this essay is to show that within speech, indeed essential to it, are the very characteristics of writing that are supposed to justify the latter's subordinate status in Western metaphysics. In order to do this, Derrida makes use of the 'concept' arché-écriture. He does not say that the original (and 'vulgar') metaphysical concept of writing should be privileged above speech by means of a reversal. Nor does he say that all mention of both speech and writing should be refused because it is metaphysical.

Arché-écriture is neither speech nor writing in the senses intended by metaphysics. It 'is', rather, the non-full, non-simple 'origin' of both. As such, it is 'non-vulgar'. However, to the extent arché-écriture must have recourse to the logic, syntax and conceptual frameworks of Western metaphysics, it must also be 'vulgar'. At this point, 'vulgar' and 'non-vulgar' can themselves be seen to be undecidable. That the distinction can be of

strategic use only becomes clear. 'Vulgar' and 'non-vulgar' feminism are related in this way and should be read sous rature as suggested on page one.

The vocabulary 'vulgar'/'non-vulgar' is of purely strategic use since the workings of ec-centric economy preclude any 'proper' use. Some such vocabulary must be used since there can be no completely non-metaphysical language and any other vocabulary that was used to do the work that 'vulgar'/'non-vulgar' is attempting to do would be subject to these considerations. If, as argued in this essay, an essential part of the 'non-vulgar' is the 'vulgar' then there can be no completely 'non-vulgar' language or, indeed, practice.

Thus 'vulgar' and 'non-vulgar' are not intended to represent a simple 'good'/'bad' opposition or dichotomy. The ultimate undecidability of the difference between 'vulgar' and 'non-vulgar' feminisms is studied in more detail in Chapter Nine and also in the 'Afterword', where these matters reappear in the guise of questions about alternative readings of Nietzsche, strategy and the telos of feminist practices.

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION: THE POSSIBILITY OF FEMINISM 1

This essay concerns the possibility of a critical or transgressive discourse that will not be immediately and unproblematically appropriated by that which it attempts to critique or transgress. For want of a better word and for reasons that will be outlined in due course, this discourse will be termed 'feminism'. However, following Spivak<sup>1</sup>, 'feminism' in this sense should perhaps be written and should certainly be read sous rature in order to distinguish it from the manifold and more or less 'vulgar'<sup>2</sup> versions of feminism to be dealt with in chapter nine as illustrating the sundry forms of critical strategy.

Feminism may be loosely and provisionally defined as the attempt to account for, critique and thereby transform the value or status of women in society. However, beginning with readings of Saussure and of Derrida's reading of Saussure, this essay intends to show first that the problems with which feminism is concerned are problems of economy, that the workings of economy are traversed by relations of power and desire and that feminism's problems are to be found in places that would not, at first sight, seem to be appropriate to feminism as defined above.

That is, this essay will establish the matter of economy as a relationship between identity,

difference and some form of opposition. Identity, difference and opposition being the basic and classical ingredients of thought and language, the essay will demonstrate that feminism's problems are ultimately those concerning what have, less classically, been called the 'limits' of thought and language, the 'limits' of philosophy and metaphysics.

It may appear 'arbitrary', and to that extent 'improper', to call such a discourse feminist insofar as what is to be critiqued and transformed is not only a 'masculine' organisation of the production of value, identity, difference and opposition, but also solidary with white and bourgeois interests, for example. That is, identity, value and the privilege that is founded upon that identity and value are to be found elsewhere (everywhere). They are to be found in race relations, politics, the treatment of the unemployed, the old and the mentally and physically handicapped and disabled, for example.

However, it will be shown that it is only a certain form of economy, what will be referred to as centred economy, and which has been traditionally or vulgarly associated with white, bourgeois and male interests, that accords a strategic privilege to the values of identity, self-presence and what is proper to that identity. A position adopted with regard to economy, to identity, difference and opposition, that is not different and opposed to centred economy in the ways that difference and opposition are organised in centred economy will not, thus, be an identity

that is proper to or appropriate to any particular sphere.

Such a position, it will be shown, is that of a non-vulgar feminism, a discourse/practice that will not be immediately and unproblematically appropriated by that which it attempts to critique and transform. And, while it may be arbitrary and to that extent improper to call a discourse that is different and opposed to centric economy, the vulgar masculine concern, a feminism, it is no more and no less so than calling it anything else. That is, it would be 'innappropriate' (and not, thereby, all the more appropriate) to speak of such a position or discourse being proper to any area (sex, race, class or whatever) since it would not willingly participate in an economy in which the values of identity, self-presence and property were privileged.

In addition to these, there are a number of other reasons as to why such a discourse/practice will be referred to as a non-vulgar feminism. First, as popularly conceived and practised, feminism seems to have been possessed of more critical energy and to have achieved rather more than any of the other '-isms' that are concerned to deal with the lot of marginal groups. Second, and perhaps related to the first, feminists often conceive their tasks as being vitally connected to other, not always obviously or especially feminist, concerns or issues. These feminists argue that all manner of issues, from



the nuclear debates to, precisely, the position of other disadvantaged groups within society, are feminist concerns.

That there can be no final authority determining the proper limits of feminism ultimately obliges even the most vulgar feminism to recognise its involvement in these 'other' areas. Such a condition may be dealt with in a number of ways. Culler notes that '"women's studies" is the name now applied to many fundamental questions of personal freedom and social justice'<sup>3</sup>. And Eagleton argues that the liberation of other repressed groups is a condition for the emancipation of women<sup>4</sup>. This essay will show that the 'liberation' of 'other' repressed groups is 'the same' issue as that of the emancipation of women in that the discourse/practice that will transgress the state in which such repression occurs itself questions talk of 'the proper' concerns of feminism.

And thirdly, it will be shown that a non-vulgar feminism consists in a particular relation to difference; it affords a peculiar treatment to the 'opposition' or 'gap' between terms which is constitutive of economy. Economy, the relationship between identity, difference and opposition, is one of the central concerns of this essay and as such the treatment of difference will be of crucial and strategic importance at a number of places. Thus the issues surrounding a non-vulgar feminism, like those surrounding difference or any of the other 'non-synonymic substitutions'<sup>5</sup> that replace it, arise at various

points at which the different ways of dealing with difference are found.

In order to introduce these problems and in order to establish feminism's problems as those of economy, power and desire, this chapter will consider an issue that is of concern to contemporary feminism - the question as to whether theoretical discourse has any legitimate role to play in the women's movements.

In her essay "Enslaved Enclave", Clément tells of the women who interrupted the speeches at the 1975 Week of Marxist Thought with shouts and 'piercing cries of "Hey, Hey"'<sup>6</sup>. She explains that the women who thus interrupted considered articulated speech and theoretical discourse to be practices which were intrinsic or proper to the position of 'the man': theory and articulated speech are somehow male property, deriving any value they have from a male dominated system of values and used to ensure both the continued existence of that system and the subjection of women and female values within it. If a male dominated system of values has privileged theoretical discourse and if men have used that discourse to dominate women, to ensure their secondary status within society, then these women hold that a properly feminist gesture is to oppose that system through the interrupting of theoretical discourse with a form of speech that has been undervalued and held to be a properly feminine form of speech, non-sensical, emotional and

shouted speech.

Clément comments, '"Be a feminist and shout"; an unchanged variant of "Be beautiful and keep your tongue"'. She suggests, that is, that to shout in this way is not necessarily a properly or specifically feminist gesture, it is simply the reverse of the traditional male dictate that women be seen to be beautiful and not heard. As simply the reversal of this demand, Clément claims that the value or meaning of shouting in this way derives from its place within a male dominated or phallogentric system of values. She thus implies that to attempt to oppose a phallogentric economy by means of the interrupting of theoretical discourse with impassioned and angry shouting is not a properly feminist activity. What is experienced as the domination of women by men through the exercise of theoretical discourse will not be ended, she suggests, by the exercise of shouted speech when it is a male dominated system of values that defines the value of shouted speech 'in the first place'.

Now the question arises as to what would be the or an appropriately feminist gesture. Are theory and articulated speech only valued in an economy in which the value of women is said to be inferior to that of men? If they are, in virtue of what? What are the issues over which such a question could be decided? The question also arises, precisely, as to whether there is or could be a properly feminist

response. Apart from the problem as to whether the very idea of there being properties or the appropriate does not only derive any value it may have from within a male dominated economy, the question as to the nature of articulated speech still requires an answer.

For if, on the one hand, theory and articulated speech do only derive any value they have from their place within phallogentric economy, then it is not immediately obvious whether to refuse and interrupt such discourse by shouting is not to leave basically secure the initial and objectionable state of affairs. Simply to reverse the status of two categories of speech, as Clément suggests, does little to damage a male dominated economy when it is the or a male oriented principle that ultimately defines or regulates the value of the categories to begin with. And if, on the other hand, theory and articulated speech are not inevitably and properly masculine activities, then women may use them in the identification and discussion of their problems without being specifically or properly anything other than language users.

The question of the possibility of feminism and of the problems that feminism faces are problems of economy. The question of the possibility of feminism may be described as the question 'How can the value of feminist gestures be produced in anything but phallogentric economy and still remain in any way both critical and feminist?'. And the problems that

feminism faces may be described as asking how to account for the value and status of women as they have been produced in economy. It was also claimed above that there is a further aspect to economy and its relation to feminism that must be explained in dealing with these questions. Although they are not to be considered as separate operations, the value of women has not only been produced, it has also been legitimated. The value of women, as it has been produced in economies, has appeared and been experienced as being legitimate, as justified or appropriate. Thus in the production of value and identity, power and desire are being exercised and satisfied in the regulation of a certain form of economy.

That is, if, as in the example above, it is claimed that theoretical discourse is employed by men to consign women to a position of inferiority and to justify men's positions of dominance, then it would appear that power is being employed on the one hand to effect the satisfaction of the desire to dominate women and on the other to justify the subordinate position of women. Three of the many women who are concerned with the sexual balance of power and whose work might be cited here include Dworkin, Millet and de Beauvoir. In her work on pornography, Dworkin asserts that 'male power [is] expressed in pornography' and that pornography is one of the means by which men exercise their power to subjugate women<sup>7</sup>. Similarly, Millet, in her Sexual Politics, sets out

to examine the power relations between men and women as they are found in literary works and which illustrate the control of women by men<sup>8</sup>. And deBeauvoir asks in the introduction to The Second Sex, 'whence comes ... submission in the case of women?' and wonders why women do not dispute what she calls male 'sovereignty'<sup>9</sup>.

If what feminism identifies as the domination of women by men cannot by its nature be unmotivated, then male desire is satisfied in or through that domination and male power is exercised in order to achieve and legitimate that domination. In that deBeauvoir also wonders why women do not dispute this sovereignty, the question as to why women do not desire to remove themselves from the situations in which they find themselves may be raised. With regard to desire, Firestone refers to the way that the 'self-containment of the other creates desire' and goes on to affect fundamentally, and to the detriment of women, relations between the sexes<sup>10</sup>.

Thus it is claimed that, even on this crude and naive level, power and desire may be seen as constitutive elements of economy, of the way in which identity, value and status are produced and legitimated. It is claimed that without power and desire economy would not operate. Since it appears to be the case that desires are being satisfied in legitimating a certain view of the proper status of women and that a certain power is being exercised to legitimate that value or status, feminism and an account

of the possibility of that feminism must deal with power and desire as they are found in economy.

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Thus this essay intends to deal with the workings of economy and with the roles of power and desire in those workings in order to elucidate the problems noted above concerning the possibility of feminism. Having shown that feminism's problems are those of economy, power and desire, chapter two will establish the idea of economy as a matter of a relationship between identity, difference and opposition and introduce the workings of power and desire into that relationship.

In explaining the workings of economy as a relationship between identity, difference and some form of opposition, traversed by relations of power and desire, this chapter will provide some idea of the nature and limits of the difference between phallocentric or metaphysical and de- or ec- centric feminist economy. For essentially pedagogical purposes, it will be claimed that centric economy (and the versions of power and desire to be found there) is vulgarly masculine and that de- or ec- centric economy (and the versions of power and desire to be found there) is non-vulgarly feminine or feminist.

So, looking first at Saussure's account of the production of value, chapter two will

establish the idea of economy as a relation between identity, difference and some form of opposition and introduce the various versions of power and desire as part of that relation. It will thus be possible, in chapters three and four, to discuss the problems of feminism as they are exemplified as the 'limits' of thought and language, the 'limits' of philosophy and metaphysics. The work of Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Adorno will be used to provide an account of how the basic and classical ingredients of thought and language are matters for feminism.

That is, it will be noted that dialectics is, amongst other things, the thought of a relation between identity, difference and opposition. Thus chapter three will begin by outlining Hegel's account of economics, as that account is found in The Science of Logic and The Phenomenology of Mind before going on to consider Nietzsche's work as a sort of critique of that account. Similarly, chapter four will look at Heidegger's response to the work of Hegel and Nietzsche as well as providing a chance for the comparison of this work with one of the more sophisticated versions of another strand of critical thought influenced by Hegel; the Marxist tradition as it appears in Adorno's negative dialectics. The role of Nietzsche in Adorno's thought will be seen to provide the crucial difference between negative dialectics and the relation of contemporary French philosophy to dialectics.



Having outlined Hegel's account of the relations between identity, difference and opposition and having elucidated the versions of power and desire that this account represents, the responses of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Adorno will be examined. The antics of these philosophers 'at the limits' of thought and language, of philosophy and metaphysics, will thus be discussed in terms of a relation to the or a possible feminism. Such a discussion will also provide a sort of genealogy of the thinkers to be elucidated in chapters five, six and seven in that again it is Nietzsche, Heidegger and Hegel who are decisive for the positions that Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari adopt.

On the basis of this discussion of Heidegger and Adorno, then, chapters five, six and seven will elucidate the various Nietzschean operations performed by Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari upon the manifestations of identity in economy, power and desire. Recapitulating, repeating and developing, what was said in chapter two, these operations will be seen to be feminist in that they are concerned to show how feminist economy is 'domesticated' or reduced to form restricted or centred economy and to show how the work of the irreducibly different and thus threatening values that are excluded from the self-present identity of the privileged term in centred economy at once constitutes and subverts that identity.

Chapter eight will deal with more conventional or recognisably feminist concerns in order to show how the issues discussed in the preceding chapters manifest themselves in what might be called more concrete economies. The theoretical labours of Freud on female sexuality will be shown to be a version of phallogentric economy, involving the representation and constitution of a particular (phallogentric) disposition of power/desire. Gallop's reading and discussion of Lacan will be used to provide a link between the concerns of the previous chapters with identity, difference and opposition, those of this chapter and those of the following chapter with strategy.

Given all this, chapter nine will describe the various strategies that are available to the critique of the production of value. The possibility of a transgressive or critical discourse that is not rendered harmless and unproblematically assimilated by that which it attempts to critique will be discussed in this chapter in terms of the forms of strategy that follow a priori from the nature of economy. These various strategies' chances of success in transgressing and transforming the production of value, which has itself been seen to be a matter for feminism, will be evaluated in this chapter, also in terms of the nature of economy, in terms, that is, of the sorts of problems that a feminism worth the name would have to deal with.

The conclusion, chapter ten, will summarise the arguments of the essay and provide an account of the second sense of the 'possibility' of the subtitle. This second sense will be seen to relate to the possible uses of feminist strategy, as the essay has elucidated it, in other areas in which marginal groups are accorded supplementary status. The conclusion will also provide an account of the essay's own relation to a possible non-vulgar feminism by means of a discussion of the various differences or dichotomies in terms of which this work itself makes sense.

The next chapter will introduce the matter of economy as a relation between identity, difference and some form of opposition.

## CHAPTER TWO

### ECONOMY: IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE AND OPPOSITION

Looking at Saussure's account of economy, and at Derrida's account of Saussure, this chapter will introduce and establish the idea of economy as a matter of a relationship between identity, difference and opposition. The constitutive role(s) of power and desire in the production and legitimation of value will be introduced in terms of the apparent 'innocence' of Saussure's notion of the diacriticity of the linguistic sign. And the distinction, which will immediately have to be qualified, between centric or phallocentric and de- or ec- centric (feminist) economy, will be introduced by way of a discussion of the will to identity as a codification of power/disposition of desire.

That is, where the value of the sign is apparently generated in the de- or ec- centric economy of exchange or (pure) difference, it will be shown that there is ultimately a privileged term or value that is supposed to be outside that diacriticity and which, in sovereign fashion, governs the production of linguistic value. The position of the privileged term is, it will be shown, one of sovereign power and the result of a certain disposition of desire: Saussure's diacriticity is not at all innocent. This chapter will thus provide the basis

for the readings of Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Adorno in chapters three and four and for the recapitulation of the themes to be discussed in this chapter in chapters five, six and seven.

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However, before looking in more philosophical detail at the workings of economy and at the role(s) of power and desire in those workings, a brief excursion into various dictionaries will be made in order to show the etymological and semantic relations between economy, power and desire.

Of the many senses of 'value', the Oxford English Dictionary gives 'worth', 'desirability', 'purchasing power', 'equivalent' and, from biology, 'rank in classification'. It also refers, via the feminine past participle of the French valoir (to be worth) to the Latin valere. From the Oxford Latin Dictionary, it appears the the Romans had a better word for it, valere including among its senses 'to be strong or able', 'to have power', 'to prevail', 'to be worth', 'to mean' and 'to be valid'. Resisting for the moment the temptation to make much of the idea of some originary feminine past in which women were worthy, powerful and valid citizens which has been superceded by a present in which they are second class and non-participant citizens of little worth and power, it should be evident that what is

perhaps a surprising variety of ideas is involved in our word for value.

Apart from the more obvious tautologies entailed by saying that to be valued or valuable is to be worth something, it appears that to say to be powerful or authoritative and to be desired or desirable are also to say things that, if not quite the same, are at least very similar and closely related. The notion of value refers, then, to the constitution and satisfaction of desire and to the possession and exercise of power.

If, on the other hand, it is suggested that a concise definition of economy today would be that it is the organisation or structure of relations between individuals, institutions and practices by means of which value, in the form of goods (commodities) and services, is produced and distributed according to various fluctuating conditions of supply and demand, then it should come as less of a surprise to note that the Greek oikos nomos, from which 'economy' is derived, indicates the management of the household.

Oikos nomos thus refers to the complex of familial relations, involving the heads or elders of families, their wives, husbands and offspring, paid or unpaid domestic staff and so on. It also refers to the ways in which those members and their resources or abilities interrelate in the running of the household, in the deployment and expenditure of the family's accumulated wealth and according to

their various needs and desires.

In the word 'economy', then, there is reference to the possession and exercise of power - to the experience of dominance and subordination, that of the head of the household over the other members and their staff, for example. Within the oikos nomos, the relative rank of the members of the household is constituted and legitimated or made proper, then, in addition to the regulation of the order and preference of the household's needs and desires and the expenditure of its resources and property. So, positions of relative power are determined in the oikos nomos, as are equivalences, properties and whose word is meaningful or valid since they are positions of power that determine who owns what, who can do what and whose word is authoritative.

Similarly, insofar as the household's needs and desires are catered for by means of the oikos nomos, (they are determined, in a sense constituted, by the family income and they are satisfied by decisions taken by those in authority as to what to buy and what not to buy), then desire is also part of the oikos nomos. It might also be said that desire is a constitutive part of economy insofar as certain sexual relations are constituted, prohibited or approved, by means of the organisation of the family. For example, incestuous desire is usually rigorously prohibited, for whatever reason, and the approval of those in authority, the heads of the family, may be necessary in order that a marriage take

place. The situation here is especially complicated if that marriage is of strategic importance to the social, political or economic status, (the power or value), of the family.

Without claiming to have discovered an original and thus authentic sense of economy, this discussion has introduced many of the ideas that the following chapters will take up. Moreover, it has introduced them as being fundamentally interrelated, as forming their own version of oikos nomos. Those interrelations will be summarised before looking again at the themes that have been thus introduced.

It can be seen that, even on semantic and etymological levels, economy, power and desire are intimately related. The sense of oikos nomos as the proper management or governance of the household's wealth and property refers to positions and relations of power and desire. And the sense of value as 'to prevail' or 'to be strong' is produced within a context of what is usually thought of as economy, a matter of value and wealth. So, value, as that which is worth something and to be desired, like economy, as that within which value is produced, refers to positions and relations of power and to the prohibition and satisfaction of desire. Indeed, it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate and keep apart the senses of value and economy as involving worth and the senses of power and desire as involving authority and need.



So, in introducing power and desire into the production and legitimation of value and in explicating economy as the management of the household's property, this discussion has situated some of the matters with which the following chapters will deal. More generally, it reflects what Aristotle, Nietzsche and Deleuze have said, in their various ways, about 'man' and locates those statements in the context of power and desire. And, more specifically, it introduces the concerns of the thinkers to be dealt with later as relevant to the matter of economy.

That is, Aristotle calls man 'the economic animal'. Presumably he intends to say something about the family and its importance in human life. And the discussion above concerning the notions involved in the oikos nomos locates those notions as matters of great significance for human values and being. Nietzsche, similarly, asserts that man is the evaluating animal 'as such'<sup>1</sup>: he is claiming, that is, that the activities of valuing, evaluating, calculating and measuring are constitutive of the creatures that we are. The discussion of the oikos nomos locates those activities within the realm of the household.

Deleuze, finally, completes the trio by saying that 'evaluations, in essence, are not values but ways of being, modes of existence of those who judge and calculate'<sup>2</sup>. Not only is human being

fundamentally involved with valuation and calculation, then, but the entire sphere in which these involvements occur is traversed by the workings of power and desire. Supposedly mundane matters like the management of the household, the affairs of daily life, affect and are affected by what have been considered to be the most remote of philosophical concerns.

The next section will introduce and begin to elucidate the idea of economy as the workings of identity, difference and opposition by looking at Saussure's account of linguistic value or identity.

### Economy and Saussure

In chapter three of part one of the Course in General Linguistics, Saussure is concerned with the distinction between static or synchronic and evolutionary or diachronic linguistics. 'Most other sciences', he says, 'are unaffected by this radical duality'<sup>3</sup>: sciences such as law, politics, and astronomy can get along without making this distinction. However, the 'economic sciences', the most obvious of which is economics itself, have this duality 'forced upon them'. Political economy and political history, for example, 'constitute two clearly separated disciplines within a single science'<sup>4</sup>. Moreover, economists have not simply decided to divide their science thus; in pursuing these two disciplines separately, economists are 'obeying an inner

necessity'<sup>5</sup>. This necessity, Saussure says, also 'obliges ... linguists ... to divide linguistics into two parts'<sup>6</sup> because linguistics, like economics, is 'confronted with the notion of value: both sciences are concerned with a system for equating things of different orders - labour and wages in one and a signified and signifier in the other'<sup>7</sup>.

Saussure thus conceives of language as an economy and of linguistics as one of the economic sciences. In order to explain the idea of an economy as a relationship between identity, difference and some form of opposition, Saussure's account of la langue will be examined.

Within the account to be given of la langue, the nature of the linguistic sign plays an essential role. Within this account<sup>8</sup>, 'sign' designates a whole. That whole consists in the unity of concept and sound-image. The concept is the signified and the sound-image the signifier. It is the bond between the signified and the signifier that is said to be arbitrary. That is, there is no natural law or reason to determine that any particular signifier or sound-image should stand for or signify any particular signified.

Because of the arbitrary nature of the sign, because there is no natural law or reason to determine which signifier signify which signified, and because, therefore, each sign is what it is only

in relation to, in its place in, the whole system of signs that are different from it, Saussure argues that a distinction be made and maintained between what are called synchronic and diachronic linguistics. The distinction between the two may be conceived as that between the 'axis of simultaneities', which 'stands for the relations of co-existing things and from which the intervention of time is excluded', and the 'axis of successions', 'on which are located all the things on the first axis along with their changes'<sup>9</sup>.

This distinction must be maintained because 'language is a system of pure values which are determined by nothing except the momentary arrangement of its terms'<sup>10</sup>. That is, since there is no natural connection between signifier and signified, the value or identity of the sign is a function or product of the differences between it and all other signs. The relevant or proper signs by means of which any one sign is defined at any one time are those which are effective or operative to the language users at that time. As Saussure says, 'the speaker is confronted with a state'<sup>11</sup>. What is significant to a speaker is the system of relations and differences constitutive of the value of the signs that go to make up the language state at any one time. La langue, then, is 'a system whose parts can and must be considered in their synchronic solidarity'<sup>12</sup>.

The synchronic analysis of the

momentary arrangement of the terms of a language consists, for Saussure, in accounting for the two sorts of relations in which a sign may exist with regard to all other signs. If 'there are only differences, without positive terms' in a language state<sup>13</sup>, and consequently 'everything is based on relations'<sup>14</sup>, then there are two sorts of relations, two sorts of difference of which the value or identity of the sign is a function. As Saussure says, 'relations and differences between linguistic terms fall into two distinct groups, each of which generates a certain class of values'<sup>15</sup>. The two sorts of differences or relations of which linguistic value or identity is a function are 'syntagmatic' and what will henceforth and as is conventional be referred to as 'paradigmatic' relations.

Basically, syntagmatic relations concern the ways in which linguistic elements, whether phonemes, morphemes or sentences<sup>16</sup> may combine with other elements and paradigmatic relations are those which concern the ways in which elements 'oppose' one another, where the presence of one precludes the presence of another. For example, 'the phoneme /p/ in English is defined both by its opposition to other phonemes which could replace it in contexts such as /-et/, (Cf. bet, let, met, net, set), and by its combinatory relations with other phonemes', 'it can precede or follow any vowel; within a syllable, the liquids /l/ and /r/ are the only consonants that can

follow it and /s/ the only one that can precede it'<sup>17</sup>. Another example would be that of a menu, where roast chicken would be eaten after the soup but before the sweet. Combinatorial relations (syntagmatic relations) would account for the value of the chicken as coming before and not after the sweet and paradigmatic relations would account for the chicken being eaten as an alternative to, rather than with, roast beef.

These various ways in which linguistic elements at all levels differ, oppose and relate to one another and so come to have the value that they in fact have may be given the generic title of a diacriticity or play of differences. On the one hand, the meaning or identity of the term 'bed' is the function of its differential relations or opposition to other terms such as 'bad', 'bet' and so on. And on the other by its place in syntagmatic relations with 'flower', 'double' and so on. These shifting oppositions and relations to other linguistic terms by means of which a term acquires the value that it has, then, will be referred to as a diacriticity. Insofar as Saussure claims 'that the entire linguistic system can be reduced to and explained in terms of a theory of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations'<sup>18</sup> then the whole linguistic system may be referred to as a diacriticity or play of differences.

Thus, basically, does Saussure account for the production of value in the economy of language. And thus is the idea of economy established

as a matter of a relationship between identity, difference and opposition. Having described linguistics as one of the 'economic sciences'<sup>19</sup>, Saussure says that 'in semiological systems like language ... the notion of identity blends with that of value and vice versa'<sup>20</sup>. The value or identity of the linguistic sign being defined by the oppositive, diacritical relations in which it stands to all other signs, Saussure is saying that, in the economy of language, value, identity and meaning are a function of difference and some form of opposition. Those differences and oppositions are the syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations in which a term stands to all other terms.

The next section will deal with Derrida's reading of Saussure in order to establish the nature and validity of the distinction between centric and de- or ec- centric economy. This distinction will be established as that between phallogentric and, for the reasons noted in the introduction, 'feminist' economy. Having elucidated this distinction, it will be possible to begin the introduction of power and desire into the workings of economy and thus complete the introduction to the thought of identity, difference and opposition as the thought of the production and legitimation of value, meaning and identity.

### Economy and Derrida

In Positions, Derrida says that 'difference is the economical concept and since there is no

economy without difference, it is the most general structure of economy'<sup>21</sup>. He also says that what he calls metaphysics amounts to 'a subordination of the movement of difference in favour of a value or meaning supposedly antecedent to difference, more original than it ... governing it in the last analysis'<sup>22</sup>. Where metaphysics posits the presence of a value or meaning as the source or origin of other values, Derrida attempts to indicate the work of the economy of difference, 'the non-full, non-simple "origin" ... the structured and differing "origin" '<sup>23</sup>, as the 'absolute production and destruction of value'<sup>24</sup>.

Difference is the absolute production of value in that it is the endless and de- or ec-centric interplay of oppositions in which elements relate and refer to one another and by means of which their value or meaning is generated. Insofar as difference may be conceived, for Derrida says that it is not a concept<sup>25</sup>, it may be 'conceived' as a radicalised and generalised version of the diacritic by means of which Saussure holds that the value of the linguistic sign is produced. As the 'non-full, non-simple "origin" ... of differences', it is productive of the differences by means of which elements relate to one another and so come to have the value that they have<sup>26</sup>.

On the other hand, it is the absolute destruction of value in that it would defer and postpone<sup>27</sup> the presence of any value or meaning that



metaphysics might appeal to as the source or origin of value. It would show that the value which Derrida calls the transcendental signified<sup>28</sup> or centre<sup>29</sup>, as supposed source of value, was always already inhabited by absence and was already itself part of an infinite play of deferring and differentiating relations to other, absent, terms from which its value derived. Where metaphysics posits a centre that is supposedly antecedent to the play of opposite relations from which value is generated, Derrida's task is that of showing that that apparently self-present identity was already the result of those relations and, as such, would be destroyed or deferred infinitely.

'Coming before' the conceptual oppositions of which language is built, difference is the 'structured and differing' origin of differences and thus of those conceptual oppositions. As structured, difference is the absolute production of value or identity since it is the play of oppositions which, as seen in Saussure, produces the value or identity of a particular term. As differing, it is the absolute destruction of value since it defers and postpones any full and simply present element in relation in relation to which another element could be said to have value. Insofar as the economy of difference is not 'governed by'<sup>30</sup> but would rather destroy the self-present identity of the centre posited by metaphysics as the source of value, it may be called de- or ec- centric economy.

Thus an identity or value only acquires its value or identity in the economy of difference. At the same time, however<sup>31</sup>, that value or identity is subverted or postponed. It is the relation to the other, to what is different and never present, that both constitutes and subverts value and identity in the economy of difference. Derrida's name for the relation to the absent is 'trace'; the trace 'marks the relationship with the other'<sup>32</sup>.

In this sense, the economy of difference is an 'economy of traces'<sup>33</sup>. The trace, however, is neither a thing nor the trace of anything: like difference, it must be thought before the thing. The trace, then, is the relationship with what is absent, with that which is not and can never be present and which must be related to in its absence in order for anything to be, to have the value that it has. If it is the relation to the other, to what is different, that generates the value and identity of an element, then that relation also postpones and subverts that identity and value. The trace also marks the disappearance of value and identity in that there can never be a simple presence for an element to be opposed to in the 'systematic play of differences, of traces of differences ... by means of which elements are related to one another'<sup>34</sup>.

In the economy of difference, then, what is referred to as identity and value is at once produced and destroyed. Identity and value are

produced and destroyed in such a way, moreover, that the value and identity of terms like 'produce' and 'destroy', 'structured' and 'differing', used to describe it, are themselves put into question. They become 'undecidable', as Derrida has it. The play of oppositions between different terms in the economy of difference thus produces undecidable 'identities' and 'values'.

This economy, which produces values that are strictly undecidable, their value both produced and destroyed, and which will later be explicated as non-vulgarly feminist economy, may be called de- or ec- centric. It is both de- centring and ec- centric with regard to centric economy. It would de- centre or, as Derrida has it, deconstruct centric economy by illustrating how the supposedly self-present and self-identical value of the transcendental signified was deferred and postponed by its relations to all other terms. And it is ec- centric with regard to centric economy; as illustrative of the production and destruction of value and identity, it would not behave 'properly', as would centric economy. So long as this is understood and to avoid what is perhaps an awkward construction, de- or ec- centric economy will henceforth be referred to simply as ec- centric economy.

Reference has been made, as perhaps it must, given that identity and value are the product

of some form of opposition, to the opposite or other of ec- centric economy. What is referred to as metaphysics or centric economy and the nature of the opposition in which it stands to difference must now be elucidated.

On the most general level, Derrida holds metaphysics to be the 'exigent, powerful, systematic and irrepressible desire for a transcendental signified',<sup>35</sup>. It is the desire for the 'subordination of the movement of difference in favour of the presence of a meaning or value supposedly antecedent to it',<sup>36</sup>. It could be said that metaphysics is indicative of a certain 'anxiety',<sup>37</sup> in the face of difference and the lack of full and simple origins that it entails. It is indicative of the desire to posit or possess some such source in order that the ec- centric free-play<sup>38</sup> of the economy of difference be curtailed and seen to issue from some stable and present source.

Supposedly antecedent to the economy of difference, the centre is held to provide a stable and fully present identity, the value of which is not produced through its relations to other not simply present values. The centre or transcendental signified is thus a privileged term that has been set apart from or outside the play of oppositional relations that would ultimately both produce and destroy its value. This centre which is thus held to be outside the ec- centric economy of difference has at least two functions.

First, it is supposed to 'master', 'neutralise' or 'reduce',<sup>39</sup> the economy of difference. The economy of difference is 'neutralised or reduced ... by ... giving it a fixed centre or referring it to a point of presence, a fixed origin',<sup>40</sup>. Thus the centre puts an end to the endless referral and deferral of difference. And second, the centre is to 'orient, balance and organise' the economy that is established by the curtailing of difference<sup>41</sup>. As such an entity, the centre provides some organising or governing principle in relation to which the other elements in the economy are said to have the value they have. In this sense, the centre is set up and privileged as being outside the differential relations that would at once produce and destroy identity and value. Thus it is held to be a stable and self-present identity that is the origin of value.

So metaphysical economy is a centred economy, an economy governed by a privileged term or value that is held to be beyond or immune to the shifting network of relations that are at once productive and destructive of value and identity. A centred economy is one in which the production of value is held to follow from a relation to the centre, a term the value of which is held to be defined solely in terms of itself. As such, the centre is a sort of sovereign or absolute value, the same as itself, and the economy it is said to govern may be said, therefore, to be based upon the logic of identity.

identity.

Given this description of difference and of what metaphysics consists in and did it not itself constitute a distinction that would signal the subordination of ec- centric to centric economy, it could be said that one aspect of centred economy was that it involved the occlusion of the 'real workings' of the production of value. That is, insofar as difference is the absolute production and destruction of value, and insofar as the centre involves the subordination of that economic process to the self-present identity of a term held to be outside that process, then it could be said that the centre is set up in the place of difference, to occlude its workings and appear as the absolute origin and measure of value.

The economy of difference, 'the systematic play of differences, of the traces of differences'<sup>42</sup>, like the trace itself, 'is necessarily occulted, it produces itself as self-occultation'<sup>43</sup>. In thus not being present, in its effacement or absence<sup>44</sup>, the play of differences provides the condition for centred economy, for the production of value. So, the non-full, non-simple 'origins' of the value or identity of the centre, as it has been produced in the economy of difference, are occluded and forgotten in the subordination of ec- centric economy to centric economy.

In this way, the two functions of the

centre, mastering and neutralising difference on the one hand, and orienting the economy that results on the other, correspond to the way in which the origins of the centre in difference and that term's differential relations to all other terms are occluded. Thus the metaphysical economy appears and is experienced as one in which the production of value is accomplished by virtue of a relation to the identity or value of the centre.

However, as Derrida says, metaphysics does not 'merely set up value oppositions around an ideal ... limit'<sup>45</sup>, it also subordinates those values to each other. In a given economy, there will be found such oppositions/subordinations as 'normal/abnormal, standard/parasite, fulfilled/void, serious/non-serious, literal/non-literal' and these reduce to a basic opposition/subordination - 'positive/negative and ideal/non-ideal'<sup>46</sup>. That is, while all the values produced and distributed within centred economy are held to be what they are by virtue of their relation to the centre, there are various terms that are held to be supplementary, to be secondary and thus subordinate to the others.

It is 'of the nature' of the sort of opposition to be found in centric economy, then, that that opposition 'also' establishes relations of dominance and subordination among the elements of that economy. The oppositional or differential relation is such that the second term in the various dichotomies (some of which were noted above) is conceived

as a threat to what is held to be the value and self-identity of the first. Thus, if the value of 'the serious' is produced by relation to the centre, which could be logos, if it is held to enjoy a privileged relation to that centre, then those values which are not 'of the order' of the centre, which consist in a threat to its self-identity, will be opposed to the centre and to the privileged term in such a way that they will be treated as secondary and supplementary.

So where, for example, the phallus is the centre of an economy, where the phallus is supposedly beyond the diacritical play of sexual differences and oppositions and thus a 'pure' and self-identical value, those values which are solidary with the value of the phallus, phallomorphic values, will be privileged in sexual economy. Those which are not of the order of the phallus will be considered a threat to that centre and held to be secondary or supplementary values.

Thus the dichotomy or opposition male/female is one of dominance/subordinance: no-one has a phallus, even the best of men only has a penis, but the penis is phallomorphic and is thus privileged over the female with regard to the phallus. It is dominant with regard to the absence of the penis, with regard to the female and gynomorphic values. In this way, the feminine is conceived as a threat to the self-presence and self-identity of the penis, the feminine is secondary, supplementary, not as good



and in need of something with regard to the phallus and phallomorphic values.

Derrida sums up the situation by saying that 'all metaphysicians, from Plato to ... Husserl, have proceeded in this way, conceiving good before evil, the positive before the negative, the pure before the impure ... etc'<sup>47</sup>. In the reduction or mastering of ec- centric economy by centric economy, difference and opposition are so ordered that the terms of centred economy are placed in positions of dominance and subordination. The opposition, of dominant and subordinate values, is set up in terms of the relation to the centre: dominant values are privileged because of their proximity to the centre and subordinate values are said to be supplementary because they consist in a lack of, or distance from, that privileged term and as such constitute a threat to it.

Finally, with regard to this notion of supplementary value within centric economy, it should be noted that, as supplementary, Derrida considers those values which are not of the order of the centre to be 'limited'. The opposition of dichotomous terms within centric economy is an opposition of dominant and subordinate forces and it seems that the subordinate force is limited, overcome or overpowered, by the dominant one. Moreover, Derrida says that the supplementary term is limited 'for motivations and relations of force [which are] yet to be

analysed'<sup>48</sup>. So, and as is to be expected, not only does centric economy consist in an organisation of power and desire but the movement from and occlusion of ec- centric economy is itself also the result of the workings of power and desire.

These, then, are some of the major aspects of economy to be found in the work of Derrida, of the ec- centric economy of difference and of the subordination of that economy to centric economy or metaphysics. Derrida describes the operation whereby difference is reduced as being performed by 'man as that being who, throughout the history of metaphysics, ... has dreamed of the full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin'<sup>49</sup>. This description of the desire to master the anxiety engendered by the lack of a full, simple origin of value, however, raises explicitly a point that is significant for this essay and which should be emphasised.

It is that, following Nietzsche, Derrida calls the play of difference, as both the production and destruction of value, the feminine operation<sup>50</sup>. Similarly, he calls the setting up and workings of centred economy the masculine operation<sup>51</sup>. That is, at the 'moment' a transcendental signified is set up to order the various differences and regulate the production of value, any number of other centres are set up to organise differences in other areas. The operation is the 'same' in all these areas. As Derrida says, 'it is one and the same system: the

erection of a paternal logos'<sup>52</sup>. For these reasons, the desire for mastery may be said to be born of 'the apotropaic anxiety'<sup>53</sup> at or over the lack of simple origins.

If, as Derrida says, difference is both the general structure and some sort of condition for economy<sup>54</sup>, and if the reduction of ec- centric economy involves 'motivations and relations of force'<sup>55</sup>, then not only is that reduction a 'sexual operation, but before it there was no sexuality'<sup>56</sup>. To reduce ec- centric economy to centred economy, of which sexuality is an example, is to decide what is properly sexual, as opposed to what is not sexual, and to decide the values or identities that have been constituted within that economy. An example of such a reduction and of the exposure of that reduction would be Freud's 'demonstration' that children, who were supposed to be eminently non-sexual beings, were actually part of sexual economy. There was no sexuality, in the sense in which it is 'familiar' from within centred economy, before the operation that reduces ec- centric economy to centric economy because the ec- centric economy of difference would both produce and destroy the identity of whatever it was that was held to be properly sexual.

'Before' the reduction of ec- centric economy to centric economy, everything and nothing was properly sexual: identities and differences, motivations and forces, among which what are, in

centred sexual economy, called sexual identities, differences and so on, are to be found in ec- centric economy but precisely not as organised in centred economy, in relation to a privileged value. As such, the identities, differences, motivations and forces of ec- centric economy are organised, their value as either sexual or non-sexual, for example, is decided, via the reduction to centred economy, in terms of the relation to the centre.

In this sense, then, the movement from ec- centric economy to centric economy is a sexual operation that institutes sexuality. The identities, differences, motivations and forces that are referred to in centred economy as sexual 'exist' 'before' the reduction to centric economy but not as they are organised or referred to in centric economy. Thus the operation is sexual in a non-vulgar sense, a sense that is not that which is familiar from the organisation of sexuality in centred economy.

This operation corresponds to a disposition or organisation of desire that is satisfied by means of various relations of force in terms of which identities and differences are produced and either privileged or subordinated in centric economy. These dispositions of motivation and force are themselves organised in relation to the centre of the centred economy that results to appear and be experienced as desire and power. Ec- centric economy, which is 'constituted' by relations between identity,

difference and opposition and which involves motivations and relations of force, is mastered by a particular disposition of force that is motivated by a particular disposition of desire to form centred economy. In that centred economy, those identities, differences, motivations and forces are organised or 'oriented' in terms of the centre.

As a sexual operation, the reduction of the economy of difference to centred economy is called masculine in what should, (for the sake of strategy, in no sense properly), be referred to as a vulgar sense. This is because difference, as the absolute production and destruction of value and identity, would defer and postpone all attempts to provide or ascribe a proper sense or identity. It would preclude the possibility of identifying an operation or term as properly masculine or feminine. The vulgar sense of masculine is that which is usual, the value of which has itself been produced in centric economy which involves the privileging of an identity, the centre, in terms of which all other terms are held to have the value that they have.

Similarly, as a sexual operation, the effects of difference are termed the feminine operation in what must be taken as a non-vulgar sense. The feminine as it indicates the subversive and identity-disrupting work of difference is to be understood in a non-vulgar sense in the same way and for the same reasons as écriture in Of Grammatology is

intended in a non-vulgar sense<sup>57</sup>. Where écriture is not writing in the sense in which the logocentric tradition identifies and values it, but is rather the 'writing' that is 'interior' to 'speech', so the 'feminine' operation is not the identity and value that the phallogentric tradition has generated. It is rather an operation that would show the disruptive undecidable within what is supposed to be a self-identity and from which it was supposed to have been excluded.

Among the dichotomous or oppositional values that are governed by what is experienced as the absolute value of the phallus in phallogentric economy, are reason/emotion and logic/intuition. Vulgar masculinity is privileged, through the possession of the penis, with regard to the phallus and phallogentric values. Vulgar masculinity thus enjoys a position of dominance over vulgar femininity which, lacking the penis, (and thus representing a threat, the possibility of its absence), is considered secondary or supplementary. Thus within phallogentric economy, vulgar masculinity is said to be reasonable, logical and so on, and vulgar femininity either has to be similarly reasonable, (it has to be like masculinity), or it is condemned as concerned with the unreasonable, the emotional - secondary or supplementary values.

Insofar as vulgar masculinity has been associated with reason and logic, for example, and

insofar as reason and logic are classically based upon the principle of identity, from which the laws of thought are held to follow, then the reduction of ec- centric economy to centric economy, (of an economy which would subvert identity to one which privileges a particular identity as source of value), is termed the vulgar masculine operation.

And insofar as the value and identity of non-vulgar femininity would not be produced in terms of one or other of the dichotomous poles of phallogentric economy that are governed by the relation to the phallus, (and hence either masculine or supplementary), but would, rather, be undecidable in terms of them, then the effects of the economy of difference may be termed the non-vulgarly feminine operation.

The disruptive and subversive effects of ec- centric economy are thus termed the non-vulgarly feminine 'concern', as are the versions of power and desire to be found there. That is, if difference is a difference and opposition of forces, then the sort of difference and forces to be found there, and the sort of opposition between those forces, are termed feminine or feminist in a non-vulgar sense since they are not governed by the relation to the centre as they are in centred economy. On the other hand, the relations between identity, difference and opposition and the parts played in those relations by power and desire, as they are found in centred economy, are called phallogentric or masculine since, as has been seen, vulgar masculinity is

associated with the devices of reason and logic and these devices themselves privilege the value of identity. Insofar as the economy of difference does not 'answer to',<sup>58</sup> phallocentrism but rather both produces and destroys values and identities, it is called feminine or feminist in a non-vulgar sense.

These arguments may be conceived as a generalised version of those Derrida employs in Spurs/Éperons. Where he is concerned with the fairly specific effects of castration in the texts of Nietzsche, Heidegger and, to a slightly lesser extent, of Freud, this chapter is concerned with what might be called a generalised version of a relation to castration. That is, Derrida is concerned with the phallus as centre or transcendental signified and the relation of various women or texts to that centre. This chapter is concerned with a more generalised version of the centre and the relation of marginal groups in general to that centre.

It was noted in chapter one that the privilege accorded self-identity and self-presence was not only the vulgar masculine operation, but also a white and bourgeois affair, for example. Thus this chapter is concerned with a castration that involves a relation to the transcendental signified where that transcendental signified is conceived as being solidary with all those interests. It may therefore be read as offering an account of a generalised relation to the centre where that centre



cannot simply be termed the phallus since it also involves reference to other, (all), positions of privilege/supplementarity or centrality/marginality.

In this sense, 'castration' refers to the relation of any element or term to the values solidary with the transcendental signified and the chapter provides an illustration of what Derrida intends but does not spell out when he says that the move to centred economy organises the whole of symbolic exchange in general<sup>59</sup>

However, as Culler, for example, has argued, it is no longer clear what is meant when the terms 'feminine' or 'female' are used - such terms do not appear to refer to what he calls 'actual human beings'<sup>60</sup>. And, without glibly asserting that such a 'confusion of identity' is so much the better, some attempt ought to be made to articulate the relation between the sorts of concern and operation that have been termed 'feminine' so far and the concrete, political affairs of 'actual human beings'. This chapter must begin the task of elucidating what Derrida has called the 'gap' between 'work on or against the institution' and 'the most advanced version of philosophical deconstruction'<sup>61</sup>.

It might be thought, then, that, as they are employed here, the terms 'feminine' and 'woman' do not and cannot refer to 'actual human beings' but are rather perhaps textual effects produced within a version of philosophical deconstruction. Work on

or against the institution, involving individual human subjects who have some idea what they are trying to do by that work, seems to belong simply to centred economy, privileging identity and having recourse to a transcendental signified. And philosophical deconstruction might be thought to simply postpone all manifestations of identity, leaving only the confusion as to what was meant by such terms as 'feminine' noted above.

Such, however, would be to forget the work of ec- centric economy. Ec- centric economy, difference, was said to both produce and destroy the value of a term. The moment of production is no less a part of this 'feminine' economy than the deferral of that value. If it is to account for the workings of ec- centric economy, a philosophical deconstruction would have to have recourse to identity or an identical subject at some point. Thus Derrida says, for example, that he does not try to destroy the subject, he merely tries to situate it, to account for where it has come from. He says, then, that the transcendental signified is indispensable and that 'the subject is absolutely indispensable'<sup>62</sup>.

That is, work against the institution, which involves a telos, a subject and so on, is a necessary moment of a philosophical deconstruction that would account for the value and identity of a term. So the work of 'actual human beings', of women, for example, as both produced and destroyed, is

a necessary moment in what has been presented as the non-vulgarly feminist concern, ec- centric economy. And so, far from not referring to the concrete struggles of actual women, what has been presented as non-vulgarly feminine includes those concrete struggles. It is, precisely, the treatment of this gap or difference, (whether it is treated as opposition or contradiction or, as here, as difference), that will in turn be seen to both preclude and permit the distinction between vulgar and non-vulgar feminism in chapter nine. The question of a telos such as liberation will also be dealt with in this chapter.

Having introduced the distinction between metaphysical and ec- centric economy, that distinction must now be qualified: it begins to appear as if the difference and opposition between the two is itself metaphysical or phallogentric. There are, that is, a number of reasons as to why the difference cannot be presented as being easily accomplished and upheld in any simple form, as the chapter has suggested so far.

Firstly, it is not a matter of opposing centric economy to ec- centric economy because, as Derrida says, there is no sense in doing away with the logic, syntax and categories which are constitutive of metaphysics<sup>63</sup>. Metaphysics is not something like a pathological condition or a historico-philo-

sophical error which it would be possible to cure or correct once and for all. Far from being a 'historical contingency',<sup>64</sup> the privileging of self-identity and self-presence is said to have a 'founding value',<sup>65</sup> and the movement from ec- centric to centric economy is a 'necessary ... movement and structure',<sup>66</sup>. This movement is necessary to the movement to philosophy and, if the centreless structure represents the 'un-thinkable itself',<sup>67</sup>, then it is necessary to thought itself.

Secondly, and for this reason, metaphysical presuppositions and critical motifs are said to coexist within the same text and even within the same proposition<sup>68</sup>, even critical propositions must borrow the logic, categories, syntax and so on of the economy they are trying to critique and transgress. So, for example, for all the promise of not being simply enveloped in an unproblematically metaphysical economy that the work of Husserl affords, in his insights into the constitutive roles of the non-presences of future and past in the present, metaphysical elements can still be seen to inhabit his text in the guise of the full, simple present he requires for the account of primordial dator intuitions to do the work he wants it to do.

Thus, as Derrida says in Spurs/Éperons, if the form of opposition to metaphysics is itself metaphysical, then 'the relation of metaphysics to its other can no longer be one of opposition',<sup>69</sup>.

The nature of opposition and the significance of these remarks will become more apparent in the following chapters and their implications for critical or transgressive practice, feminism, will be made more explicit in chapters five through to eight. However, these remarks should be emphasised and born in mind despite the essay's continuing to talk, for the sake of strategy, as if centric and ec- centric economy could be clearly and simply differentiated and opposed.

One consequence of all this may be seen as a development of something Spivak has noted. She suggests<sup>70</sup> that philosophy must now be conceived as a form of housework. That is, there is no way of avoiding contact with, and therefore contamination by, the logic, concepts and syntax that are to be dealt with as metaphysical. And, in that critical and metaphysical motifs coexist even in the same statement, there could be no final point at which it could be said that metaphysics had been ended or escaped from. Philosophy, indeed any discourse that attempted to be critical or transgressive, as housework, entails getting one's hands dirty and is never finished.

The difference between this conception and others like it of the nature of critical activity, those of Locke or Kant, for example, is that this is no longer what might be called a reactive conception. Locke's view of philosophy as the under-labourer to the master-builder, science, and Kant's of his critical efforts as preparing the ground for

the construction of the royal road to science are both reactive in that they conceive science as the realm of decidable, conclusive issues, something that philosophy can properly prepare for but not achieve itself. This view would have it that, as the engineer is but a privileged bricoleur, so science is but over-privileged philosophy. That is, the view to be proposed here is that science, too, deals with issues and objects which, were it not for the occlusion of the undecidable, would be recognised as such.

As a result, it is not by chance that those philosophies which make reference to the essentially finite nature of issues, those which consider it possible, for example, to clarify once and for all the meaning and usage of a word, are those which privilege the role of logical, reasonable, devices. Those philosophies share the vulgarly masculine trait of privileging the potentially concludable nature of philosophical tasks using logic and reason. This sort of philosophy is part of what Gallop will be seen later to call the man's man's domain - the realm of serious and frank discussion that has a clearly definable and finite task.

Such a conception of philosophical activity, solidary with the concerns and values of the wider society, has contributed to the denigration of such supposedly trivial, feminine, tasks and concerns as housework. Housework, like philosophy on Locke's

and Kant's accounts, for example, has been presented as supplementary to the important business, be that important business the scientific elucidation of nature or the production of surplus value. Oikos nomos in the sense of the management of the household has been subordinated to oikos nomos in the sense of the production of commodities. And this move is a vulgarly masculine move, solidary with the values of self-presence and self-identity that are privileged in logical, finite and decidable reasoning.

However, the Conference of Socialist Economists' essay, "Women's Domestic Labour"<sup>71</sup>, is instructive on at least two counts here. The essay concerns 'the relation of domestic labour to the expansion of surplus value'<sup>72</sup>. The Conference argues that domestic labour or housework, performed mainly by women and economically undervalued, actually plays a crucial role. The claim is that domestic labour is 'essential for the reproduction of the capitalist system'<sup>73</sup> and, more significantly, that 'the relation of domestic labour to the production of surplus value is simply that the former makes the latter possible'<sup>74</sup>.

There are at least two closely related moves illustrated here, both of which are important for this essay. First, the CSE is saying that a form of labour that has been considered to be of supplementary status is essential to the existence and maintenance of the form of labour that the vulgarly masculine concern has privileged. And second, it is

saying that oikos nomos, in the form of the management of the household, along with the corollary relations of power and desire, has a constitutive role to play in the economic production from which it has hitherto been excluded.

That is, where vulgarly masculine economics has represented housework as exterior and secondary to the production of surplus value, the CSE shows that it plays a constitutive role in that production. Thus oikos nomos, as management of the household, along with the relations of power and desire that it entails, is essentially a part of the production of surplus value. Such a move will be seen again later, from a different tradition, in the discussion of Deleuze and Guattari in chapter seven.

This chapter, too, would argue that the supposedly supplementary activities which are associated with the feminine, housework, are, when seen in their philosophical guise, rather the stuff of which philosophy is made. This chapter argues, then, that philosophy as housework, when it is conceived non-vulgarly, is essential to what has been presented as the real work of the sciences and that the value of these activities is, following Derrida's account of writing, undecidable: philosophy as housework is feminist in a non-vulgar, non-reactive sense.

Thus the view of philosophical activity proposed in this essay is not reactive in that, in proposing a critical or transgressive discourse as



housework, it is not advocating a role that is secondary to that of the sciences. Nor is it suggesting that the hitherto subordinate practices associated with housework are simply to be taken over and privileged. These latter would be reactive and part of vulgarly masculine economy in that their meaning and value would derive from the position and role of the sciences in the first place and from a simple reversal in the second. Rather, the tactic proposed here would invaginate the relationship between the two: it would show how the supposedly inferior devices associated with housework, and philosophy as housework, are interior to those of science. It would, then, no longer be possible, as it is in phallogentric economy, to decide which was science and which was housework in the same way that the bri-colour and the engineer are ultimately undecidable.

### Derrida and Saussure

Given all this, Derrida refers to a 'tension' in Saussure's work<sup>75</sup>. This tension could be explicated in terms of what might be called the 'closet feminism' of the work on anagrams<sup>76</sup>, or the 'repressed feminism' of the Course. Amounting to much the same, the tension that Derrida refers to will be dealt with here as that between ec-centric and centric economy, between difference and the account of linguistic value that is provided by Saussure. So, if, as Derrida says elsewhere, there

are no concepts or operations metaphysical in themselves<sup>77</sup>, but that it is rather as if a veil passes between a text and itself<sup>78</sup>, this section will begin to account for the movements of the veil that passes between the work of ec- centric and centric economy in Saussure's Course.

At 'first sight', Saussure's account of the economy in which linguistic value is produced does not appear to be part of or descriptive of centric economy. The sorts of differences and relations that Saussure describes as being productive of linguistic value do not appear to be those that were described in the account of centric economy. Hence it will be necessary to critique or supplement Saussure's account to show how it is in this case that ec- centric economy produces itself as its own self-occlusion. On the other hand, in showing how what appears to be an entirely diacritical account of the production of value ultimately involves the role or rule of a centre, this section will be showing how that role/rule has been occluded.

These issues will be illustrated by looking again at the example which was used above to demonstrate the differences between syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations. It will be seen that the account of the production of value or meaning is essentially incomplete and needs supplementing with reference to a centre that ultimately involves the government of the economy in which linguistic

value is produced. Insofar as the account is incomplete, the role/rule of the centre and the workings of ec- centric economy may be said to have been oc- cluded.

It was noted above that the value or identity of 'the phoneme /p/ in English' was gener- ated or 'defined by its opposition to other phon- emes that could replace it in contexts such as /-et/ ... and by its combinatory relations with other phonemes',<sup>79</sup>. Such an account of the value or mean- ing of an element is incomplete and needs supplemen- ting with reference to a centre, a term the value of which is not defined by the relations it governs. The value in this case, which is not presented as a function of difference and opposition, is 'the Eng- lish language'.

Only, that is, on the proviso that the example concerns the English language can it be said that these particular relations govern the value of the phoneme /p/. Insofar as the possibility exists that there are other languages that do not, for exam- ple, distinguish the phoneme /p/ from the phonemes /b/ or /d/, for example, and which may 'allow' it to precede liquids other than /l/ and /r/, then those relations which are claimed to generate the value of /p/ cannot completely account for that value. 'The English language', which is not, apparently, defined by syntagmatic or paradigmatic relations, ultimately governs the play of differences and oppositions that

produce the value of the phoneme /p/.

In that 'the English language' is not referred to in the Saussurean account of the production of the value of /p/, as ultimately governing that production, then its role or rule may be said to have been occluded. It neither appears nor is experienced as the centre of the economy. And, in that it regulates the centred economy in sovereign fashion, the workings of ec- centric economy, which would at once produce and destroy the value of an element, are said to have been occluded. In the reduction of ec- centric to centric economy, then, both the role/rule of the centre as sovereign value and the origins of all values in ec- centric economy are said to have been occluded.

Another way of saying this would be to say that, if there is no value that is not produced in ec- centric economy, then the value of 'the English language' in the Saussurean account has also been produced in ec- centric economy but that subsequently, that non-full, non-simple "origin" has been occluded or has produced itself as its own self occlusion. On the other hand, if the value of 'the English language' has been produced in ec- centric economy and, subsequently, in centric economy, been privileged as beyond the play of oppositive and differential relations, then the position of that centre as regulative of centric economy may be said to be grounded in ec- centric economy.

The origins of the centre's position as centre, the value that governs, but is immune to or beyond, the differential relations in which other values exist, have been occluded and the centre neither appears nor is experienced as the sovereign value of centred economy. Saussure's diacriticity is thus not at all innocent. On the one hand, it is finally governed by the centre: the syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations and differences constitutive of the value of /p/, for example, are ultimately governed by relation to 'the English language', a term that is presented in centred economy as beyond oppositive and differential relations. And on the other, it is that diacriticity that 'first' generates the value of any term. The value of the centre is produced and occluded in the play of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations.

Thus the 'tension' that Derrida refers to in Saussure's work manifests itself in the account of linguistic value. Elsewhere, in the essay "Linguistics and Grammatology"<sup>80</sup>, Derrida shows Saussure's linguistics to be ultimately organised in terms of a relation to logos which necessitates the privileging of the spoken over the written sign in linguistics. In the same way, but on a different level, this section has tried to show that and how the value of the linguistic sign in the various diacritical relations is ultimately governed by the relation to the centre. In the example used above, that centre was 'the

English language'. As has been seen, elements of centric and ec- centric economy coexist with, indeed provide for, each other: the ec- centric economy of difference both produces or generates and is ultimately held to be governed by the value of the centre as that centre is privileged in centred economy. There is no gap or space, then, only the movement of a veil.

Given that there are no concepts meta-physical in themselves, but that there exists, even in the same proposition, a 'tension' between two impulses, the roles of power and desire that were seen to exist in centric and ec- centric economy may also be seen in Saussure's account of linguistic economy. On the one hand, within centric economy, the centre is said to have mastered or reduced ec- centric economy. Thus the centres of the various economies to be found in Saussure's work, logos, 'the English language', and so on, are as sovereign powers which, while grounded in ec- centric economy, are represented in centred economy as precisely beyond or immune to the sorts of relations that give meaning and value to the other terms.

On the other hand, those other terms or values do not merely coexist. Rather, they are forces that are organised hierarchically in centred economy - writing is held to be inferior to speech in such economy. But they are not organised in the same way in ec- centric economy - Derrida shows how

the attempt to thus organise writing and speech must collapse because of the presence of arché éc-riture within speech. That is, where the sort of power to be found in ec- centric economy would both produce and destroy a term's position of dominance/ subordination, in centric economy, a term's position in the hierarchy is determined and fixed.

Similarly, the tension between centric and ec- centric economy may be seen as one of the attempted satisfaction of desire by means of providing something that is lacking, (full, simple origins), and the realisation that desire is in itself self-deconstructive or ec- centric. That is, if what is desired is the full, simple origin of value and that which would both produce and destroy value is the ec- centric economy of difference, then desire for the full, simple origin will never be satisfied once and for all. It will rather be produced (constituted) and destroyed (satisfied) by difference, ec- centric economy. For these reasons, the centre of the linguistic economy posited in an account such as Saussure's is both produced and destroyed by difference. It may be seen as an attempt to or the desire for mastery over the economy of difference, but it and its desire have been constituted and would be destroyed by difference.

### Conclusion

Thus this chapter has introduced the

questions of economy and strategy. The etymologies of the words 'economy' and 'value' were considered and found to refer to the governance or management of the household property and to relations of power and desire. The interrelations of these words also indicated that the matters they described were of fundamental importance for human being and that they affected and were affected by concerns that were supposedly of only academic or philosophical interest.

The notion of economy was presented as a relationship between identity, difference and some form of opposition by looking first at Saussure's account of linguistic value and then at Derrida's account of Saussure. The tension between centric and ec- centric economy was introduced and established as a tension between a vulgarly masculine and a non-vulgarly feminine operation. As a non-vulgarly feminine operation, the work of ec- centric economy is a transgressive or critical operation that will not be immediately and unproblematically appropriated by that which it attempts to critique and transgress.

The following chapters will account for the possibility of this non-vulgar feminism by looking at the work of Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger. That is, the thought of dialectics also being the thought of identity, difference and opposition, and these three being the decisive thinkers for the work



of Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, the positions of Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger with regard to dialectics and hence economy will be elucidated.

### CHAPTER THREE

#### HEGEL AND NIETZSCHE

With the exception of Hegel, the thinkers to be dealt with in the following chapters have all offered versions of the thesis that philosophy since Hegel has been an attempt to distance or differentiate itself from him<sup>1</sup>. In their various ways, they have also offered versions of the thesis that the history of philosophy is the history of the occlusion or forgetting of a difference that does not ultimately reduce to a metaphysical identity. Whether Hegel foresaw these developments or not, it is not by chance that the concern with identity, difference and opposition, along with that for what has thus been forgotten, is as important a matter for the thinkers to be discussed as they consider it to be for thought itself.

And nor is it by chance that the account of the thought of identity, difference and opposition, the thought of economy and the matter of feminism, begins with Hegel. That is, feminism's problems have been seen to be problems of economy and the matter of economy has been seen to be the matter of a relationship between identity, difference and opposition. Moreover, this relationship is itself traversed by relations of power and desire. Thus, since Hegelian dialectics is 'also' the

thought of identity, difference and opposition, this chapter will outline his account of economy before looking at the other thinker's responses to that account in order to see what it is that they all try so hard to differentiate themselves from.

Of at least equal significance for the thinkers discussed in the following chapters is the work of Nietzsche. And, in addition to describing Hegel's position with regard to feminism, as it is found in his work on dialectics, this chapter will look at Nietzsche's relations to feminist economy. It will be seen that Nietzsche's thought is decisive for the possibility of feminism in that he differs from and opposes centric economy in ways that are not the ways that centric economy organises difference and opposition.

Thus Nietzsche provides a discourse that is transgressive of centric economy and which is not immediately appropriated by that economy. He also provides the force that enables the positions of Heidegger and Adorno to be distinguished from those of Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari. That is, Adorno's and Heidegger's positions with regard to feminism are what they are and differ from those of Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari because of their relation to Nietzsche's work. Nietzsche is thus decisive for the possibility of feminism as that feminism is exemplified in these latter.

HEGELDialectic

Without wishing on the one hand to presuppose the readings of Hegel to be dealt with in later chapters and while not claiming on the other to be entirely 'innocent', this section will first present Hegel's analysis of the reflexionsbestimmung - the roles of identity, difference and contradiction as they are to be found in the Science of Logic. For, as Sarlemijn says, 'the theory of the determinations of reflection ... is the core of the dialectic of this philosophy'<sup>2</sup>. Having described the account of economy as it is found in the Science of Logic, this section will consider the roles of power and desire in that economy as they are found in the master/slave dialectic described in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Finally, this section will look at the combination of these moments in the accounts Hegel gives in the Philosophy of Right of sexual difference, the family and the state.

In discussing these issues, this section will attempt to show that and how the potentially subversive and thus, it has been argued, feminist moments or forces in Hegel's dialectic may be described as reducing to un-aufgehoben differences which must be 'mastered' in order to be sublated and incorporated into the movement of the dialectic. Those potentially subversive moments

or forces will be seen to be difference as diversity in the Science of Logic, woman with regard to the family, the Penates with regard to the state and difference, ('before' it becomes opposition and therefore admitting of sublation), with regard to sexual difference.

In the somewhat obscure 'Remark' that prefaces the sections of the Science of Logic that deal with identity, difference and opposition, Hegel asserts that the various propositions which are set up as laws of thought are opposed to and contradict one another. Identity can supposedly be defined by means of the principle ' $A=A$ '. The principle of identity, taken on its own, says that 'everything is identical with itself'<sup>3</sup>. If all a thing is is to be identical with itself then it cannot be distinguished from anything else, everything is thus indistinguishable from everything else and there is, as it were, no 'room' for difference<sup>4</sup>. On the other hand, difference can also be defined by means of the principle ' $A \neq -A$ '. The principle of difference, taken on its own, says that 'no two things are the same ... everything is different from everything else'<sup>5</sup>. If this is the case, then there can, similarly, be no 'room' for identity.

As Hegel says, these two principles contradict one another: 'the assumption of any of these principles rules out the assumption of the others'<sup>6</sup>. Something is either the same as itself

and everything is indistinguishable from everything else or everything is different to everything else and there is no room for identity. As in Greek aporiai, the principle of non-contradiction, which says that nothing can both be and not be (something) at the same time, leads to such 'impassable dilemmas' as people like Zeno were wont to describe.

In his account, Stanley Rosen suggests that Hegel's intention in the face of such problems is 'to say what is "unsayable" in traditional logic. He claims thereby to complete or explain, and not to annihilate traditional logic'<sup>7</sup>. And, if aporiai may be described as the negation of the possibility of human thought, then Hegel intends his Logic as the negation of that negation, a negation which, as shall be seen, he considers to be a positive effect. Thus, briefly, contradiction must be thought as productive and the ground of thought, (and thus the real), rather than as limit, obstacle, a dilemma that blocks further thought.

### Identity

Non-dialectical thought, what Hegel sometimes calls external reflection, thought that does not meet the subject matter on its own ground<sup>8</sup>, conceives identity as 'aloof from difference'<sup>9</sup>. Such thought says that identity and difference 'are different, that identity is not difference'<sup>10</sup>.

However, to say this is to say that 'identity is different: for [external reflection says that] identity is different from difference'. This assertion, that identity is not difference, implies that 'identity, not externally but in its own self ... is this, to be different'<sup>11</sup>. External reflection's notion of identity, according to Hegel, is a 'one sided determinateness which as such has no truth'<sup>12</sup>. So Hegel wants to 'complete'<sup>13</sup> this idea of identity - 'truth is only complete in the unity of identity with difference'.

If external reflection's notion of identity were true, if that one sided determination of identity were true, then statements like 'A plant is a plant' and 'God is God' would be more than 'absolute verbiage'. On Hegel's view they are 'absolute verbiage' and a view of identity like that put forward by external reflection, which attempts to conceive identity as simply the same as itself, can say nothing new of anything.

The reason for this is as follows. If such statements are seen as trying to bring out some new truth or determination of the thing and that does not happen (nothing new is learnt from a tautology) then 'identical thought contradicts itself'; 'identity, instead of being in its own self truth ... is the passage beyond itself into the dissolution of itself'<sup>14</sup>. Identity, in and for itself, then, must contain some essential reference to difference and

difference must, as far as Hegel is concerned, be an essential part of identity.

### Difference

So, even to identify something with itself, as in the principle of identity, 'A=A', that 'A' must be differentiated from itself: this is what Hegel calls absolute difference, difference in and for itself and thus identity contains difference<sup>15</sup>.

This absolute difference is to be distinguished from the 'otherness of determinate being', where one determinate being is differentiated from another. This latter sort of difference, the difference that is posited between things by an external observer, Hegel terms 'diversity': what he calls external reflection deals with a sort of difference that is not (a) dialectical difference, (a) difference, and therefore identity, that are opposed and in contradiction. For external reflection, identity and difference are opposed and in contradiction in that as identity and difference they are unlike themselves<sup>16</sup>. Neither is the same as itself insofar as it is only through external reflection that they are in the first place. So, where external reflection posits the separateness of identity and difference, Hegel shows that that separateness is actually or dialectically a connectedness - identity and difference are connected or mediated by contradiction.

Given this, absolute difference, the



difference of something, even the 'A' of the principle of identity, from itself, is 'the difference of difference from itself'<sup>17</sup>. Difference, then, is not only itself but also its other: that which is different from difference is identity and difference is therefore itself, difference and its other, identity. Absolute difference, the other of essence, 'is the other in and for itself, not the other of some other existent outside itself'<sup>18</sup>. So difference, as difference of itself from itself, is not different from identity, (in that identity is also different in itself from itself), and the dialectical result is the identity of identity and difference.

### Contradiction

Hegel notes that 'difference as such is already implicitly contradiction'<sup>19</sup> and, as Rosen says, to have understood Hegel's ideas on identity and difference is to have grasped the structure of contradiction as he presents it.

However, 'the determination of opposition', that, for example, between the principle of identity and the principle of difference, 'has also been made into a law: the so-called law of the excluded middle; something is either A or -A, there is no third'<sup>20</sup>. But, as Hegel says, the third that is indifferent to the opposition is in fact given in the law itself, A is given in that law.

That is, as the discussion of identity

and difference has made clear, identity is at once both the same as itself and different from itself:

The something itself, therefore, is the third that was supposed to have been excluded. Since the opposite determinations in the something are just as much posited as sublated in this positing, the third which has here the form of a dead something, when taken more profoundly, is the unity of reflection into which the opposition withdraws as its ground. 21

Contradiction is the ground, then, of identity and difference: the opposition is grounded in contradiction and rather than contradiction proving the limit or reflection, it is its source. As Hegel says, 'on this point, formal thinking lays down for its principle that contradiction is unthinkable: but as a matter of fact, the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the notion'<sup>22</sup>. Contradiction is thus the identity of identity and difference<sup>23</sup>, the 'absolute activity' and 'absolute ground' that 'contains and supports its determinations'<sup>24</sup>.

The resolution of contradiction in any finite sphere, in appearance, for example, does not take place 'within' that sphere, for that sphere is, necessarily, finite and contradictory. Rather it has a 'higher sphere for its negative unity, for its ground'<sup>25</sup>. As Hegel says in the introduction to the Science of Logic, the result of the negation of negation 'is higher and richer than its predecessor', it contains the previous negated stage, but also 'something more'<sup>26</sup>: onwards and upwards to Absolute

Knowledge and the attaining of Wisdom.

Thus, 'identity and difference are inseparable but distinguishable features of opposition as the general characteristic of positing, or the manifesting of appearance, a positing which is, as such, a self-negation'<sup>27</sup>.

Finally, and as is fairly well known, the way in which Hegel conceives himself to be implicated or caught up in the dialectical progression of philosophical forms is as the completion of that progression. In understanding the development of history as forms of philosophically available consciousness or mind, Hegel claims that that history has been completed<sup>28</sup>. This however, is not to say that Hegel conceives himself as standing outside history or philosophy. Rosen describes the case economically:

Wisdom is speculation; the Absolute thinking itself, albeit within its individual manifestations as wise men, of whom the first in human history is Hegel. Speculation in man comes after the completion of theory in practice whereas in God it is perpetual. Thus, by achieving the level of speculation, man identifies himself with God or dwells in eternity, but in an eternity that includes temporality. To this extent, Hegel's eternity is temporalised. 29

While Hegel has attained wisdom, then, and completed history, as the sage and akin to God, he is, nevertheless, part of that history, part of that temporality.

Thus, basically, does Hegel present the elements of dialectics, identity, difference and

opposition, in the Science of Logic. The relation to feminism, to ec- centric economy, will be discussed here in terms of the roles of difference and opposition. That is, Hegel's account of economy represents a particular version of the production of value. It will be shown that this version is phallocentric insofar as it involves various characteristic operations being performed upon difference and opposition. Those operations consist in the reduction or mastering of difference to produce an opposition from which nothing is 'lost' - an opposition which, far from proving the limit to thought or the chaotic dispersion of meaning and value, conserves and preserves that meaning and value.

Simply, the claim is that one sort of difference, difference as diversity, is mastered by, or turned, by what Hegel considers its own, internal, movement, into dialectical, speculative difference. Similarly, the opposition of two terms in diversity, which has been variously represented as aporia, unproductive and a falling apart, is mastered by or turned, again by what Hegel considers the movement of the dialectic, into contradiction and aufhebung, the productive ground that accounts for both terms. In that contradiction does account for both terms and in that difference is already implicitly contradiction, Hegel's dialectic consists in operations which amount to the ordering and mastering of difference to produce an opposition (i.e. contradiction)

from which nothing is lost: aufhebung is thus a speculative force in more than one sense<sup>30</sup>.

Aufhebung, that is, organises difference as diversity into difference as the identity of identity and difference. A difference that, as noted, has been represented as aporia, unproductive and a falling apart is organised by the relation to the centre of Hegelian economics, aufhebung, to become a productive ground. Insofar as it was shown in chapter two that the role of the centre was phallogentric, then Hegel's account of economy may be described as phallogentric.

Before looking at the roles of power and desire in Hegelian economics, however, reference should be made to the tension between centric and ec-centric economy in those economics. Although this review of Hegel's dialectics is not specifically concerned with that tension here, ec-centric economy may be said to be found in the references to identity continually passing beyond itself as its own dissolution<sup>31</sup>. While the identity which is the result of aufhebung continually dissolves itself in ec-centric economy, that ec-centric economy is always mastered or reduced in the 'next' aufhebung and Hegelian economics consists in the tension between these two moments.

### Power and Desire

This section is concerned with the roles of power and desire in Hegel's economics and uses the description of the relations between master and slave to illustrate those roles. The tension between centric and ec-centric economy will be seen to be reflected in the role of death as centre, as the stable value in terms of which the actions of the protagonists receive the value or meaning that they have. Death as this stable, organising value exists in a tension with death as a meaningless negativity, a death that is destructive of meaning and value and is ultimately privileged above it. Similarly, that power is required to be represented and that desire is essentially for something that is absent in this economy will be shown to be instances of the versions of power and desire that are found in centred economy.

At this particular stage in the production of meaning and value, in the appearance of spirit as it is described in the Phenomenology, self-consciousness 'exists only in being acknowledged'<sup>32</sup>. In the process of recognition, rather than just recognising itself in the object, (in the object of desire, for example, which is negated in the satisfaction of that desire in being consumed), self-consciousness only exists in recognising itself in and being recognised by another consciousness. So, not only does self-consciousness recognise itself in another

self-consciousness but 'this action of the one has itself the double significance of being both its own action and the action of the other as well'<sup>33</sup>.

Self-consciousness does not relate to the other as an object, 'merely as it exists ... for desire', but as a consciousness that has an 'independent existence of its own'<sup>34</sup>. Each self-consciousness 'sees the other do the same as it does: each does itself what it demands of the other'. As Gadamer's example of the greeting illustrates<sup>35</sup>, 'action by one side would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought about by both'<sup>36</sup>. Thus, they 'recognise themselves as mutually recognising one another'<sup>37</sup>.

Having accounted for the notion of recognition, Hegel deals with the process as it appears to self-consciousness. To begin with, self-consciousness is what Hegel calls 'simple being-for-self', it is an individual from which all otherness has been excluded to be confronted as unessential, negative object<sup>38</sup>. Thus, when one self-consciousness confronts another, when 'one individual is confronted by another individual', they are for each other just shapes of consciousness. They are like ordinary objects which have not yet 'rooted out' 'the purely negative being of self-identical consciousness'. Insofar as 'each is ... certain of its own self, but not of the other ... its own self-certainty still has no truth'<sup>39</sup>.

Thus, as Hegel says, according to the

Notion of recognition, essential self-certainty 'is possible only when each is for the other what the other is for it'<sup>40</sup>; the two individuals must have exposed themselves to each other as pure being for self or as self-consciousness. It is at this point that the relation to death begins to take a part. The presentation of self that is necessary for self-certainty to have any truth consists in showing that it is 'not attached to any specific existence ... that it is not attached to life'<sup>41</sup>. This presentation, Hegel asserts, is a twofold action: as with the account of the Notion of recognition, action on both sides is required.

The relation to death begins to take a part insofar as each seeks the death of the other and insofar as each must stake its own life in order that its self-certainty be raised to the level of truth. In this way, Hegel says that the relation of two 'self-conscious individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other in a life and death struggle'<sup>42</sup>. Only by engaging in this struggle and staking one's life is the certainty of being for self raised to truth since only this will prove that the essence of that self-consciousness is 'not (just) being, not the immediate form in which it appears'<sup>43</sup>. Similarly, only in seeking the other's death can the self-externality of consciousness be avoided, since it is in the other that self-consciousness recognises itself and thus recognises itself as being



outside of itself.

Death as 'abstract negation', however, as 'negation without independence',<sup>44</sup> cannot sort the masters from the slaves: the simple annihilation of the other produces nothing that is significant or meaningful in terms of Hegel's dialectics. The sort of negation that can elevate self-consciousness to certainty of itself is not, on Hegel's account, annihilation. It is, rather, the negation that comes from consciousness which 'supercedes in such a way as to preserve and maintain what is superceded',<sup>45</sup>. In the relation to and experience of death, then, self-consciousness 'learns that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness',<sup>46</sup> and death as abstract negation turns the two opposed consciousnesses into 'lifeless, merely immediate unopposed extremes' the middle term of which has itself collapsed into 'a lifeless unity'.

So, if consciousness learns that life is essential to its self-certainty, it must needs recognise itself in another consciousness that is not simply annihilated but which rather exists for another consciousness. Thus consciousness is divided into consciousness that is for itself, pure self-consciousness, and consciousness that is not for itself but for another. The former Hegel calls master and the latter slave. That is, the self-consciousness that can put its life at stake in the struggle and which brings about the self-negation of another

self-consciousness as being for self is the aspect of self-consciousness that Hegel calls mastery. And the aspect of self-consciousness that does so exist for another, that has not proved itself independent in the struggle but which has not, equally, been annihilated, Hegel calls servile consciousness.

Thus, as Rosen puts it, 'the victor in the struggle for recognition is acknowledged as the master of the slave's desire'<sup>47</sup>. And, as Hegel puts it, 'what desire has failed to achieve [the master] succeeds in doing, viz. to have done with the thing altogether and to achieve satisfaction in the enjoyment of it'<sup>48</sup>. Where once the thing was independent and desire was thus dependent upon it, the efforts of the slave destroy that independence and the master 'takes to himself only the dependent aspect of the thing and has the pure enjoyment of it'<sup>49</sup>.

However, insofar as servile consciousness is servile, the truth of the master's self-consciousness, (which is provided in servile consciousness), 'is in reality the unessential consciousness and its unessential action'<sup>50</sup>. That is, the process of recognition that transpires between these two moments of self-consciousness is 'one sided and unequal'<sup>51</sup> insofar as the slave is servile, dependent, and does not do to the master what the master does (to) himself, make his other servile and set aside his being-for-self. Insofar as the recognition is one-sided and unequal, the master cannot be 'certain

of being-for-self as the truth of himself'<sup>52</sup>.

So, Hegel says, 'the truth of the independent consciousness is ... the servile consciousness of the slave'<sup>53</sup>, even if it first appears that the slave does not know this<sup>54</sup>. It is, as noted above, death, which Hegel calls the Absolute Master, that effects the transformation of servile consciousness into 'truly independent consciousness'<sup>55</sup>. The slave's fear of the master is a sort of mundane version of his fear of the Absolute Master: the former makes the moment of 'pure being for self' explicit while in the latter it remains implicit<sup>56</sup>. It is through the service of the master that the slave 'becomes conscious of what he truly is'<sup>57</sup> since that service rids the slave of his 'attachment to natural existence' and forms the beginning of his becoming independent<sup>58</sup>.

That is, the experience of death 'leaves' servile consciousness nothing but pure being for self: what is here implicit is explicit in the experience of the master and the work servile consciousness performs in the service of the master is the beginning of the 'working off' of natural existence, its dependence on the object. This is because work is desire 'held in check'. Where the desire of the master is satisfied in the annihilation of the object that has been produced by the slave, the desire of the slave is 'delayed' insofar as his work shapes and forms the thing. In that the slave's negative

relation to the thing, work, forms the thing, that work assumes a permanence outside of the slave. In the independence of the thing produced, then, the slave recognises his own independence, something which the master, who has not worked on the thing, cannot do.

This, then, is the basis of Hegel's account of the master/slave relationship. The version of un-aufgehoben difference, difference that resists being negated and conserved in the process of the dialectic, that is most apparent here appears in the relation to death. In the struggle for recognition, master and slave are said at one point<sup>58</sup> to remain unopposed: they are lifeless extremes and are related by the similarly lifeless medium or unity of death as abstract negation. That is, these two identities constitute a difference but it has not yet become an opposition, a productive difference. It is a difference that remains un-aufgehoben.

Thus, of the two sorts of death, it is death as that which 'supercedes in such a way as to preserve and maintain what is superceded',<sup>60</sup> which ensures that the truth of self-certainty becomes attainable to consciousness. Death as abstract negation contributes nothing meaningful to the process of recognition involving, as it does, the disappearance of the 'essential moment' at which the two self-consciousnesses divide into opposed extremes. It is this sort of difference and this sort of death that

the Hegelian dialectic cannot cope with: it cannot master it and preserve it in the next stage. For Hegelian dialectics, this difference is meaningless and valueless.

As in the account of identity and difference, then, the tension between centric and eccentric economy manifests itself in the way in which difference that is not organised or ordered in terms of a relation to aufhebung or productive death is considered to be meaningless and valueless. This indifferent difference<sup>61</sup> is, by the logic of the dialectic, superceded and becomes meaningful and valuable. Master and slave, related as identity and difference, pass from being unopposed extremes in indifferent difference and having no meaning or value as self certainty, to being opposed in dialectical difference in which their meaning and value as master and slave are assured by virtue of their relation to aufhebung, productive death.

Power and desire are similarly organised in the master/slave dialectic. It is, basically, the desire that one's self-certainty be recognised by the other and thus that one's dominance be represented which provides the initial movement of this process. Rather than desire being simply satisfied in the consumption of the object, now that object is itself consciousness and desire desires the recognition of that consciousness. If it can manage the negation of that consciousness in such a way that, although

it is negated, it is not thereby annihilated, then it is dominant or the all powerful master with regard to servile consciousness.

Desire, then, is the 'motor' of the dialectic and power is the limit to the slave's desire. The master's power determines that the slave works for the master's satisfaction rather than for his own. It is only later, when the truth of the master's self-consciousness is found to lie in unessential servile consciousness, that the slave's desire is liberated from this imposition and he comes to enjoy the object produced as reflecting him.

### Family, State, Sexual difference

This chapter has so far described the workings of Hegelian dialectics and followed those workings through the master/slave relationship, the process in which consciousness becomes certain of itself as self-consciousness. However, as Derrida points out, 'we cannot describe a phenomenology of spirit, that is to say, following the sub-title, an "experience of consciousness", without recognising the onto-economic work of the family'<sup>62</sup>. That is, if it is the case that consciousness only proceeds to self certainty in interaction with other consciousnesses, it is also the case that consciousness is always en famille: 'consciousness ... only becomes for itself - only becomes consciousness - in the family'<sup>63</sup>.

Predating the Oedipal and Anti-Oedipal dramas of Freud and of Deleuze and Guattari, Hegel's account of the production of value involves a consideration of familial and hence sexual relations. Hegel's account of economy, of oikos nomos, may be found in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right. This section will elucidate the parts played by sexuality in the production of meaning and value and account for the way in which eccentric economy is mastered in Hegel's tale of that production.

In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel's account of the family and sexual relations is found at the point at which he discusses 'the ethical order',<sup>64</sup> and the way in which unreflective forms of ethical life, (ethical substance), develop into reflective or self-conscious forms and ultimately destroy the ethical order<sup>65</sup>. Given that all is governed by the process of the dialectic, it is no surprise to find that, as in the account of master and slave, the transition from unreflective to reflective ethical life involves the negation and preservation of the previous stage. The account of sexual and familial relations, that is, is structurally homologous to the account of the relations between master and slave.

So, the first thing that ethical life or substance does is to split itself into two, into human and divine law<sup>66</sup>. Human law is associated

in this account with the nation or community and with the citizens of that nation. Human law is the known law, that which is conscious of itself<sup>67</sup>. Confronting the human law is divine law: 'the ethical power of the state, being the moment of self-conscious action, finds its antithesis in the simple and immediate essence of the ethical sphere'<sup>68</sup>.

Divine law is associated here with the family, it is 'the unconscious, still inner Notion (of the ethical order) [and] stands opposed to its actual, self-conscious existence'<sup>69</sup>. The family, then, as this unconscious or immediate being of the ethical order, stands opposed to the nation or state. Hegel says that the family 'stands over against that order which shapes and maintains itself by working for the universal'. The gods of the household stand opposed to the universal spirit represented by the self-conscious state.

As in the production of self-consciousness in the master/slave dialectic, the production of self-conscious ethical life is accomplished by leaving the immediate, natural and unconscious, in reflection in something external and is organised in terms of the relation to death. The individual, insofar as it is the individual, a member of the family and not a citizen, remains 'only an unreal and impotent shadow'<sup>70</sup>. That is, insofar as the individual does not take part in the life of the state and does not, as Hegel has it, 'work for the universal' that is external to the family, its ethical



consciousness is not a self-consciousness.

Although the individual in this condition may attain a sort of universality, it is not, says Hegel, 'the result of an action consciously done'<sup>71</sup>. This sort of universality is an immediate or natural universality and corresponds to death. Like death as abstract negation, as seen in the master/slave dialectic, this death is unproductive and contributes nothing valuable to the ethical substance. It is rather in the 'work' that the individual performs in the state that ethical consciousness 'returns to itself and becomes self-consciousness'<sup>72</sup>.

This externalisation or passage from the family to the community or state is thus the passage from divine to human law and according to Hegel it is only the males of the family who (can) do this. The feminine, for Hegel, is associated with the Penates, the gods of the household, and since the law of the family, like divine law, is the unconscious, inner essence 'that is not exposed to the daylight of consciousness'<sup>73</sup>, the feminine may have only 'intuitive awareness of what is ethical' and may not attain to consciousness of it<sup>74</sup>. So, where 'the sister becomes or the wife remains the head of the household and the guardian of divine law'<sup>75</sup>, the 'brother leaves this immediate, elemental life of the family in order to acquire and produce the ethical life that is conscious of itself

and actual'<sup>76</sup>.

Thus at this particular stage in the development of economy, of the production of meaning and value, the feminine is presented as associated with the 'nether world', the gods of the household, and is said to stand opposed to the self-conscious and universal concerns of the state, the affairs of men. As such, the feminine is the enemy of the state but at the same time is essential to it. The feminine, that is, is a necessary part of the economy but one which is subversive of that economy and which must be suppressed or mastered in order that the self-conscious stage of ethical life, the universal concerns of the community, be produced.

Hegel says, then, that 'human law in its universal existence is the community, in its activity in general is the manhood of the community ... it is, moves and maintains itself by consuming and absorbing into itself the separatism of the Penates or the separation into independent families presided over by womenkind'<sup>77</sup>. The feminine is thus presented as the internal and necessary enemy of the state, 'the eternal irony (in the life) of the community'<sup>78</sup>, and works, not only to subvert the ends of government, but also to corrupt male youth. The latter is accomplished through ridiculing and mocking the universal and 'earnest wisdom of mature age' so that youth finds nothing worthy in it. Ultimately, Hegel says, the work of the feminine is to

transform 'the universal end of government into a private end' and to 'pervert the universal property of the state into a possession and ornament for the family'<sup>80</sup>.

At this point, Hegel says that the contradictions in ethical life force its ruin and cause the passage into another form<sup>81</sup>. However, this next form does not concern this chapter: what this section has been concerned with is the way in which the feminine, as that which resists being mastered by the concerns of the state, is presented as the internal and necessary enemy of the state which must be negated and conserved in order that the passage to self-conscious ethical life be effected. It is, moreover, only at a particular stage that sexual being acquires what Hegel calls an ethical significance.

In Glas, Derrida says that, for Hegel, male and female are not originally opposed as two terms of an opposition. Rather, he suggests that they are opposed as indifference and difference: 'sexual difference is the difference between indifference and difference'<sup>82</sup>. However, in order to be sublated, (relevé), difference must be determined as opposition. Sexual difference, that is, is not originally an opposition that may be productively sublated; it exists as diversity or what has been described above as an indifferent difference. So, although sexual identity is a function of a sort of

difference, it is only the sort of difference in which the terms exist as opposition, governed by a relation to a transcendental signified, that is truly meaningful or valuable in Hegel's account.

Thus it is that Hegel says that only when the brother, the male, passes from being concerned with human law and the female, the sister, assumes the guardianship of divine law do 'the two sexes overcome their merely natural being and appear in their ethical significance'<sup>83</sup>. Similarly, in the Philosophy of Right<sup>84</sup>, 'the differences in the physical characteristics of the two sexes' is said to have a rational basis and consequently acquire 'intellectual and ethical significance'. Only insofar as difference has been organised in relation to aufhebung, (whether it is presented as the transition beyond the family, as in the Phenomenology of Spirit, or as marriage and the dissolution of the family, as in the Philosophy of Right), does it, and the identity dependent upon it, assume any meaning or significance in Hegel's dialectic<sup>85</sup>.

It is interesting that in his account of the role and position of women in the ethical life of society, Hegel prefigures what Freud says. Both are seemingly committed to the idea that women occupy a position of marginality or supplementarity with regard to the central male concern with the ethical. Women, or 'the feminine', for both Hegel and Freud, never achieve full ethical consciousness<sup>86</sup>.

However, before looking at Freud in chapter eight, the next section will deal with Nietzsche's attitudes to the matter of economy in order to continue the task of accounting for the possibility of feminism as it has been elaborated so far.

## NIETZSCHE

### Introductory

It might be supposed either that Nietzsche is relatively unconcerned with dialectics or that his work is eminently dialectical. Neither Danto nor Hollingdale make any reference to either Hegel or dialectics in the indexes to their works on Nietzsche and Hayman refers only to Hegel. Alternatively, passages like "How The Real World At Last Became A Myth" and a general conception of will to power as a collection of conflicting forces might be understood as dialectical accounts of events or phenomena.

However, as Deleuze says, 'we have every reason to assume a profound knowledge of the Hegelian movement in Nietzsche ... Hegelian themes are to be found in this work as the enemy to be opposed'<sup>87</sup>. So, apart from the fact that they 'define Nietzsche's positions' with regard to dialectics, those elements of his work that will be discussed here are also those which will be seen later to determine and polarise Adorno's, Heidegger's and ...

Derrida's, Foucault's and Deleuze and Guattari's responses to Hegel and dialectics.

### Critique of identity

In Daybreak, § 474, Nietzsche tells us that both dialectics (Plato) and its antithesis, (Schopenhauer) are 'wrong' - 'for the thing to which they wish to show us the way does not exist'.

Thus the first and perhaps most obvious of Nietzsche's critiques of dialectics concerns the absence of any telos: there is no end point, and indeed, no simple origin, (as The Genealogy of Morals makes clear), that could provide a key to the meaning or direction of history. It is suggested that the idea of eternal return may be seen as a critique of all arché- and telos- positing philosophies. The eternal return indicates that there never was nor could be a simple arché, (in a Husserlian sense, for example), and that there is not, nor could there be, a telos, (in precisely, for this essay, a Hegelian sense), that could organise and render meaningful, either once and for all, (in the state of Wisdom), or in particular cases, (in the aufhebung of contradiction), the elements of history, philosophy, discourse and so on.

Part of the argument, such as it is, for the eternal return, is to be found in The Will to Power. In § 1062, Nietzsche says that 'If the world had a goal, it must have been reached. If

there were for it some unintended final state, this also must have been reached ... The fact of "spirit" as a form of becoming proves that the world has no goal, no final state and is incapable of being'. The talk of 'spirit', 'becoming' and 'final states' here is undoubtedly talk of Hegelian themes and as such suggests that the eternal return is to be understood as being, if not directed against, then at least concerned with Hegel's treatment of these themes. As Nietzsche says, the ideas of eternal return and will to power are interpretations and here he seems to be interpreting the 'same' phenomena as Hegel to give a result that is completely different to the interpretation that Hegel gives.

In The Will to Power, § 516, Nietzsche says that 'we are unable to affirm and deny one and the same thing: this is a subjective empirical law, not the expression of any necessity, but only of an inability'. The subjective empirical law that prohibits us from affirming and denying one and the same thing is the logicians principle of non-contradiction, logic being 'bound to the condition: assume there are identical cases'<sup>88</sup>. However, either the principle of non-contradiction 'asserts something about actuality, about being, as if one knew this from some other source; that is, as if opposite attributes could not be ascribed to it. Or the proposition means; opposite attributes should not be ascribed to it'<sup>89</sup>.

Since we have no knowledge of entities prior to there being entities known, 'the proposition therefore contains no criterion of truth, but an imperative concerning what should count as true'<sup>90</sup>. Our 'coarse and false' senses, which would give the 'instinctive proof; I cannot have two opposite sensations at the same time'', under the influence of 'ceaseless experience, which seems ... to confirm it', lead us to the belief in stable, self-identical things and hence to the stable, self-identical 'A' of logic<sup>91</sup>.

Thus Nietzsche says that 'the 'A' of logic is ... a reconstruction of the thing': 'Logic applies only to fictitious entities that we have created'<sup>92</sup> and rests upon the 'sensualistic prejudice' that leads to the 'fundamental falsification of all events'<sup>93</sup>. That is, the senses would give the 'proof', 'I cannot have two opposite sensations at the same time', which falsifies events and things. Consequently, logic reconstructs events and things to give the stable and self-identical 'A' of the principle of non-contradiction. Logic, then, supposedly based upon the principle of non-contradiction, along with all that is in turn held to rest upon logic, (dialectics, knowledge, language and so on), deals only with things that have been (taken apart and) put (back) together in terms of this logic of identity<sup>94</sup>.



Will to Power I

In The Will to Power, § 46, Nietzsche says that 'there is no will'<sup>95</sup>. This is qualified later when he says that 'the will of psychology hitherto is an unjustified generalisation ... this will does not exist at all'<sup>96</sup>. Like the 'A' of logic, the will of psychology is a reconstruction and a falsification of a more 'primordial' will - 'the most intimate essence of being is will to power'<sup>97</sup>. Thus, if 'pleasure is every increase of power'<sup>98</sup>, then such questions as '... who feels pleasure? ... who wants power?' are absurd, since 'the essence itself is power-will and consequently feelings of pleasure and displeasure'<sup>99</sup>. The 'who' of the subject comes after, or is an effect of, the reduction and mastering of will to power and to ask who feels pleasure is absurd when it is power-will that is feelings of pleasure and displeasure.

What gets talked about as will, (and what must be unlearned or 're-learned', in some sense, in order to talk about power-will<sup>100</sup>) is a particular form of will - one that involves the reconstruction of will to power according to the logic of identity. And what gets talked about as power is a particular form of power which involves the idea that there is first of all a subject, a 'who' that possesses and enjoys power and which has similarly reconstructed and occluded will to power.

Will to power, then, is a version of what Foucault has referred to as 'micro-power' or power with a small 'p': 'the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power'<sup>101</sup>.

This will to power, this shifting substrate of forces, coupled with 'an insatiable demand for the demonstration of power'<sup>102</sup>, provides the basis for what appears and is experienced as the will of psychology taking possession of and enjoying the exercise of power, of sovereign power or what Foucault would call power with a capital 'P'.

On the other hand, insofar as will to power is 'an insatiable demand for the demonstration of power', for an increase in the feeling of pleasure and is non-subjective, it bears resemblances to, indeed, Descombes says that it is, what Deleuze and Guattari call desire. In their Anti-Oedipus, desire is not subjective until there is 'repression' of it, until it has been codified or reconstructed according to the logic of identity<sup>103</sup>.

Dialectics, then, insofar as it conceives of power as the representation or reconstruction of power, may be said to deal only with finished objects and cannot cope with the production of those objects in will to power. The master in Hegel's master/slave dialectic requires that his power be recognised, thus he desires that it be represented. On Nietzsche's account, this would

be to conceive and 'dialecticise' power 'after the event': in the same way as the 'A' of logic is a reconstruction and occlusion of the thing, the power of the master is a re-presentation and falsification of a more original and non-representable form of power that Nietzsche calls will to power.

### Will to Power II

Such an interpretation is consistent with elements of the readings of Nietzsche to be found in the work of Pautrat, Klossowski, Derrida and Bataille. As Pautrat says in his Versions du Soleil<sup>104</sup>, Nietzsche's version of history is a

destin sans pourquoi which only finds its place in another history which is eccentric to that of meaning and more comprehensive than any dialectic. It is a history that is as prior to meaning as it is to non-meaning: the history of life as will to power. 104

And, in a footnote to the same, he says that

we could say that history in Nietzsche unfolds itself as a history that exceeds the dialectic, ruled by the accidental necessity, (l'accidental necessaire), by a necessity which is not the necessity of meaning. 105

That is, history as will to power is that which must be and has been reduced and occluded in order that history as meaning and non-meaning, as dialectical movement, can be written. History as dialectic, then, involves objects that have been organised in terms of meaning and non-meaning: they have been reconstructed according to a 'necessity of meaning' which fixes and limits them, reducing their excess to something manageable.

Thus dialectics deals with already constituted objects and cannot account for the (non dialectical) constitution of those objects as invested by will to power in eternal return. And thus something of value is lost in the limiting of the economic play of will to power that takes place with dialectics or any other necessity of meaning. It is interesting to note that in The Will to Power, § 1067, Nietzsche describes the world as 'a household without expenses or losses but likewise without increase or income': through the history of the words oikos nomos, Nietzsche is aware of the relation between the transvaluation of values and the management of the household.

Another aspect of the claim that dialectics cannot cope with the excess that is found in experience and which Nietzsche refers to as will to power is found in his discussion of language and sensation in Daybreak. In § 195, Nietzsche says 'we are deceived by a similarity of words and concepts; but behind them lies a sensation that has to be foreign, incomprehensible and painful to modern sensibility'. This sensation is the one which the sensualistic prejudice noted above cannot account for since it renders equal or the same what are disparate experiences and they are these sensations or experiences that are lost in the ordering of phenomena and events by the dialectic or a necessity of meaning.

These ideas, that we are deceived by the seeming identity of word and concept, and that dialectics cannot cope with or account for the experience of will to power in eternal return, will be discussed again later in the sections on Adorno's negative dialectics, which employ precisely this quote, and Derrida's deconstructive strategies.

### Dialectics and Nihilism

So, will to power in eternal return may be described as ec- centric economy and it is mastered or reduced by centric economy, of which dialectics is an example; Nietzsche's position with regard to dialectics cannot, therefore, be a simple one. Thus he says in Ecce Homo<sup>106</sup>, that 'I contradict as has never been contradicted before and yet am the opposite of a no-saying spirit',<sup>107</sup>. Nietzsche claims to say things 'differently' and 'oppositively' about difference and opposition in such a way that he is 'different to' and the 'opposite of' the thought of Hegelian dialectics.

As noted, difference for Hegel was already contradiction, it 'already' had the internal structure of opposition. This contradiction, moreover, was not to be thought of as a contingency or abnormality<sup>108</sup>. It was, rather, 'the root of all movement and vitality', the ground of identity and difference<sup>109</sup>. Hegel's difference, as contradiction, the unity of identity and difference, is

always already mastered or sublated via the negation of negation. Nietzsche's differences, on the other hand, are to be enjoyed and affirmed: they do not contradict, like Hegel's difference, and thus are not to be relieved in the identity of a third term.

Deleuze suggests that it is the role of the negative in Nietzsche's work that separates him from Hegel's version of dialectics<sup>110</sup>. Nietzsche's widersprechen, his speaking against and differently, is not the contradiction that is Hegel's difference in that it would permit differences to exist but not as contradiction, not, as Foucault has it, 'under the rule of the negative, as an instance of non-being'<sup>111</sup>, since this would be the prelude to the Hegelian negation of negation, the lifting up, interiorising and preserving that would reduce the difference to the identity of identity and difference.

In this way, Nietzsche's contradictions or differences appear as the articulation of differences outside, beyond or as they exceed the dialectic, the centred economy of a necessity of meaning. Strictly, it appears as the articulation of differences, intensities and mobilisations of forces, of will to power. Thus it is that Nietzsche can differ from himself without either collapsing into a state in which every pronouncement is equally worthless or providing some arché or telos that would provide the source and measure of the meaning of each of those pronouncements. A no saying spirit is the spirit

of nihilism and the problem is how he that contradicts, 'how he that says No ... to everything to which one has so far said Yes can nevertheless be the opposite of a no-saying spirit',<sup>112</sup>.

Moreover, in the same way that Nietzsche can differ from and contradict other thinkers, he may also be said to differ from and contradict himself. He does this on numerous occasions - on the matter of dialectics, for example. He says in The Will to Power that when one wields the dialectic, 'one has a merciless weapon in one's hands',<sup>113</sup>. And in Twilight of the Idols<sup>114</sup>, dialectics is said to be the philosophy of slaves, that it 'can only serve a defensive arm'. In Ecce Homo<sup>115</sup>, Nietzsche says that apart from being a decadent, he is also the opposite.

These pronouncements do not make any simple, coherent sense, as would be provided by an arché or a telos. Nor do they prove completely meaningless, as they would if they were simply contradictory. And nor can they be clearly reconciled into the identity of Hegelian difference. As Nietzsche says, they are only his truths. And as Derrida comments, they are multiple, variegated, contradictory, even.<sup>116</sup>.

Nietzsche may be seen as attempting to be the opposite of the spirit of nihilism, as completing and thus overcoming European nihilism insofar as his no-saying, his differences, are not the

no-saying and differences of the dialectic but are rather that which exceeds the dialectic. They are the differences of will to power, of the different and conflicting forces in will to power, rather than the stable, codified differences of dialectic. As such, they are not different to Hegel's difference in the way that Hegel's difference operates - Nietzsche can differ, contradict and say No without being a no-saying spirit.

He is thus an 'active nihilist',<sup>117</sup>, the 'completion' of European nihilism<sup>118</sup>, insofar as he enjoys and exploits the differences, those intensities and mobilisations of will to power, that have been 'effective' all the time but which have been falsified, reconstructed and mastered by weak, passive and reactive accounts of no-saying and difference. Among those weak, passive and reactive accounts of difference, those passive nihilisms, are the Platonic/Hegelian dialectics on the one hand and Schopenhauer's account of will and representation on the other.

Nietzsche's work is not such a reactive nihilism, it is claimed, and thus does not admit to either an original, sense-giving arché or telos or to the state in which each of his pronouncements are equally meaningless. He is, rather, a strategist, articulating the different intensities and directions of forces in will to power for strategic and specific purposes.



### Philosophical Practice

Where who could be called traditional philosophers, (Hume, Kant, Hegel and so on), will deal with their critics in philosophically traditional or respectable ways, Nietzsche will caricature, insult, parody and use generally eccentric and non-traditional forms, (the aphorism, irony, rhetorical questions and so on), to deal with his opponents. Traditional philosophers will oppose, by means of logic, strict argumentation, premisses and conclusions. Nietzsche, alternatively, will call Kant the Chinaman of Koenigsberg, and profess to hearing the croaking of frogs from the swamp of contemporary philosophy. He will establish a difference between himself and the others by means of both the content and the form of his writings.

As he says in The Genealogy of Morals, 'what have I to do with refutation?'; Nietzsche is not in the business of logical and traditionally philosophical modes of argumentation, he does not attempt to refute ideas, he merely puts on gloves before them<sup>119</sup>. Thus he will not oppose, but will establish and enjoy a difference, both with regard to what he says and how he says it, since to oppose would be to set himself up as an identity, something the same as itself. This, as has been seen, he considers to be a falsification of life as will to power: only in centred economy, logic and dialectics, for example, are there stable, self-identical beings.

It is suggested that this may be seen as taking up a number of positions with regard to the thought of dialectics which are not immediately incorporated into, (mastered and reduced by), that dialectic either in terms of what is said or how it is said. Nietzsche's philosophical practice is a form of Yes-saying, affirming and enjoying differences, that is also the most contradictory. It approximates, thus, to an active nihilism, a nihilism that would complete and thus 'overcome', via transvaluation, the history of European nihilism<sup>120</sup>. Nietzsche's philosophical practice and textual activity may be seen as an instance of the attempt to complete nihilism: he will affirm differences, be a no-saying spirit, without trying to aufhebung the thinker from whom he differs into his work, without being the spirit of nihilism.

### Nietzsche and Feminism

Nietzsche's account of will to power in eternal return thus offers an account of economy in which value and identity are at once produced and destroyed. Nietzsche's economics are thus ec-centric in that there is no privileged value that regulates the relations, the differences and oppositions, from which value is generated. In that Nietzsche describes ec-centric economy, his position is that of a non-vulgar feminism or feminist.

As has been seen, Nietzsche's account

of identity connects with the idea of will to power in eternal return in that this latter would both produce and destroy identity. The 'conflict' of forces in will to power would produce identity in that, like Saussure's diacriticity, they are differences, forces and differences between forces, that generate identity. And it would subvert or postpone identity in that those forces are never stable, never organised into centric economy. Will to power in eternal return ensures, that is, that there is no privileged term or force that could put an end to the shifting conflict of forces that produce and destroy identity, value and meaning, at the same time.

Likewise with difference, Nietzsche's account of difference, insofar as it has not been summarised above, would not be the sort of difference that is found in centric economy. Difference in the account given by centric economy, if it is productive at all and not simply meaningless diversity, would be productive only of contradiction. It would, as such, be valued only as either the internal structure or prolegomenon of aufhebung, the recuperative sublation that provides a stable value to the 'outcome' of contradiction in a greater whole.

As has been seen, Nietzsche's differences do not constitute opposition and nor are they sublated in a third term. Yet they are 'productive' -

they are productive of the undecidable. Thus Nietzsche's differences and oppositions are not the differences and oppositions that are to be found in centric economy and the values and identities that they produce are not those of centric economy. The absence of privileged values such as arché or telos that is entailed by will to power in eternal return demands that Nietzsche's differences and oppositions are both productive and destructive and thus that the values that are 'produced' and 'destroyed' are strictly undecidable.

This non-vulgar feminism is exemplified in the things he says about women. As Derrida, for example, has noted<sup>121</sup>, there are many women and many types of women to be found in Nietzsche's works. Derrida refers to the 'hordes of mothers, daughters, sisters, old maids, wives, governesses, prostitutes, virgins, big and little girls'<sup>122</sup> that are to be encountered in his work. And in sections 63 to 75 of The Gay Science alone, there are to be found mothers, young and old women, housewives, corrupt, upper class and masterful women.

As there can be no identity or value in itself, no truth in itself, that is not also destroyed or postponed by will to power in eternal return, so there can be no truth in itself of women in themselves. Nietzsche's women are a multiplicity that will not reduce to a single, ordered, value or identity. Thus, when he offers his thoughts on the

notion of woman as such, even the things he says are emphasised as being 'only - my truths',<sup>123</sup>.

As Derrida comments on Nietzsche's treatment of these questions of identity and woman, 'there is no truth in itself of ... either man or woman in itself',<sup>124</sup>.

That is, the women to be found in Nietzsche's works are, amongst other things, sorts of prisms or magnifying glasses<sup>125</sup> 'that allow one to make visible a general but elusive and creeping calamity'. He refers to these various forms of women, (for example, persons generally are said to function as these glasses), as a crystallisation of more widespread, non-representable forces. Each of the types of women, then, serve as a glass which enables Nietzsche to articulate, to perceive and describe, the workings of forces in will to power. Each type of woman serves as a sort of model for a different codification of forces that usually remain un-represented, will to power in eternal return. They do not, as will to power does not, constitute a self-present identity - their identity is produced and destroyed as investments of forces.

Whether 'male' or 'female', those who would attempt to identify 'woman as such', 'woman in itself', are masculine, according to Nietzsche. The concern with the production of a self-identical value or definition of what woman is is the vulgarly masculine concern. Thus Nietzsche condemns

those women, 'Madame Roland, Madame de Staël, or Monsieur Georges Sand',<sup>126</sup>, for example, who attempt to 'enlighten men about "woman as such"'. 'Enlightenment in this field has hitherto been the affair and endowment of men': the concern with the proper identity and identification of women has hitherto been the vulgarly masculine affair<sup>127</sup>. So, where both male and female may share the vulgarly masculine concern with identifiable and stable values, non-vulgar femininity, (including Nietzsche himself<sup>128</sup>), recognises the work of will to power as productive and destructive of value and identity.

It is this non-vulgar femininity that Nietzsche also calls life: 'it is covered by a veil interwoven with gold, a veil of beautiful possibilities, sparkling with promise, resistance, bashfulness, mockery, pity and seduction. Yes, life is a woman',<sup>129</sup>. So, not only is this version of femininity described as life, it is also denotative of will to power and associated with the figure of Dionysos. It is the work of the undecidable, the non-vulgarly feminine, that connects life, will to power and Dionysan themes in Nietzsche's stands against the vulgarly masculine concern with identity and self-presence.

The value of woman, then, as invested by forces in will to power, is both produced and destroyed by that investment. It is this 'creative' duplicity that the figure of Dionysos attempts to

capture and which makes him/her the paradigm of non-reactive affirmation for Nietzsche. Having both male and female characteristics, then, Dionysos is the double-born offspring of woman and Zeus's thigh. Associated with the theatrical arts, the mask and representation, Dionysos offers the personification of will to power as productive and destructive of value and identity.

### Conclusion

Thus this chapter has accounted for the positions of Hegel and Nietzsche with regard to the matter of dialectics, the thought of the relations between identity, difference and opposition. Since feminism's problems are those of economy, power and desire, this account has also outlined their relations to feminism. It remains for this chapter to sum up the relations between their positions.

Briefly, Hegel's position with regard to economy, power and desire tends towards that of centric economy in which the disrupting and disconcerting is reduced to manageable identity. Similarly, the sort of power that is represented and that it represents along with the desire to be found in relation to that power are those to be found in centric economy. Hegel's version of power is the power that governs in the manner of omnipotent law-giver and the desire that is to be found in relation to it is the desire for that form of mastery.

And Nietzsche's position on identity, difference and opposition, along with the power and desire that traverse them, tend toward that of feminist or ec- centric economy in which identity and value are at once produced and destroyed. His version of power and desire, will to power in the mode of eternal return, is similarly that to be found in ec- centric economy. That is, will to power in eternal return is the power/desire that would both produce and destroy the appearance of the power that Hegel's position represents.

The account of economy that Hegel represents is a version of the vulgarly masculine concern in that it organises differences into centric economy by means of a centre or transcendental signified to produce stable identities and values. The enigmatic play of difference, which would subvert the masterly dialectical progression, has been seen to have been reduced or organised in Hegel's economics to opposition and hierarchy. Rather than being the collapse of identity into meaningless diversity, difference for Hegel is productive of contradiction which is stable and self-identical insofar as it may be negated and conserved in the aufhebung.

Nietzsche's position on economy, power and desire, however, is feminist in that he attempts to chart the workings of what was presented in chapter two as the economy of difference. Nietzsche's



differences, the differences of forces in will to power, do not collapse into meaninglessness. Nor do they go to form a stable, even dialectically stable, identity or meaning, although they are doubtless productive. Rather, the absence of either arché or telos, the absence of a transcendental signified, that is indicated by the eternal return describes the production and destruction of meaning and value.

So, where Nietzsche's differences are productive and destructive, thus 'constituting' undecidable entities, Hegel's are simply productive—the aufhebung profits from the contradictions to which they give rise. And thus Nietzsche represents an instance of ec-centric economy, a non-vulgar feminism: and Hegel <sup>represents</sup> a version of the vulgarly masculine concern with centric economy.

The next chapter will look at the work of Heidegger and Adorno in order to ascertain their positions with regard to centric and ec-centric economy, the possibility of feminism.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### HEIDEGGER AND ADORNO

In his essay "Hegel and Heidegger", Gadamer characterises the difference between Adorno's and Heidegger's responses to 'the self apotheosis of thought implied in Hegel's idea of truth'<sup>1</sup>. He says that where the former contradicts it, arguing that 'the Whole is the false'<sup>2</sup>, the latter 'den[ies] it outright and juxtapos[es] it to the temporality and finitude of human existence'<sup>3</sup>. It is the task of this chapter to examine the responses of Adorno and Heidegger to the thought of Hegel and Nietzsche in order to ascertain their positions on the matter of economy and hence their relations to the or a possible feminism.

Heavily influenced by both Hegel and Nietzsche, Heidegger in turn plays a substantial role in the motivation behind Derrida and Foucault. Adorno is also much concerned with Hegel and Nietzsche and his presence in this chapter allows the comparison to be made between the reception of the latter's thought in both contemporary French thinking and in another critical tradition indebted to Hegel, Marxism.

HEIDEGGERIntroductory

The opening of Heidegger's early work, Being and Time, is illuminated by a statement from Plato's Sophist. Supposedly one of the later dialogues, The Sophist deals with existence, non-existence and difference, among other things, and takes place between Theatetus and the Eleatic Stranger who is a pupil of Parmenides and Zeno. The Sophist thus relates, thematically and temporally, to the Parmenides, a dialogue which, as Gadamer points out, appears to have exercised 'seminal power' in terms of both plan and terminology, upon the chapter of Hegel's Jena Logic in which he deals with the laws of identity and contradiction<sup>4</sup>.

The following sections will attempt to elucidate Heidegger's own thought on Being and beings, ontological difference and the Nothing in order to evaluate his relation to the work of Hegel on dialectics, the thought of identity, difference and opposition, and thus the matter of feminism. Whether Heidegger's position can be described in terms of denial and juxtaposition, (for elsewhere Gadamer himself says that it cannot), and what sense is to be made of Dasein's temporality and finitude, it is the task of this chapter to describe.

The Nothing and Negation

'Why does all dialectics take refuge in negation,

when it cannot provide dialectical grounds for this thing itself?' 5

'... the nothing is the origin of negation, not vice versa' 6

Thus does Heidegger pose and begin his dealings with the question of Being as it relates to dialectics in Being and Time and "What is Metaphysics?", two of his early works. Three and a half decades later, while the name of the task has changed, the question remains the same<sup>7</sup>, and Heidegger is found in "The End of Philosophy" saying that '... dialectical thinking ... remain[s] dependent upon openness which already dominates, upon the opening'<sup>8</sup>. It seems that dialectics, as a version of metaphysics, needs 'grounding', its 'origins' are to be 'accounted for' but in a way which is not metaphysical, which cannot simply be described as grounding or accounting for.

The essay "What is Metaphysics?"<sup>9</sup> asks the ambiguous and multifaceted question, "How is it with the nothing?". Characteristically, Heidegger unfolds and elaborates this question with an account of the received versions of the nothing. The version of the nothing that he receives from science is that the nothing is to be rejected as a simple 'nullity', as what there is not<sup>10</sup>. And from logic, which first teaches science of the nothing, he learns that the nothing is a form of negation. As such, it is a 'specific act of the intellect' and effects 'the negation of the totality of beings'<sup>11</sup>. Science,

consequently, wishes to know nothing of the nothing, it being an 'outrage and a phantasm', while for logic, thinking must act in a way contrary to its own essence when it thinks of the nothing<sup>12</sup>.

However, and equally characteristically, Heidegger proceeds in the rest of the essay to show, to the contrary, that the nothing is anything but a simple nullity. 'The nothing does not merely serve as the counter concept to beings: rather it originally belongs to their essential unfolding as such',<sup>13</sup>. Similarly, the nothing being originally experienced in the fundamental mood of anxiety, the 'possibility of negation as a specific act of the intellect, and thereby the intellect itself, are somehow dependent upon the nothing',<sup>14</sup>. And, if metaphysics, 'the question concerning the nothing', that is beyond or over beings, is the basic occurrence of Dasein, then thinking only enters into its essence when it thinks of the nothing<sup>15</sup>.

"What is Metaphysics?" presupposes and develops what is said in Being and Time about the nothing and its disclosure in anxiety. In § 40 of Being and Time, Heidegger says that if 'the "nothing" - that is, the world as such - exhibits itself as that in the face of which one has anxiety, this means that Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious',<sup>16</sup>. The nothing is that from which beings come to be the beings that they are for Dasein and thus that by means of which

Dasein comes to have or be the sort of being that it has or is. By means of 'having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it ...', a 'world' is disclosed to Dasein such that the Da and the sein of Dasein are as they are<sup>17</sup>.

Anxiety, then, is the state in which Dasein feels unheimlich, not at home in the world<sup>18</sup> and in which 'everyday familiarity collapses'<sup>19</sup>. In anxiety, the nothing is revealed in that Dasein is brought face to face with itself as being in the world. Its finitude and thrownness, the 'that it is and has to be', are disclosed as matters that are of the utmost significance and which must be concernfully and authentically dealt with. The nothing, the world as world, is disclosed in anxiety, then, insofar as those various ways of being-in, (having to do with something, producing something and so on), into which being-in-the-world has always already been 'dispersed', become apparent as the ways in which the Da and the sein of Dasein are constituted.

As what Heidegger calls an 'existentiale', Being-in-the-world is the basic state or structure of Dasein<sup>20</sup>. As such, Dasein is held out or hovering in anxiety<sup>21</sup> and, although this experience of the nothing is for the most part covered up or distorted,<sup>22</sup> it is in the sense that Dasein is essentially constituted by its concern for its Being-in-the-world that Heidegger says that Dasein's essence

lies in its existence<sup>23</sup>. If this is the case, then metaphysics is the basic occurrence of Dasein<sup>24</sup>, since metaphysics is the enquiry over or beyond beings 'to' the question concerning the nothing. And thus thinking only 'becomes' essential when it attempts to think what is here called the nothing.

Similarly, if the nothing is properly part of the process by means of which the Da and the sein of Dasein are constituted, and if it is originally disclosed in terms of the fundamental mood of anxiety, then it is in a sense 'prior to' the beings and the acts of the intellect that attempt the negation of those beings. Thus the nothing 'does not remain the indeterminate opposite of beings but reveals itself as belonging to the Being of beings'<sup>25</sup>. And thus 'the action of the nothing that oppresses Dasein in anxiety ... will not submit to calculation in terms of annihilation and negation'<sup>26</sup>.

In these ways, Being and Time and "What is Metaphysics?" introduce Heidegger's position with regard to the matter of dialectics. Beings, and the negation which dialectics would practice upon those beings, are 'grounded' in Being and the nothing. These latter are strictly undecidable in terms of presence/absence and annihilation/negation, the ways in which Being and the nothing are usually thought by science and logic, by metaphysics. Thus Hegel's proposition, that 'pure Being and pure Nothing are

therefore the same', is correct on Heidegger's account but because Being only reveals itself in the transcendence of Dasein beyond beings into the nothing<sup>27</sup>.

### Identity and Difference

'The principle of identity is considered the highest principle of thought'<sup>28</sup>. The usual or customary formulation of this principle,  $A = A$ , says that one A is equal to another, according to Heidegger. Thereby 'it conceals precisely what [it] is trying to say'. As usual, thinking has problems. For Heidegger, what the principle is trying to say is that 'A is A ... every A is itself the same'; by making it necessary that two elements are equated in the principle of identity, the customary formulation obscures the identity of a thing with itself. It took Western thought more than two thousand years to recover the sense of mediation within identity, to recover the 'essence, in itself synthetic, of identity' that was lost after Plato<sup>29</sup>.

Thus does Heidegger begin his dealings with the principle and matter of identity in Identity and Difference. Given this, it is, as he says, unlikely that the problems still involved and unresolved in the 'essential source of identity' will be dealt with in a day<sup>30</sup>. It appears that even the synthetic sense of identity that is prepared and formulated in the tradition of speculative idealism



and which culminates in Hegel is insufficient for the attempt to 'find out ... what identity is',<sup>31</sup>. In the form 'A is A', the principle 'tells us how every being is ... ; it itself is the same with itself'. In this way, the principle speaks of the Being of beings and as such, as a 'principle of Being', it says that 'to every being as such, there belongs identity',<sup>32</sup>. The doctrine of Western metaphysics thus says that identity belongs to the Being of beings: 'identity belongs to Being',<sup>33</sup>.

However, if we consider one of Parmenides' enigmatic fragments, we shall have to 'acknowledge the fact that in the earliest period of thinking, long before thinking had arrived at a principle of identity, identity itself speaks out',<sup>34</sup>. The fragment reads, 'For the same perceiving (thinking) as well as being'. Heidegger perceives this as saying that 'thinking and Being belong together in the Same and by virtue of this Same'; crudely put, where metaphysics says that identity belongs to Being, Parmenides says that 'Being belongs to an identity',<sup>35</sup>. Moreover, this identity that Parmenides' fragment speaks of 'stems from further back than the kind of identity' represented by metaphysical thinking.

If we are to make sense of this original form of identity, identity as a belonging together, we cannot do it in terms of thinking of a belonging together since that would be to 'represent

this belonging together as nexus and connexio,<sup>36</sup>. The thought of identity as a belonging together, on the other hand, opens the possibility 'of no longer representing belonging in terms of the unity of the together but rather of experiencing the together in terms of belonging',<sup>37</sup>.

Even this belonging together cannot be understood, however, 'as long as we represent everything only in terms of categories and mediation, be it with or without dialectic',<sup>38</sup>. Thus, when Heidegger says that 'man and Being are appropriated to each other',<sup>39</sup>, he is suggesting that this belonging, the relation, is more original than, indeed productive of, the terms that are related, that are together. He says that a leap or spring is required in order to move away from representational, metaphysical, thinking to where we always already are - to where Being and man are appropriated, belong together, and from where each first receives the determinations that are represented in metaphysics.

Man's relation to Being, which presents itself in what Heidegger calls the framework and as being accomplished via technology, is not originally of man's calculation and construction - it is not itself something technological. Beings are presented to man and man is delivered over to beings in the mode of technology by virtue of the event of appropriation. The Being of beings and man, as

calculable and calculative, are appropriate and appropriated to one another by virtue of the event of appropriation. Man and Being, then, are related in the appropriation in such a way that beings appear to man as appropriate to his nature and vice versa<sup>40</sup>.

The question now arises as to what appropriation has to do with identity. Heidegger answers, 'Nothing. Identity, on the other hand, has much, perhaps everything, to do with appropriation'<sup>41</sup>.

Where metaphysics 'represents identity as a ... characteristic of Being', Parmenides' fragment and a consideration of belonging together, introduce the possibility of a more original sense of identity that is a property of the event of appropriation<sup>42</sup>. Thus what metaphysics presents as identity has a more original sense that cannot be articulated in the terms of metaphysics. As far as representational thinking is concerned, this sort of identity must remain enigmatic but for Heidegger's more original thinking, an appropriate sense may be given to it.

The second essay in Identity and Difference, "The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics", deals with a number of highly complex and interrelated issues. Before looking at the account of difference that is offered there, it should also be noted that the essay explains how that account affects or effects Heidegger's relation to past thinkers in general and dialectics in particular.

The essay is set up as a conversation with Hegel: Heidegger says he will discuss the same thing in this essay as Hegel, Being. But, he says, Being 'with respect to its difference from beings',<sup>43</sup>. Consequently, where Hegel's position with regard to dialectics obliges him to sublate past thought, Heidegger says that 'for us, the character of the conversation with the history of thinking is no longer aufhebung but the step back',<sup>44</sup>.

That is, for Hegel, the force of a past thinker lies in what he has thought, 'in that their thought can be incorporated into absolute thought as one of its stages',<sup>45</sup>. But for Heidegger, the force of past thought lies in what has remained unthought but from which all thinking 'receives its essential space',<sup>46</sup>. Heidegger will not attempt to master or incorporate past thought in totalising, dialectical fashion, nor will he attempt the negation of that thought. Rather, he will attempt what he calls the step back into that which first gives us thought, gives us to think. Thus does Heidegger's position on the matter of dialectics affect or effect his relation to the thought of tradition.

On page 71 of Identity and Difference, Heidegger summarises his position by saying that 'Because the thinking of metaphysics remains involved in the difference which as such is unthought, metaphysics is both ontology and theology in a unified way, by virtue of the unifying unity of

perdurance'. That is, Heidegger says that 'the difference between beings and Being is the area within which metaphysics, Western thinking in its entire nature, can be what it is'<sup>47</sup>. If it is the oblivion of the difference that 'gives us thought'<sup>48</sup>, then, in not thinking that difference, and in attempting to account for the beings that are either in terms of a general ground or a highest being, metaphysics is onto-logy and theo-logy. Metaphysics is both, and in a unified way, because it is 'originally' what Heidegger wants to call 'difference as such ... difference as the perdurance of unconcealing overcoming and of self-keeping arrival'<sup>49</sup> that gives Being and beings in the first place.

Thus, when metaphysics represents the Being of beings as, or with regard to, 'the ground that is common to all beings as such then it is logic as onto-logic'. And when it represents the Being of beings as, or with regard to, 'the highest being that accounts for everything' then it is logic as theo-logic<sup>50</sup>. In both cases, however, Heidegger wants to say that metaphysics represents 'beings in respect of what differs in the difference without heeding the difference as difference'<sup>51</sup>. Two terms or differends, Being and beings, differ in the difference but neither onto-logic nor theo-logic consider that difference as difference.

The question Heidegger wants to ask is 'what do you make of the difference if Being as well

as beings appear by virtue of the difference ... ?<sup>52</sup>. That is, what if difference as difference, as the 'perdurance of unconcealing overcoming and self-keeping arrival'<sup>53</sup>, first give both Being and beings? If this were the case, and Heidegger wants to argue that it is, then Being and beings would not be separated by a between into which we could then representationally insert difference<sup>54</sup>. Original difference 'grants and hold apart the "between"'<sup>55</sup> in which overwhelming and arrival may relate to one another but which is forgotten in metaphysical thinking. In this latter form of thinking, it is the terms of the difference that are presented as Being and beings, ground and grounded, that are considered in favour of the difference as difference.

Thus it is no longer possible to think of the Being of beings in the ways that metaphysical thought does. Thought originally, difference as productive of both Being and beings means that 'Being does not leave its own place and go over to beings, as though beings were first without Being'<sup>56</sup>. There is, then, a sense of identity in difference - Being and beings are differentiated and first appear as such by virtue of the perdurance of the being apart and being toward each other of overwhelming and arrival. As Heidegger says, 'Being of beings means Being that is beings'<sup>57</sup>, now that difference has been thought more originally. And thus Heidegger can say, in The End of Philosophy, that, thought in terms of

the appropriation of Being and beings in original difference, 'difference is "identity"',<sup>58</sup>.

In this way, then, difference as difference, as perdurance, does not admit of representation and calculation in the terms of metaphysics. Difference in this sense, as Heidegger says, 'directs our thinking to the realm which the key words of metaphysics - Being and beings, ground and grounded - are no longer adequate to utter',<sup>59</sup>. And, insofar as this is the case, the original sense of difference must be forever enigmatic and undecidable as far as metaphysical thinking, (which thinks difference as the difference between two opposed terms, as what differs in the difference), is concerned.

Nevertheless, Heidegger thinks that this enigmatic difference may be given a proper sense and, although original difference may be said to dissolve the difference between identity and difference, he may be said to be concerned with the identity of identity and difference.

### Heidegger's Strategy

It may be said that Hegel was concerned with the identity of identity and difference and Nietzsche with the disruptive before, during and after of identity and difference. And it was suggested above that Heidegger was concerned with the identity in or of difference - he wants to re-awaken an appreciation of the original and proper sense of difference.

Before looking at how this strategy manifests itself in his other works, a prior indication of what the concern with the identity in or of difference consists in may be gained from a brief passage in the "Letter on Humanism"<sup>60</sup>.

In the letter, Heidegger says that logic and metaphysics think what is involved in 'the possible' and 'possibility' 'solely in contrast to "actuality"'.<sup>61</sup> Logic and metaphysics, that is, think 'possibility' as one of two dichotomous or antithetical terms: its meaning is generated as the opposite or different term to 'actuality'. The task of essential thinking, on the contrary, is to think 'possibility' in a more original way, in terms of Being. Thought 'before' or more 'originally' than the possibility of logic and metaphysics, Heidegger says that possibility is 'the "quiet power" of the favouring-enabling'.<sup>62</sup> Thought in this way, 'possibility' can no longer be represented and opposed to the 'actuality' of logic and metaphysics.

Being, with a capital 'B', therefore, is undecidable with regard to the terms of logic and metaphysics: it does not admit to calculation or determination as possibility or actuality, (nor as existence or essence, or any of the other oppositions in terms of which metaphysics deals with Being), as those terms are used and thought in metaphysics. 'Before' the terms of metaphysics/logic, Heidegger locates a 'between', an interval, which is undecidable



as far as those terms are concerned and attempts to give it an original and proper identity, an original and proper meaning.

Perhaps the most obvious example of this strategy, at least the clearest, is to be found in the essay "Language"<sup>63</sup>. Here, Heidegger is dealing with the difference between world and thing as the 'unitary fourfold of sky and earth, mortals and divinities'. However, the word 'difference' no longer means what it usually means; it is not a 'generic concept for various kinds of differences'<sup>64</sup> and neither is it to be opposed to what is customarily referred to as identity. Hyphenating, or introducing an interval into the word itself, Heidegger says that '... dif-ference is neither distinction nor relation'<sup>65</sup>. It cannot be made sense of or identified in the terms of metaphysics and, as such, constitutes an undecidable. Dif-ference is not 'merely a relation between world and thing, so that a representation coming upon it can establish it'<sup>66</sup>.

Rather, seeking the original and proper sense of dif-ference<sup>67</sup>, Heidegger says that dif-ference 'first determines world and thing in their presence'. A 'relation' that is no relation in the sense that metaphysics understands, which comes before and is productive of the terms so related, must be 'thought' if Heidegger is to describe dif-ference. That is, before any calculative and establishing representation can describe the 'separateness and

towardness of world and thing'<sup>68</sup>, the two already 'traverse a middle'<sup>69</sup>. Traversing this middle, world and thing first come to be what they are. Thus Heidegger says that 'in the midst of the two, in the between of world and thing, in their inter, division prevails: a dif-ference'<sup>70</sup>.

This between or interval that Heidegger calls dif-ference is not a difference that is added to world and thing 'after the fact'. Rather, it first 'opens up the separateness and towardness of world and thing' such that things bear world and world grants things<sup>71</sup>. Things, then, are present by virtue of world, only through world do they appear, and world is born(e), or as Heidegger has it, is gestured/gestated by things<sup>72</sup>. That which 'first determines world and things in their presence, i.e. in their being towards one another', the interval or between, is dif-ference. Heidegger describes the work of dif-ference by saying that 'dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world; it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of things'<sup>73</sup>.

If dif-ference is that which, itself incalculable and unmeasurable, 'first' produces the things and acts that may be represented and calculated, then Heidegger may be said to be concerned with the identity of difference. He is attempting to (re)awaken an appreciation of, and give a sense to, the interval that comes before and is productive

of the values and identities that metaphysics deals with as dichotomous opposites.

In the essay, "What is Metaphysics?", the nothing was seen to be incalculable with regard to the terms of metaphysics. Nihilation could not be described in the terms of science or logic as negation or annihilation/nullity. But on the other hand, Heidegger attempted to re-awaken a sense of its identity as nihilation<sup>74</sup> as in a sense productive of the terms and acts of science and logic. Similarly, in Being and Time, Being may be seen to be undecidable and incalculable with regard to any number of metaphysical oppositions, man/world, subject/object being just two such oppositions. Nevertheless, Being is made sense of, ultimately, in terms of the existentials constitutive of being-in-the-world.

Another version of this move may be seen in the grounding of the metaphysical couple correctness/incorrectness by means of the enigmatic process of aletheia's veiling/unveiling, the undecidable truth of Being which cannot be calculated or measured but which first sets the standard for every measure<sup>75</sup>. In the "Conversation on a Country Path", the sort of thinking that Heidegger wants to call 'meditative' and which would constitute Gelassenheit zu den dingen, is shown to be undecidable with regard to metaphysical thinking. If part of what metaphysical thought has consisted in has been described as either activity or passivity, willing or non-willing,

[Scientist:] Then Gelassenheit lies, if we may use the word lie, beyond the distinction between activity and passivity ...

Scholar: ... because Gelassenheit does not belong to the domain of the will. 76

And, finally, in "The Question concerning Technology"<sup>77</sup>, the supposedly antithetical values of art and technology are shown to issue from the undecidable and potentially threatening 'revealing' of poesis. Poesis, itself neither art nor technology, may 'go either way', according to the 'enframing'. In all of these examples, what is 'original' or primordial, according to Heidegger, cannot be simply accounted for or represented by the oppositional terms of metaphysics. And, in all of these examples, Heidegger attempts to ascribe or describe non-representationally what is thus original and proper. He attempts, that is, to re-awaken an appreciation of a proper sense, an original identity.

That is, what is original, (be it nicknamed aletheia, Being, the Nothing or whatever), and therefore the difference between what is original and what is derivative or grounded is, on Heidegger's account, strictly undecidable in the terms of metaphysics. Yet Heidegger wants to provide some sort of non-representational, non-calculative, 'account' of the original and the difference. Insofar as he does thus want to give a proper and original sense to what is incalculable in the terms of metaphysical thought, then he may be said to be concerned with the identity in or of difference.

### Heidegger and Nietzsche

Heidegger considers Nietzsche to be the last metaphysician, to have provided the vollendung, the final and complete stage of a way of thinking that is, if not predetermined, at least in some way destined. What is perhaps less well known is that it is again the role of the nothing in their thought that ultimately determines the positions they adopt. This section will look at Heidegger's Nietzsche and The Question of Being in order to account for Heidegger's position with regard to Nietzsche and the thought of the nothing, the thought of nihilism.

Heidegger's account of Nietzsche may be described in nuce as the claim that, for various reasons over which he had little or no control, Nietzsche misconstrues nihilism and the nothing. Heidegger says 'If ... nothingness prevails in nihilism and the essence of nothingness belongs to Being ... then the essence of metaphysics is shown to be the place of the essence of nihilism'<sup>78</sup>. Consequently, if Nietzsche is the last metaphysician, then, the history of metaphysics being co-terminous with the history of nihilism, it will come as no surprise to hear that Nietzsche also offers the 'completion' of nihilism<sup>79</sup>. Both nihilism and metaphysics fail to recognise the essence of the nothing. Nihilism ignores the work of the nothing which, as seen above, does not admit of calculation by metaphysics, to present representable values, and

as a result Heidegger considers Nietzsche's concept of nihilism to be itself nihilistic<sup>80</sup>. And metaphysics ignores that enigmatic no-thing to represent representable values as all there is, as what there is.

Insofar as nihilism and metaphysics represent the nothing nihilistically and metaphysically, as an act of the intellect that would effect the negation of all beings, for example, Heidegger says that they constitute the 'essential non-thinking of the essence of the nothing'<sup>81</sup>. That is, as seen in "What is Metaphysics?", nihil, the nothing, is anything but the simple negation of or counter concept to beings. Rather, it belongs to the essential unfolding or disclosure of beings as such. So, if, as Heidegger says, 'the essence of nihilism is nothing nihilistic'<sup>82</sup>, then valuative thought, that which represents representable values and beings as all there is and which constitutes Nietzsche's nihilism and metaphysics, thinks the essence of Being in its non-essence<sup>83</sup>.

Nietzsche's project of the transvaluation of all values is thus seen in Heidegger's work as the triumph of European nihilism, the final and complete stage of valuative thought. For Nietzsche, there is no Being 'behind' beings - there is will to power in the mode of eternal return. It is will to power that invests beings with value and identity, the thought and experience of which

would effect the transvaluation of all values. For Heidegger, however, that there is no Being 'behind' beings in Nietzsche is evidence of the fact that valuatative thought has completed itself in Nietzsche's work and that nihilism, in the guise of the thought and experience of the devaluation of all values, rules the world.

On Heidegger's account, then, Nietzsche has made Being itself into a value, there is no Being behind beings but rather Being itself 'exists' as a value, as a configuration of will to power in eternal return. Nietzsche's nihilism, active as it may be, thus misses the role of the nothing as the unthought and forgotten of Western metaphysics as far as Heidegger is concerned. And insofar as all of Being exists as a configuration of will to power for Nietzsche, Heidegger considers his work to form the last stage of the valuatative and representational thought that was begun with Plato.

It is in The Question of Being that Heidegger introduces the practice of writing Being as ~~Being~~<sup>84</sup>. Prefiguring Derrida's practice of the sous rature, the kreuzweise durstreichung, or crossing of Being hints at what Spivak has called the 'inarticulable presence' of the work of Being and the nothing<sup>85</sup>. It is this work, which has remained unthought, that constitutes the presence of Being and the nothing in beings. Hence ~~Being~~ is legible

but remains effaced, it is there but is no thing, no being and can only be read as its own effacement, its own self-concealment in the face of beings. After Nietzsche, then, the only way to conceive Being is under the kreuzweise durstreichung - it may not be simply described in the language of valiative and representational thought.

## ADORNO

### Introductory

Hegel's position was described as involving the identity of identity and difference. Nietzsche's was described as being concerned with the 'before' and 'after' of identity and difference, the affirmation of the differences and oppositions that must be falsified and reconstructed to form the stable and identical entities which can then be spoken about in terms of the identity of identity and difference. And, in the last section, Heidegger was shown to be concerned with the identity in or of difference. In this section, Adorno's position will be explicated as being concerned with the non-identity of identity and difference.

### Negative Dialectics

Adorno's dialectic 'does not tend to the identity in the difference between each object and its concept: instead it is suspicious of all identity, its logic is one of disintegration'<sup>86</sup>.



Such a conception of dialectic can be seen to relate to Nietzsche's ideas, noted above, concerning the way in which we are deceived by the similarity between words and concepts<sup>87</sup>. Adorno says that 'the non-identical element in an identifying judgement is clearly intelligible insofar as every object subsumed under a class has definitions not contained in the definition of the class'<sup>88</sup>.

That is, behind or beyond the identification of the thing as such and such a thing, by means of the concept, there are sensations like those referred to by Nietzsche that are not included in the definition of the concept and which disrupt the identity of concept and object posited in Hegelian dialectics.

Consequently, negative dialectics, the 'cognition of non-identity ... identifies in other ways and to a greater extent than identitarian thinking'<sup>89</sup>. And, where contradiction was once a vehicle of total identification, (that is, in Hegel, where contradiction is the ground, the productive support of movement), it is now up to (negative) dialectics to pursue the contradiction or inadequacy between thought and thing, to bring about the experience of contradiction in the thing.

A concise account of the difference between Adorno and Hegel might consist in the following. Where for Hegel dialectics involves the unity of subject and object and the unity or identity of

object and concept and where that identity is given positive value, is both desired and possible, for Adorno, that identity is neither possible nor desired, it has a negative value.

Identity thinking, the thought of Hegel's dialectic, 'says what something comes under ... and what, accordingly, it is not itself'<sup>90</sup> for Adorno. Critical, non-identitarian thought, the thought of Adorno's negative dialectic, would find such non-identities and attempt to make that contradiction manifest as part of its critical activity.

#### Positive and Negative Dialectics

So, for Adorno, it is the position or value accorded to identity that determines whether a dialectic is positive or negative. As noted in Negative Dialectics, the dividing line from Hegel is drawn by the dialectician's intent as far as Adorno is concerned. In a positive dialectic, Hegel's, for example, identity is the ultimate, the absolute and should be encouraged and reinforced - identity has a positive value that results from the negation of negation. In a negative dialectic, identity is conceived as the universal coercive mechanism, something to be escaped from. On the latter view, the negation of an original negation remains negative: 'to equate the negation of negation with positivity is the quintessence of

identification ... what thus wins out in the inmost core of dialectics is the anti-dialectical principle,<sup>91</sup>.

So, where, in Hegel, the one-sided truth expressed by non-dialectical or external reflection is completed by the aufhebung of contradiction, in Adorno that contradiction is pursued, its apoetic logic is made manifest and displayed:

A successful work, according to immanent criticism, is not one which resolves contradiction in a spurious harmony, but one which expresses the idea of harmony negatively by embodying the contradiction, pure and uncompromised, in its innermost structure.

As might be expected, a negative dialectic sounds like the reversal of a positive dialectic. Where the identity that results from the aufhebung is positively valued in a positive dialectic, it is of negative value in a negative dialectic. Where 'positivity' is itself valued, (as far as the 'homicidal praise of positive forces',<sup>93</sup>), in a positive dialectic, it is not in a negative dialectic. And where the negation of negation is affirmative for Hegel, it is not for Adorno<sup>94</sup>.

Thus, Adorno says that 'the Hegelian system ... must presupposed the identity of subject and object' whereas 'the concrete unfolding' of the system of spirit 'negates the identity it ascribes to its sum total'. Adorno's dialectics would break up the identity which <sup>he</sup> says Hegel must presuppose<sup>95</sup>.

### 'The Method'

Susan Buck-Morss, in her The Origins of Negative Dialectics, suggests that 'Adorno argued, on the one hand, that actual past history was not identical to the concept of history, (as rational progress), because of the material nature to which it did violence. At the same time, the 'natural' phenomena of the present were not identical to the concept of nature, (as essential reality or truth), because they had been historically produced'. Such a 'demythifying process', she continues, 'relentlessly intensified the tension between thought and reality instead of bringing them into a harmony'<sup>96</sup>. Within this tension, Adorno saw the hope for 'the future realisation of freedom'<sup>97</sup>.

Thus, in his "The idea of Natural History", Adorno points out that 'nature itself is transitory. It thus contains within it the moment of history. Whenever the historical appears, it refers to the natural which passes away within it. Conversely, where convention confronts us, it is de-ciphered by the fact that its meaning becomes clear precisely in its transitoriness'<sup>98</sup>. And, in Negative Dialectics, Adorno will demonstrate the thesis that being an object is part of the meaning of being a subject<sup>99</sup>, that the meaning of one is generated by the relation to the other.

So, of a pair of dichotomous concepts, one is said to elucidate the non-identity of the

other with its object and, at the same time, that other is used to bring out the non-identity of the first with its object. In the distance or space between concept and object, in that non-identity, Adorno perceived the hope for a demythified and free consciousness.

This, briefly, is the method of Adorno's negative dialectics. As Buck-Morss notes, 'the fluctuating meanings of Adorno's concepts, their purposeful ambivalence, is a major source of the difficulty of interpreting his works'<sup>100</sup>. It was Adorno's intention, then, to frustrate what he saw as the twentieth century's habit of only thinking in rigid categories by means of these shifting and ambivalent concepts.

An early version of Adorno's thesis here may be found in his Inaugural Lecture, "The Actuality of Philosophy", where he says that it is 'only in traces and ruins' that reason is 'prepared to hope that it will ever come across correct and just reality'. The idea of totality being beyond the grasp of reason, it is left to reason in the form of negative dialectics, itself the child of the lost totality, to find in 'traces and ruins' the signs of the Good Life.<sup>101</sup>

These ideas are more fully developed in Negative Dialectics<sup>102</sup>, where Adorno is considering the non-identity of concept and object.

Developing the account of negative dialectics that was introduced above, he says that, although it is hubris to define identity 'as the correspondence of the thing in itself to its concept', (as the form of thinking that Rose would call 'rational identity thinking' would do), identity must not simply be discarded<sup>103</sup>.

Rather, according to Adorno, 'living in the rebuke that the thing is not identical with the concept is the concept's longing to become identical with the thing',<sup>104</sup>. Although, that is, the will to identity may be the 'ideological element of pure thought', hidden in that will is also the pledge 'that there should be no contradiction, no antagonism'. Thus, what Adorno calls the 'Utopian element' is to be found even in the pragmatist, nature-controlling, identifying judgement<sup>105</sup>

In terms that prefigure what will be described below as the logic of the supplement or hymen, Adorno describes the two sorts of identity as follows. 'What is, is more than it is. This "more" is not imposed upon it but remains immanent to it, as that which has been pushed out of it. In that sense, the non-identical would be the thing's own identity against its identification',<sup>106</sup>. The 'thing's own identity' would be that identity which would constitute Utopia, when identitarian thought had been overcome, and 'its identification' refers to what could be called the 'bad identity' of

identitarian thought.

'For the sake of Utopia', then, in the form of 'hope' for that Utopia, identity in the sense in which we speak of identifying with people and things is 'contained' in the identifying judgements that we make and while these judgements are, nevertheless, the vehicles of ideology. Adorno says that 'Utopia would be above identity and above contradiction, it would be a togetherness of diversity',<sup>107</sup>.

Thus, not only is a mistrust of the work of identity compatible with the hope for Utopia, it is sanctioned and even demanded by that mistrust: it seems that, on Adorno's account, Utopia is 'on the way' anyway - the very form of judgement implies a desire for Utopia and the possibility of Utopia.

Consequently, it may be said that Adorno appropriates enough Nietzsche to mistrust the work of identity, conceived as a positive value, in the Hegelian dialectic. Similarly, where Nietzsche speaks of the way in which philosophical concepts belong 'just as much to a system as do the members of the flora and fauna of a continent',<sup>108</sup>, Adorno will speak of what he calls 'constellations'.

This idea is found in the Inaugural Lecture, among other places:

... just as riddle solving is constituted, in that the singular and dispersed elements of the question are brought into various groupings for so long until they close together in a figure out of which the solution springs - so philosophy has to bring its elements ... into changing constellations ... until they fall into a

figure which can be read as an answer. 109

Constellations are the sedimented systems in which elements become meaningful as 'second nature' or convention<sup>110</sup>: within these constellations, it is possible to articulate the oppositions between the elements that make them up. The riddles noted above would be where the author had contradicted himself, unintentionally and helplessly, because of the nature of the concepts he was using. In the ruptures of the text, then, in the gaps or spaces noted above, Adorno will locate unintentional truth, contradiction, and see these truths embodying the hope for a demythified and critical consciousness.

Where Hegelian dialectics would locate untruth, in the contradiction, non-identity or inadequacy between thought and thing, Adorno sees a different truth reflected, he sees social truth and the possibility of critique.

### Reversal/Displacement

It is claimed that Adorno appropriates Nietzsche's critique of identity thinking, of the will to identity, but that he (Adorno) employs the insights from that critique in the terms of a reversal rather than, as is claimed for Nietzsche, a displacement. Similarly, Nietzsche's contention that (philosophical and other) concepts develop within constantly changing economies is used in the idea of a constellation but again that it is used with



regard to already constituted elements. On Nietzsche's account, these elements would eventually confuse and subvert the attempt to posit relations between them which could be claimed to make sense of them. In short, it is claimed that Adorno employs Nietzsche against Hegel within centric or limited economy, an economy in which the value or meaning of the elements is already fixed, and thus that Adorno operates a reversal, from positive to negative, for example, rather than, as is claimed for Nietzsche, a displacement<sup>111</sup>.

However, the idea that Adorno simply reverses the terms and the hierarchy involved in identitarian thinking will be supported by looking at his reading of Nietzsche's ideas regarding amor fati. It is claimed that it is the idea of eternal return which determines and polarises Adorno's and Derrida's responses to Nietzsche and Hegel.

Briefly, amor fati, the embracing of one's destiny or fate, plays a role in the idea and experience of eternal return. As Nietzsche says, the thought of eternal return is his most abysmal thought<sup>112</sup> and it would take a truly Dionysian character to withstand that thought and experience. Amor fati involves the idea that 'one wants nothing to be different ... not in all eternity' and that one does 'not merely bear what is necessary ... but love it'<sup>113</sup>. The thought of will to power in

eternal return is a sort of test<sup>114</sup>, and the small man, the base, passive and reactive type could not cope with the thought and experience of it - only the noble and Dionysan could embrace and affirm the thought of it - amor fati.

Although the work of Utopia is more complicated in his thought than simply playing the role of some conceivable telic state, Adorno may be described, as Lyotard has done<sup>115</sup>, as being 'nostalgic'. Adorno is nostalgic insofar as he still hopes for the Good Life as the reversal or non-identity of presently constituted and accepted identities and values. That is, Adorno conceives and rejects Nietzsche's amor fati as 'the resignation that bows down in the face of the powers that be'<sup>116</sup>. Far from being the transvaluative experience that Nietzsche intends it to be, Adorno says that 'the origin of amor fati must be sought in the prison': 'love of stone walls and barred windows is the love of someone who sees and has nothing else to love'<sup>117</sup>.

Now, the problem becomes that of accounting for how Adorno can say that Utopia would be a 'togetherness of diversity', above and beyond contradiction<sup>118</sup>, when what is thus beyond identity and contradiction is Nietzsche's eternal return. Since Adorno has rejected the eternal return and amor fati, the only thing he can mean by a togetherness of diversity is a togetherness between the things that are together here and now, between

the elements of an already constituted economy. This economy is centred economy, economy that has not been transvalued by the thought and experience of eternal return as has ec- centric economy.

If, that is, eternal return is conceived as the transvaluing experience that would transform both man and world to bring about heaven on earth, as Haar, for example, has suggested<sup>119</sup>, and if Adorno is hoping for Utopia as beyond or infinitely distant from the here and now<sup>120</sup>, then he may indeed be described as nostalgic. Thus it is claimed that Adorno is operating within an already constituted set of terms, 'the powers that be' and the 'prison', and failing to see the non-dialectical constitution and subversion of those terms in will to power. He does not take account of the experience of eternal return.

With regard to what might be called the question of woman, on the other hand, it might be claimed that Adorno's appropriation of the already formed concepts of history and nature and his idea of negative dialectics, (as a reversal of Hegelian dialectics), prevent him from dealing with the question of the woman in Nietzsche's work as anything more than something to be excused and dismissed. Adorno considers Nietzsche's treatment of women to be the question that finally brought his thought 'under the sway of bourgeois society'<sup>121</sup>.

According to Adorno, Nietzsche simply 'took over a second-hand and unverified image of feminine nature from the Christian civilisation he otherwise so thoroughly mistrusted' and failed to see in this case that 'whatever is in the context of bourgeois delusion called nature is merely the scar of social mutilation',<sup>122</sup>. Thus it is claimed that, insofar as there are many women and many different sorts of women in Nietzsche's work, each of them 'employed' for different strategic purposes, for the articulation of different manifestations of will to power, and such that they would, as femina vita, utterly confuse and postpone the attempt to posit precisely the sort of identity that Adorno would conceive himself as objecting to, Adorno has read his own image of feminine nature and his own privileging of identity into Nietzsche's work. And thus he may be said to be taking over the terms that have been constituted in society by means of the 'necessity of meaning' based upon the logic of identity in order to reverse those terms.

### Implication

The relation between a thinker and the tradition of which he is a part is a dialectical relation according to a dialectician: the way in which a thinker conceives that relation will therefore depend upon how that thinker conceives the nature of dialectics. There appear to be at least two

ways in which Adorno conceives himself to be related to past thinkers. Phrases indicating a decisive break with, or a stepping outside of, the tradition are to be found alongside phrases which would indicate a more sophisticated conception of that relation. In either case, however, the position of the immanent critic with regard to tradition is determined by the practice of negative dialectics.

That is, sometimes Adorno will speak of a 'decisive break' with Hegel<sup>123</sup>, or of a 'farewell to Hegel'<sup>124</sup>, and he will say that negative dialectics 'names the difference from Hegel'<sup>125</sup>. Statements like these would tend to suggest that Hegel and the Hegelian tradition have been left behind or negated. Insofar as negative dialectics 'names the difference from Hegel', it would appear that Adorno conceives his work as an identity that could be put in opposition to Hegel.

On the other hand, a more sophisticated account is also to be found in Adorno's work. This account appears to be informed by Hegel's contention that 'the genuine refutation must penetrate the opponent's strong-hold and meet him on his own ground; no advantage is gained from attacking him elsewhere and negating him where he is not'<sup>126</sup>. The idea of the sublation of a work, 'through its own immanent dialectic'<sup>127</sup>, finds its expression in Adorno's idea of immanent critique.

According to Adorno, 'dialectic's very procedure is immanent critique'. Rather than opposing a philosophical work, a literary work or indeed a culture, by means of a 'position' or 'model' that is external and 'alien' to it, immanent critique will 'push' that work or culture 'to where it cannot afford to go',<sup>128</sup>. Immanent criticism, then, does not, on this account, oppose or critique by means of external models or positions.

Elsewhere, however, immanent criticism is said to involve positions of both interiority and exteriority with regard to its subject matter. In Negative Dialectics, for example, we are told that immanent criticism of the privileging of identity means, 'paradoxically enough', 'to criticise it from outside as well'. And, in Prisms, we learn that 'the dialectical critic of culture must both participate and not participate in culture',<sup>129</sup>. Finally, as Adorno says, 'the very opposition between knowledge which penetrates from without and that which bores from within becomes suspect to the dialectical method which sees in it a symptom of precisely that reification which the dialectic is obliged to accuse',<sup>130</sup>.

So, there are a number of ways in which Adorno conceives his position with regard to tradition, completely outside it, completely inside it, both within and without and neither within nor without. Presumably, Adorno could provide as many reasons

for the different <sup>are</sup> accounts of the position of the negative dialectician as there are accounts of that position. However, it is claimed that whatever Adorno says is his position, it is actually described in 'the method' of negative dialectics and that his repeated and various relations to outside and inside are indicative of the fact that dialectics, whether negative or not, deals with fixed, stable entities that may be seen to be identical, non-identical, and opposed to one another.

Thus Adorno's work may be describing the non-identity in the identity that characterises tradition. Where Husserl, for example, will expound his doctrine of perception, Adorno will elucidate the antinomies of that doctrine. He will demonstrate the non-identity, the contradiction, within that doctrine or identity. So, if the thinkers of the past conceive tradition to be a process in which a standpoint is raised to a higher one by means of its own immanent dialectic<sup>131</sup>, Adorno will demonstrate the contradiction in such a conception and exhibit that contradiction by means of immanent critique.

That Adorno continually talks of the outside and the inside, of the constitutive role played within conceptuality or nature, for example, by that which is supposedly outside that conceptuality or nature, is, it is suggested, indicative of the fact that he does not radicalise the insight into that constitutive work. Had that insight been so

radicalised, it would be possible to suggest, with Nietzsche, for example, that that work is undecidable with regard to the terms of the opposition and that it is the 'source' of that opposition. That is, the work of the inferior term of the opposition in the other, superior, term is reduced or managed in order to provide an account of the non-identity of the superior term rather than an account of the work that is constitutive of both terms 'in the first place'. More will be made of these points in the chapter that follows and with respect to the difference between Adorno's practice and that of Derrida.

### Conclusion

The differences between Heidegger and Adorno and their relations to Derrida's feminism will be discussed in greater detail towards the end of the next chapter, after Derrida's feminism has itself been discussed. However, it should be clear that Heidegger's position on the matter of economy is fairly complex and at times approaches that of a non-vulgar feminism, one that is instructive for both Derrida and Foucault. That Adorno's position, while appearing to be a more or less vulgar feminism, a reversal, also approaches that of a non-vulgar feminism, may be less clear.

Conceiving identity, difference and opposition as they are found in Hegelian dialectics



to be in need of grounding, Heidegger says that their origins have been forgotten. That is, metaphysics presents the elements of economy as representations or valuations, and one, be it 'idea, ousia, energeia' or whatever<sup>132</sup>, is privileged and held to be the unifying or governing value which regulates the value or identity of all the others. On Heidegger's account, identity, difference and opposition are conceived metaphysically as representations or valuations and are regulated by some other representation or value, what was called the centre above.

Thus, he says that they need to be grounded, that their grounds should be remembered, brought out of occlusion: some non-representational and non-valuative source must be found for their value. And thus he says that, considered more originally and authentically, identity is to be thought, via belonging together, as the event of appropriation. Difference is to be thought as a special sort of identity and opposition as a stepping back into the essential unthought of past thinkers. Similarly, it has been seen that negation, another ingredient in Hegel's dialectic, is to be thought as having its grounds in the Nothing rather than the other way round, as is held by metaphysics.

Adorno, however, thinks that the privilege accorded one of the constitutive terms of economy, identity, is misplaced and that it should

be given to that which is equally part of the production of value but which has been forgotten, difference or non-identity. On Adorno's account, then, identity, difference and opposition are organised metaphysically in that identity is privileged and regulates the value of all the other terms.

Both Adorno and Heidegger may be said, therefore, to be approaching and 'missing' a non-vulgar feminism and from different directions. Although, clearly, it is not being suggested that a non-vulgar feminism has a 'proper place', (that idea was dealt with in chapter two), Heidegger may be seen to be approximating to a version of eccentric economy, feminist economy, in that he says that the terms of metaphysics are inadequate to describe the original and primordial grounds of themselves. That is, Being, for example, is strictly undecidable in terms of beings, in the terms of metaphysics. And Adorno may be seen to tend toward such a position in that the meanings of the terms he uses fluctuate according to what he is trying to do with them and as a result of the work of non-identity.

Therefore, in that Heidegger is concerned with an economy in which value or identity is undecidable in the terms of metaphysics and issues from a source that cannot be described in the terms of metaphysics but which may, nevertheless, be given a proper and original sense, he is approaching and missing non-vulgar feminism from

the side of ec- centric economy. He is always led back, by this concern with the proper sense of the origin, to centric, vulgarly masculine, economy. And Adorno approaches ec- centric economy in that the value or identity of the terms he uses fluctuates but is ultimately prevented 'access' to a non-vulgar feminism by the role of Utopia in his thought. The undecidable is, or may always be seen, in the last instance, to be reduced to centric economy by the task he is trying to carry out and the role of Utopia as telos, even if it is a negative telos.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### DERRIDA

In chapter two, reference was made to the tension between centric and ec- centric economy. In the attempt to present economy, the production and legitimation of meaning and value, that distinction was presented as a matter of a relationship between identity, difference and opposition and as traversed by various relations of power and desire. Having followed that account through the work of Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Adorno, using the idea of dialectic as a guide, it remains for the present chapter to recapitulate those themes and to consider the ways in which they affect the workings of economy, power and desire as they are found explicitly in the work of Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari.

Consequently, this chapter will deal with the work of Derrida on economy in order, on the basis of the 'genealogy' of the previous chapters, to show how that work provides for the possibility of feminism. Having done that, the differences between his position and those of Adorno and Heidegger on the matter of economy and hence feminism will be pointed up. In chapters six and seven, the work of Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari will be used to show that and how power and desire are

organised in economy to produce and legitimate the sort of economy and the sort of values and meanings that have been characterised thus far as phallocentric.

### Differance

Derrida considers differance, with an 'a', to operate a displacement that is both radical and infinitesimal with regard to Hegel's dialectics and to mark the point at which one breaks with the system of the aufhebung<sup>1</sup>. The following sections will continue to elucidate the idea of economy with reference to dialectics and they will begin here with Derrida's position.

That position is elliptically summarised in "The Double Science" by his saying that 'it is not only the difference, (between desire and its satisfaction), that is abolished [by the thought of the hymen] but also the difference between difference and non-difference'<sup>2</sup>

However, Derrida is more than usually careful when it comes to dealing with Hegel: he quotes with apparent approval Engels' remark to the effect that 'the fellow demands time to be digested'<sup>3</sup>, he refers to the relations in which his works exist with those of Marx and the Marxist tradition and he says that 'I attempt to bring the critical operation to bear against the unceasing reappropriation of this work of the simulacrum by a dialectics of the

Hegelian type'<sup>4</sup>. The simulacrum, difference with an 'a', for example, must be constantly and critically surveyed in order that it does not succumb to being appropriated by Hegelian dialectics, to being defined as Hegelian contradiction, for example, as it seems Houdebine and Scarpetta would like to do<sup>5</sup>.

To say that the logic of the hymen<sup>6</sup>, or any of the other strategically employed undecidables that are to be found in Derrida's work<sup>7</sup>, abolishes the difference between difference and non-difference sounds like Hegel's saying that difference, as difference of itself from itself, is not different from identity. The lack of difference between difference and non-difference that Derrida assures us the hymen effects sounds like the lack of difference between identity and difference that Hegel says difference, in and for itself, is.

However, it is difference with an 'a' that effects the radical and infinitesimal displacement of Hegel's system and, as Derrida says, difference with an 'e' sounds like difference with an 'a'. To see how this difference makes the difference, the next section will look at difference and eternal return.

#### Difference and eternal return

Difference, with an 'a', is Derrida's version of Nietzsche's eternal return; as he says,

the same ... is not the identical. The same is precisely difference ... as the diverted and equivocal passage from one difference to another, from one term of the opposition to the other ... It is out of the unfolding of this 'same' as difference that the sameness of difference is presented in the eternal return 8

Difference, as the 'origin' of differences, which appears in the coupled oppositions or differences of which both philosophy and everyday language are made, as the reference/detour of one term to another, is the same. The same, on the other hand, is the way in which difference appears in the coupled oppositions of philosophy and everyday language to effect the reference/detour of one term to another. There is, then, nothing to stop this unfolding, (which is the 'condition' or 'non-full, non-simple "origin"'<sup>9</sup> of meaning), nor, indeed, anything with which it might have begun. Insofar as this is the case, difference is Derrida's version of eternal return.

The eternal return is the return of the same but not of the identical, (this, it is claimed, is the point that Adorno did not appreciate when he disapproved of amor fati as a bowing down to the powers that be), since for it to be the eternal return of the identical, (which is in fact a contradiction in terms), the terms that were returning would have to be full, simple presences that did not obtain any value they had by appearing as the difference of some other term.

It is thus difference with an 'a' that breaks with Hegel. It is thus that difference with an 'a' breaks with difference with an 'e' while, nevertheless, sounding like it. And it is thus that the abolition of the difference between difference and non-difference breaks with, while sounding like, the identity of identity and difference. In this way, it is suggested, does Derrida appropriate, take over and transform, Nietzsche's thought and experience of eternal return: difference, as the 'unfolding of the "same"' provides the 'non-full, non-simple "origin"' of the differences which may then be thought as dialectical differences and taken up into a dialectic 'of the Hegelian type'.

The displacement is radical insofar as difference, with an 'a', 'predates' the Hegelian dialectic of identity and difference. Where Hegelian contradiction is an active and productive ground for identity and difference, difference is the '"active" ... discord of the different forces and of the differences between forces' that constitute Nietzsche's will to power<sup>10</sup> and which would both constitute and postpone identities and differences<sup>11</sup>. In this way, the difference is radical in that it shows the difference between centric or restricted, (Hegelian), economy and ec-centric or general, (Nietzschean and Derridean), economy.



The displacement is infinitesimal in that, as noted above, Hegelian difference, as the identity of identity and difference, sounds like the Derridean hymen, as the abolition of the difference between difference and non-difference. The displacement is infinitesimal insofar as, as will be seen later, it is not as if there is any 'gap' or space between centric and ec- centric economy. It is not, that is, as if there were concepts or operations that are metaphysical in themselves: as Derrida says in "The Retrait of Metaphor", there is no metaphysics in itself, and as he says in Dissemination, it is rather as if a veil passes between a concept and itself.

If, as suggested here, difference is Derrida's version of the eternal return, then the 'deconstructive program', such as it is, may be 'conceived' as an attempt to put to work Nietzsche's idea of a non-reactive or affirmative nihilism - an attempt, thus, to complete nihilism. It is affirmative and non-reactive in that there is no (apparent) question of 'nostalgia' for an arché or a telos with difference.

#### Restricted and general economy

As will be seen, this distinction between restricted and general economy is another way in which Derrida signals the difference between centric and ec- centric economy. The difference

between these two economies is, literally, senseless; 'it is the difference of sense, the unique interval between meaning and a certain non-meaning',<sup>13</sup>.

The difference, then, is the difference between difference and difference, between the ec-centric economy of difference and the centred economy of differences that exist between stable entities and are governed by what Derrida calls the centre or transcendental signified. In that this difference is also radical and infinitesimal, and for the same reasons, as the difference between Hegel's system and difference with an 'a', it might well be referred to as the difference between restricted and general economy.

It might be noted at this point that the move from centric to ec-centric economy in Derrida's work reflects what Nietzsche says about the transvaluation of values - the change in the element from which value derives, the change in the value of values. Where in centric economy the value of values derives from a privileged term or value, the transcendental signified, in the economy of difference, value is at once produced and destroyed by the play of differential relations<sup>14</sup>.

With regard to restricted and general economy, the translator of Writing and Difference notes on page 335 that '... aufhebung means to negate and conserve at the same time. In the

Phenomenology of Mind each step along the way is lifted up and interiorised, negated and conserved in the next step. Thus the aufhebung leaves nothing behind and is the best of speculators because it wastes nothing and profits from everything. Bataille, Derrida is demonstrating, is not a "speculator" because he is concerned with precisely what is left behind, with the excess which the aufhebung excludes because it cannot profit, (i.e. make sense), from it'<sup>15</sup>.

Hegel's dialectic is thus centred economy, it 'restricts itself to conservation, to circulation and self-reproduction as the reproduction of meaning'<sup>16</sup>. It restricts itself to already constituted values and cannot account for or make sense of the absence/loss of sense that is the non-full, non-simple 'origin', the eccentric economy of difference.

Thus the difference between these economies, between Derrida's difference and Hegel's dialectics, is radical insofar as difference is productive of the oppositions and differences that Hegel's dialectic will cancel and preserve on a higher level by means of the aufhebung. It is infinitesimal because the 'gap' between the two economies is no gap at all, rather it is as if a veil passes between Hegel and himself<sup>17</sup>. There are no concepts that are purely and simply 'part of' centred economy,

purely and simply metaphysical<sup>18</sup>, as there would have to be in order to speak of a 'gap'.

Rather, the concepts, operations and procedures that are constitutive of philosophy are all governed by or produced within an economy with a transcendental signified, a restricted or centred economy. Thus the reading of Hegel allows for the reading of the general economy that Hegel must restrict in order to write but which cannot itself be written. General economy, <sup>ec-</sup>centric economy, cannot be written, as grammatology is the name of a question rather than the name of a science, save through recourse to the few strategic ploys that can be used to disrupt centred economy.

### Implication

One aspect of the way in which Derrida conceives his relation to past thought or tradition has been noted in the introduction to this essay. In Spurs/Eperons, he says that 'if the form of opposition and the oppositional structure are themselves metaphysical, then the relation of metaphysics to its other can no longer be one of opposition'<sup>19</sup>. Thus Derrida does not consider himself to be opposed in any simple fashion to those thinkers he deals with: his relation to the thought of tradition, like Adorno's, is determined by his conception of and relation to the thought of dialectics.

The traditional and metaphysical forms of opposing what one chooses to term metaphysics and tradition are discussed by Derrida at a number of places and may be seen to fall into two basic types, that of refusal and that of reversal.

There are two forms of refusal. The first consists in refusing the terms and values implicit in any discourse. And the second consists in refusing or rejecting the terms and values implicit in a particular form of discourse and replacing them with another form of discourse. However, as Derrida says, 'the step "outside philosophy" is much more difficult to conceive than is generally imagined by those who think they made it long ago with cavalier ease and who are in general swallowed up in metaphysics by the whole body of discourse which they claim to have disengaged from it'<sup>20</sup>.

Both these forms of refusal, of stepping outside philosophy, are difficult and highly risky, then, if not impossible, for there is, on Derrida's account, no discourse that is foreign to that of metaphysics. One risks either silence or the simple repetition of the offending material. On the other hand, even if it were possible to simply step outside of all the discourses of tradition and metaphysics, it is unlikely that what is thus outside those discourses would be communicable. And the attempt to oppose and replace one discourse with another is doomed since it is the organisation

of discourse in terms of a transcendental signified that constitutes metaphysics 'in the first place'. Thus, opposing tradition and metaphysics is not 'a question of opposing a graphocentrism to a logocentrism, nor, in general, any centre to any other centre'<sup>21</sup>.

There are, similarly, two forms of reversal. The first form consists in privileging the hitherto supplementary term because the things it is said to be are 'really' more valuable than the things those terms having the properties of the transcendental signified are said to be. On such a strategy, writing, for example, would be privileged because being the sign of a sign was held to be more valuable than the presence of the spoken word. And the second form of reversal consists in privileging the hitherto supplementary term because it is 'really' all the things that the privileged term is held to be and is thus of at least equal value.

However, as they stand, Derrida asserts that these forms of opposition amount to little more than 'a clamorous declaration of the antithesis'<sup>22</sup>. Both privileged and supplementary terms are produced within the economy of discourse and so is the idea of privilege/supplementarity: reversal, therefore, affects neither the 'form' nor the 'content' of a centred economy, of tradition.

A crude characterisation of these forms of opposition would be to say that refusal attempts

to step outside of tradition while reversal opposes wholly from within tradition and metaphysics. The form of opposition and the oppositional structure are thus metaphysical insofar as outside and inside are categories which have been produced 'within' metaphysics.

The question or matter of a 'double strategy', of 'struggling ... upon two fronts, on two stages, and in two registers',<sup>23</sup> manifests itself here in that what seems to be required is a form of opposition that is not metaphysical insofar as it is neither a form of remaining wholly within metaphysics nor a form of stepping completely outside metaphysics. Sensitive to the Hegelian law, noted above<sup>24</sup>, which dictates that 'one cannot speak out against [Reason] ... except by being for it', Derrida says that, from 'within its domain, Reason leaves us only the recourse to strategems and strategies',<sup>25</sup>. Thus, the language of metaphysics, the only one available<sup>26</sup>, must be shown to be both produced and destroyed in eccentric economy.

Thus Derrida says that the 'thought that means nothing', the thought that exceeds meaning and meaning-as-hearing-oneself-speak by interrogating them - 'this thought, announced in grammar, is given precisely as the thought for which there is no sure opposition between inside and

outside'<sup>27</sup>. While the language one is compelled to speak will oblige one to speak of outside and inside, strategems and strategies will enable one to 'oppose' metaphysics and tradition in such a way that one's positions are ultimately undecidable; one is neither outside nor inside, outside and inside become undecidable.

In effect, the difference or tension between centric and ec- centric economy constrains opposition to centric economy to recognise that moments of centric economy possess a form of strategic necessity as well as being, precisely, that which is to be critiqued or transgressed. Moments of centric economy, whether in the guise of a telos or the language of metaphysics, are necessary in that they are the only recourse strategy has. But, in that they exist as a tension between centric and ec- centric economy, they are to be critiqued, exposed as such and shown to be ultimately undecidable.

It was noted above that the difference between centred and ec- centric economy could not be given a sense, that it is the 'unique interval which separates meaning from a certain non-meaning'<sup>28</sup>.

Derrida employs a number of strategic pseudonyms or, as he has it, 'non-synonymic substitutions'<sup>29</sup>, for that interval<sup>30</sup>, for that thought which means nothing. He calls it difference, supplement, pharmakon and hymen, among other things<sup>31</sup>. It is 'the logic



of the hymen'<sup>32</sup> then, that, while accounting for Derrida's position with regard to metaphysics and tradition, will describe the strategies to be employed in dealing with that tradition and account for the relation to the thought of identity, difference and opposition, the thought of dialectics.

This 'logic' or 'graphic'<sup>33</sup> of the hymen may be seen at work in Derrida's reading of Rousseau. In Rousseau's discussions of writing and masturbation, he will say that they are supplementary operations and that they are to be excluded from the realms of communication and sexuality proper. Writing, as in Saussure, Husserl and back to Plato, involves the representation of the speaker's intentions, for example, that are fully and simply present in speech. Masturbation, on the other hand, is to be excluded from the realm of sexuality proper because it "cheats" ... "nature",<sup>34</sup> and involves the absence of a sexual object who is simply present in proper intercourse. Both writing and masturbation are condemned as dangerous supplements.

So, where Rousseau condemns writing and masturbation for involving the unnatural and potentially dangerous lack of presence that is found in a pure and simple form in speech and sexual intercourse, Derrida shows that he also wants to say that only in his writing is his true or proper self to be found<sup>35</sup> and that his desire was most 'real', its full strength was most manifest, precisely when the loved

woman was absent<sup>36</sup>. Thus Derrida brings out the way in which, in Rousseau's text, writing, supposedly inferior and to be excluded, contained outside speech, is definitive of speech, interior to it. And he shows the way in which sexuality 'proper' is a version of masturbation, in that it is the absence, either actual or possible, of the sexual object, that renders either in any way satisfactory. Derrida thus shows how, in the works of Rousseau and the others, that which represents a force in the forms of writing and masturbation interior to intercourse and speech and essential to them has been contained outside them<sup>37</sup>.

Except that such a demonstration has confused what was meant by vulgar conceptions of both speech and writing to such an extent that there is no longer any simple, identifiable difference between the inside, what is proper to, and the outside, what is inessential to, of speech and intercourse. Ideas as to what their identities consisted in, necessary for writing to be contained outside and inferior to speech, for example, have been rendered undecidable. Thus does the logic of the hymen question and problematise what were thought to be simple oppositions.

In terms of a relation to tradition and metaphysics, then, Derrida does not oppose himself to or claim to stand outside of that tradition. Rather, he inhabits as he reads a text - his version of deconstructive practice is parasitical in a way

that would, nevertheless, show that received notions of the parasitical were inadequate. He will account for the production of differences in a text and show how each appears as the difference of the other rather than posit an alternative set of oppositions or differences. So, if the relation of metaphysics to its other can no longer be one of opposition, Derrida will not oppose metaphysics, nor will he attempt to contradict or negate it. His deconstructive practice will rather be informed by the 'logic of the hymen': it will be 'an operation that both sows confusion between opposites and stands between the opposites at once'<sup>38</sup>.

Consequently, if the logic of the hymen involves the abolition of the difference between difference and non-difference, the confusion of fixed and stable identity, and thus the surplus that the aufhebung cannot account for and sublate, (that surplus being ultimately irreducible to identity, 'an excess facing, un debord, ... that cannot be mastered'<sup>39</sup>, then Derrida's difference may be said to 'come before' dialectics. As noted above, the centred or restricted economy of dialectics must reduce, master or tie down the ec- centric economy of difference in order for there to be anything like identities, difference between those identities and then the aufhebung of those differences.

Difference, then, the conflictual and productive play of differences<sup>40</sup>, and detours among

those differences, cannot be conceived as a version of dialectics since it would produce and destroy at the same time<sup>41</sup> the values and identities that dialectics can master. And, where Adorno's negative dialectics would show the detour of nature via history, for example, an instance of non-identity between concept and thing, Derrida would show it as the undecidable, non-full, non-simple 'origin' of differences<sup>42</sup> that has to be, but which can never be, reduced in order to then speak of identities and differences.

The hymen, then, is 'neither identity nor difference ... neither inside nor outside ... that is, simultaneously either/or'<sup>43</sup>. It 'can no longer be included within philosophical (binary) opposition' and, although it would inhabit that opposition, it would not allow the opposition to exist as either Hegel's or Adorno's contradiction. It would never 'leave room for a resolution in the form of speculative dialectics'<sup>44</sup>.

### Derrida, Heidegger and Feminism

Derrida's account of ec- centric economy is thus feminist and an account of feminist economy insofar as the latter would both produce and destroy value and meaning without ascribing a self-present and self-identical value as source and insofar as the former does not attempt to provide such a reassuring origin. Before looking at the ways in

which power and desire operate and are operated upon in centric and ec- centric economy, the differences between Derrida's and Adorno's and Heidegger's feminisms will be explained.

Of the two forms of transgressive practice noted above, Adorno's will be seen to tend towards that of reversal while Heidegger's tends towards that of refusal. In the former, the work of the undecidable remains unappreciated and is ultimately mastered by the dichotomous oppositions that are correctly identified as the 'roots' of the problem. And in the latter, although the undecidable remains undecidable in terms of oppositional and representational thinking, meditative thought believes itself capable of giving an appropriate sense to that undecidable.

So, where Jameson confesses to being tempted to characterise Derrida and the rest of the Tel Quel group of the period as 'Left Heideggerians',<sup>45</sup> and where both Gasché and Wordsworth have suggested that Derrida's version of deconstruction looks like Adorno's immanent critique<sup>46</sup>, the following sections will attempt to distinguish it from both. It will be seen that, whatever affinities his work bears to theirs, it is ultimately the role or 'presence' of Nietzsche that divides his work from 'the Left' and from Heidegger.

The general features of Heidegger's relation to feminism should be fairly clear. In

Of Grammatology, Derrida refers to the impossibility of separating the two moments of Heidegger's situation with regard to the metaphysics of presence<sup>47</sup>. Continuing that discussion in Spurs/Eperons, he describes the ways in which Heidegger's onto-hermeneutic interrogation is disrupted by the enigmatic process of appropriation in the later texts<sup>48</sup>. Although Heidegger's thought of ec-centric economy is marked by an 'ineradicable preference' for centred economy, that thought is all the more surely led (back) to ec-centric economy<sup>49</sup> and Heidegger is at once contained in and transgressive of metaphysics<sup>50</sup>. That Heidegger's position with regard to feminism is fairly ambiguous should be clear.

Insofar as Heidegger is concerned with Being, the Nothing, appropriation and so on, the non-representable, non-calculable and hence undecidable source of value and meaning, his thought is transgressive of metaphysics, centred or phallogcentred economy and may be said to be feminist. Insofar as he wants to give a proper, or, as he has it, authentic, sense to this non-origin, to identify it non-representationally, his thought is contained in, as a refusal of, metaphysics. It may thus be described as phallogcentric. It is the play between the desire or preference for the proper and authentic sense of Being, for example, and the disruptive work of that undecidable non-origin that accounts for the ambiguous nature of Heidegger's position with regard to

feminism.

In terms of the relation to feminism, then, the differences between Heidegger and Derrida reduce to the following. For both Heidegger and Derrida, that which is productive or the origin of the representable and calculable terms of metaphysics is itself undecidable. For Heidegger, though, that origin constitutes some sort of identity, it may be given a proper sense and thought appropriately and it does not produce terms that are themselves undecidable. On Derrida's account, however, there is no suggestion of a desire to give that non-origin a proper sense or identity, nor to suggest that the terms of metaphysics are themselves simply and unproblematically calculable.

So, Heidegger's 'between' or 'interval' is said to be undecidable in terms of representational, calculative and valuative thought and to be productive of the terms with which metaphysics has to do<sup>51</sup>. At the same time, those calculable and representable entities are presented as simply and unproblematically representable and calculable<sup>52</sup>, and meditative thinking is called upon to give a proper, non-representational, account of that interval. On the other hand, Derrida's 'between' or 'interval'<sup>53</sup>, as general economy, is undecidable in the terms of centred economy, in terms of metaphysical thinking and is both productive and destructive of those terms.

At the same time, however, those terms are not themselves simply calculable or representable - like Derrida's Hegel and unlike Heidegger's beings, they are separated by a veil or tension from the general economy which cannot itself be simply represented but which must be restricted or represented in order for there to be representation.

It should come as no surprise, therefore, to see that where Derrida presents the economy of difference as a version of will to power in eternal return, Heidegger considers Nietzsche's will to power to be the final expression of Western metaphysics as the will to will. As on that of economy, Heidegger's position on will to power, on power/desire, is that he is concerned to find a 'prior stage' or 'beyond' to power and desire as they are represented metaphysically. Thus Derrida says that his version of deconstruction is not undertaken in order to see opposition disappear, that he is Nietzschean to the extent that it is the conflict of forces in will to power that produces values and meanings<sup>54</sup>.

And thus Heidegger says, in the "Conversation on a Country Path", that Gelassenheit would lie beyond the domain of the will. Heidegger's strategy consists in a refusal of the will to will, something which may also be seen in the "Letter on Humanism", where power is said to be the 'quiet power of the favouring-enabling'. There is no room in Heidegger's thought, as there is in Derrida's, for



dominance or submission except as the metaphysical representation of power/desire.

So, where Heidegger's origin is non-representable and lies beyond what he considers to be the calculable and representable terms of metaphysics, Derrida's difference is both constitutive and subversive of the terms of metaphysics. For Derrida, there is no beyond to the will to power in eternal return. His version of will to power is itself undecidable with regard to representability and would both produce and destroy terms, values and meanings. Insofar as these terms, values and meanings would be both produced and destroyed, they are similarly undecidable. Heidegger's beyond is undecidable in that the terms of metaphysics cannot 'get at it', cannot account for it, because they are representable and calculable. Derrida's difference is undecidable but precisely because it constitutes both the production and the destruction of the values of the terms employed to 'get at' it.

The difference between Heidegger and Derrida as feminists, then, consists in the fact that Heidegger is refusing what he considers to be metaphysics whereas Derrida is explicating the ways in which ec-centric economy is mastered or occluded by or in centred economy. If Heidegger's metaphysics is centred economy, in that Being has been occluded in the epochal reduction to particular beings which are then held to be the source of value, then his version of ec-centric economy, feminist economy, is a refusal

of the terms of metaphysics. Derrida's metaphysics is similarly centred economy but his feminism does not consist in refusal since there is no non-representational beyond. Rather, difference, ec-centric economy, inhabits as it takes apart or deconstructs the values of centred economy.

That is, chapter two has argued that ec-centric economy, constitutes the feminine operation, (in a non-vulgar sense), in that it would consist in both the production and destruction of value and meaning and is not based upon a self-present and self-identical value. Metaphysics, which consists in the operation by which ec-centric economy is mastered by centric economy, an economy in which value is produced by relation to a self-present, self-identical value, has been seen to be the vulgarly masculine operation in that it is the result of forces, desires and privileged values that have traditionally been considered to be definitive of masculinity. Heidegger's feminism is thus a refusal of metaphysics, phallocentric economy, in that it seeks a beyond and to give a proper sense to that beyond. And Derrida's feminism has been seen to consist in the illustration of the ways in which ec-centric economy is occluded as productive and destructive of the values and identities of centric economy.

So, the presence of Nietzsche in Derrida's thought differentiates him from Heidegger in that, for Derrida as for Nietzsche, there is no Being

behind or beyond will to power in the mode of eternal return. The 'non-full, non-simple "origin"' of meaning and value is the conflictual play of forces in will to power for both Derrida and Nietzsche whereas for Heidegger there is a beyond that is similarly undecidable but nonetheless available to authentic thought.

For example, as was seen in chapter four in connection with the Discourse on Thinking, Heidegger says that the meditative thinking which would constitute Gelassenheit zu den dingen lies 'beyond' the distinction between activity and passivity - it lies beyond the domain of the will. As such, it would lie beyond valuatative and calculative thought which deals with beings and is intimately connected with the domain of the will. David Krell refers to this issue when he says that 'in valuatative thought, Heidegger sees the main obstacle to Nietzsche's advance beyond metaphysical modes of thought'<sup>55</sup>.

So, as was seen in Heidegger's Nietzsche, Nietzsche remains a metaphysical thinker for Heidegger, providing, indeed, the fulfillment of metaphysical thought<sup>56</sup>. And, as seen in Derrida's Spurs/Eperons, 'the reading of Heidegger' or 'Heidegger's reading ... is opened up by a certain dehiscence'. Heidegger's reading is 'forced to open onto still another reading which for its part refuses to be contained there'<sup>57</sup>. That is, there is a certain 'tension' in 'the reading of Heidegger' - Heidegger's

text is itself between centric and ec- centric economy, and is itself opened up by that same tension as it is found in Nietzsche's text. Nietzsche thus escapes, as far as Derrida is concerned, Heidegger's 'last metaphysician' charge.

Nietzsche escapes because, for Derrida, metaphysics is centred economy which can include both representational and non-representational thinking, whereas, for Heidegger, metaphysics is representational thought which he equates as coterminous with evaluative thought. For Heidegger, the other of metaphysical thought is meditative, non-representational, thought whereas, for Derrida, it is ec- centric economy which can also include representational and non-representational thought.

Consequently, Heidegger can say that Nietzsche's style is nothing less than his relation to Being<sup>58</sup> and that because his style is bound up with a play of valuation, the thought of will to power<sup>59</sup>, Nietzsche is a metaphysician. And Derrida can say that Nietzsche's styles effect what 'escape' he is able to make from metaphysics. The heterogeneity of Nietzsche's text<sup>60</sup>, his strategy of writing, the differences and deviations in quills, in styles, determine that he does not simply erect a discourse against centric economy and that his texts exploit ec- centricity.

Nietzsche's styles are ec- centric for Derrida whereas they are calculative for Heidegger.

Arché-écriture is similarly ec- centric for Derrida and Being 'is' non-valuative for Heidegger. The latter's Being, however, is nevertheless at least partially constituted by centric economy as far as Derrida is concerned and that Heidegger 'misses' the question of the woman in Nietzsche's text is testimony to the limits of Heidegger's onto-hermeneutic project - the points at which it is disrupted by ec- centric economy. As Derrida has said, 'if style were a man ... then writing would be a woman'<sup>61</sup>.

Heidegger's project, that is, cannot cope with and/or is regularly disrupted by the ec- centric workings of undecidability - by what Nietzsche terms Vita Femina or will to power, and what Derrida terms arché-écriture or differance. Nietzsche's styles, as ec- centric, are non-vulgarly feminine and do not submit easily to Heidegger's project of non-representationally describing the proper or original truth of Being. Nietzsche's styles, then, return, eternally, to his woman, Vita Femina, who 'is (her own) writing'<sup>62</sup> whereas Heidegger's style would tie itself to, fix upon, the truth or meaning of Being.

#### Derrida, Adorno and Feminism

The differences between Derrida's and Adorno's feminisms, between their critiques of phal- locentric economy, may be summarised by saying that, where Adorno's feminism consists in a reversal of

the privilege accorded one of the terms of an opposition, Derrida's consists in a reversal 'followed by', (for he assures us that the operation(s) take(s) place 'in a kind of disconcerting simul<sup>63</sup>'), a displacement. This section will illustrate how the two practices differ and account for those differences by considering each thinker's relation to Nietzsche.

For Adorno, the metaphysical or ideological element of thought is identity. In a positive dialectic, like that of Hegel, for example, the identity of identity and difference that results from the negation of negation is given a positive value - it is both desired and possible. That identity is given negative value in Adorno's negative dialectic. It is conceived as the universal co-ercive mechanism and is neither desired nor strictly possible - only ideology presents it as either<sup>64</sup>. Consequently, for Adorno, metaphysics consists in (a) centred economy in which identity is privileged as centre. In such (an) economy, the values of the terms involved is generated by their relation to identity.

In this way, metaphysics or ideology may present something as natural and privilege it over the historical by virtue of the supposed identity of that thing with the concept of nature and by the supposed identity of the concept of nature and its object. Adorno's negative dialectic, then, does 'not tend to the identity in the difference between each object and its concept'<sup>65</sup>.

That identity, in terms of which ideological value is generated and legitimated, is rather to be distrusted and the ways in which it disintegrates or breaks down under its own immanent forces are to be described by the negative dialectician<sup>66</sup>. Thus Adorno says that a successful piece of immanent criticism 'is not one which resolves contradiction in a spurious harmony, but one which ... embod[ies] the contradiction, pure and uncompromised, in its innermost structure'<sup>67</sup>.

For these reasons, the meanings of the words that Adorno uses will change according to the use he is trying to make of them. Where it is the natural that is presented as privileged over the historical by ideology, it will mean something other than what it will mean when Adorno is trying to show how ideology presents convention or the historical as privileged. As noted above, Buck-Morss describes this strategy by saying that 'Adorno argued, on the one hand, that actual past history was not identical to the concept of history, (as rational progress), because of the material nature to which it did violence. At the same time, the 'natural' phenomena of the present were not identical to the concept of nature, (as essential reality or truth), because they had been historically produced'<sup>68</sup>.

Thus Adorno's negative dialectics will show the non-identity or contradiction within what

metaphysics presents as the identity of concept and object. It will attempt to show the constitutive role of the non-conceptual in the conceptual or the historical in the natural, for example<sup>69</sup>, and in so doing will reverse the privilege accorded to both the terms and to identity. That is, where, by virtue of its supposed identity with its object, the concept of nature is privileged over the historical, Adorno will reverse the privilege to show the role of the historical in the natural and thus show the non-identity between concept and object.

Derrida, however, does not 'simply' reverse the privilege accorded one of two terms in centred economy. The form, which is in each case hierarchical, of opposition, is also treated by Derrida's strategies so that what he terms 'displacement' takes place. By means of displacement, neither term may be clearly represented and identified as enjoying a privilege over the other. Thus he says that deconstruction is a 'double strategy' and that unless the reversal of the poles is followed by displacement, the work of the undecidable, then critique amounts to little more than a declaration of the anti-thesis. And thus the role of the telos in deconstructive strategy is at once necessary and to be avoided - it is at once produced and destroyed by the forces at work in displacement.

Metaphysics for Derrida, too, involves



the privileging of one term of an opposition by virtue of a relation of proximity to the centre of (the) economy. But, on his account, to reverse the privilege accorded the terms and identity is insufficient to subvert the operations of centred economy - displacement is also necessary.

Thus, as seen in his treatment of Rousseau's account of speech and writing, for example, Derrida will not only reverse the privilege accorded speech in Rousseau's work, nor will he simply show how writing plays a constitutive role in speech, (which would be Adorno's ploy here). Rather, he will attempt to show that what has been contained outside speech as inferior or supplementary is actually a force within speech and thus that the values of writing and speech are ultimately undecidable. It is not, on Derrida's account, as it is on Adorno's, as if speech and writing were different things, the latter having a constitutive role within the former, but rather that their relation is such that they are undecidable with regard to identity and self-presence; speech is a form of writing.

So, where negative dialectics consists in a reversal, concerned to show the non-identity between concept and object<sup>70</sup>, Derrida's difference 'cannot be preceded by any identity'<sup>71</sup>. The 'diverted and equivocal passage from one difference to another, from one term of the opposition to the other'<sup>72</sup>,

describes the movement of the undecidable and points to the 'non-full, non-simple "origin"' of differences<sup>73</sup>; of the hierarchically organised terms of the opposition.

And thus Adorno's 'fluctuating meanings', the 'purposeful ambivalences',<sup>74</sup> are not the same as Derrida's undecidables. There is no prior identity to the terms of Derrida's economy to which non-identity might be opposed. And there is, similarly, no theological, telic, presence, in terms of which the differences could be resolved.

The difference between Adorno's fluctuating meanings and Derrida's undecidables may be characterised as the difference between polysemia and dissemination, as that difference is outlined in Positions. Here, Derrida says that, although 'polysemia ... doubtless represents progress' in relation to the linearity of monothematic reading, which is always anxious to anchor itself to the principle signified of a text, it is nevertheless organised 'within the implicit horizon of a unitary resumption of meaning',<sup>75</sup>. 'Dissemination, on the contrary ... can be led back neither to a presence of simple origin ... nor to an eschatological presence',<sup>76</sup>.

There is no end, then, to the play of signification that is involved in dissemination, but Adorno's fluctuating meanings constitute polysemy insofar as they begin from already constituted entities and do not chart the production and destruction of

those entities. They also constitute polysemy in that they are governed by the pledge that is contained in judgement that there be no non-identity. This pledge, as seen above, is that what has been called the bad identity of concept and thing be replaced by the good identity that would make up Utopia.

As for the differences between these two, it is again the reading of Nietzsche that is decisive. Adorno, like Derrida's version of Heidegger, conceives Nietzsche to be trapped within contradiction and to be stuck at the level of reversing the Platonic privilege accorded System, Being and so on. Adorno's reading of the ideas surrounding eternal return, however, suggests that he, too, is trapped within the contradictions he finds.

That is, if Nietzsche's account of eternal return and amor fati is intended to describe a transvaluative and selective experience, one that would, as Deleuze says, complete nihilism and eliminate or transform all that cannot affirm eternal return, and if Adorno conceives it simply as a form of bowing down to the powers that be<sup>77</sup>, then Adorno may be said to have missed or rejected something in that account.

What he has thus missed or rejected is precisely what Derrida makes so much of in the idea of difference. It is displacement, dissemination, the invaginated logic of the hymen - the idea that

the return of the same is not the return of the identical. It is the idea that even a laziness may return but that if it could will its own return, amor fati, it would not be the same, base, reactive laziness<sup>78</sup>. So, as claimed above, Adorno's ambivalences differ from Derrida's undecidables as polysemy from dissemination. Nietzsche's eternal return, what Derrida calls 'the sameness of difference and repetition'<sup>79</sup>, remains unthought in Adorno except as the thought that the injunction to 'Live Life' appears barbaric and cynical.

So, differance is a version of eternal return. As such, it attempts a non-reactive, transvaluative completion and overcoming of nihilism. To say that there is no stable origin is to affirm the conflict of forces in will to power that would at once produce and destroy, (and thereby transvalue), all values and meanings without either simply reversing the privileges accorded those values or saying that all is equally valueless. Adorno does not say that all is equally valueless - it is the non-identical element that generates meaning and value and which promises Utopia. But, insofar as he rejects or misses amor fati, he employs will to power as a critique of identity only by reversing the privilege ideologically accorded self-present and self-identical values in order to then privilege non-identity.

The differences between Derrida's and Adorno's feminisms may be summarised as follows. Adorno reverses the privilege accorded one of the terms of an opposition and reverses the value held to be the centre, (in relation to which those terms are supposed to derive their value). Thus, where identity was presented in ideology as the centre of economy and where one term was held to enjoy a privileged position with regard to that centre, (and thus to be dominant with regard to the other pole), Adorno will posit non-identity as that which generates meaning and value and will privilege the hitherto supplementary term.

Derrida, on the other hand, will reverse the privilege accorded one of the two terms by showing that it is actually a force within the supposedly superior term. Displacement consists in the radicalisation of that process to show how one term's appearance as the difference of the other accounts for both the production and destruction of the terms and ultimately renders them undecidable.

### Conclusion

Although it has been seen to be much else besides, insofar as Derrida's account of economy is a version of Nietzsche's will to power in eternal return<sup>80</sup>, it is also an account of power and desire<sup>81</sup>. One of the most important lessons to be learnt from

Derrida's account of economy is that difference is not originally opposition and one consequence of this lesson is that phallogentric or metaphysical economy cannot be simply differentiated from ec- centric or feminist economy. It should come as no surprise, therefore, to see that not only does Derrida not deal explicitly with the workings of power and desire in the texts examined so far but also that what he does say leaves him open to charges of not being sufficiently critical.

That is, Derrida says that metaphysics consists in the powerful and irrepressible desire for a centre, for a stable and self-identical source of value and identity that would curtail the endless deferral and referral that both constitutes and destroys value and identity<sup>82</sup>. Similarly, he says that the role of the centre in phallogentric economy is to limit, govern and organise the differences in terms of which value and identity are produced and destroyed in ec- centric economy<sup>83</sup>. Both of these claims <sup>admit to</sup> the charge of referring only to power and desire as they are found in metaphysical, phallogentric, economy.

The desire that motivates centric economy is presented as the desire for something that is simply absent and as if it is always and everywhere the same. And the power that is employed to govern the production of value is presented as,

precisely, something that is employed in a predominantly negative and prohibitive role. Neither of these claims are strictly consistent with the rest of Derrida's economics in that those economics do not appear to support such a simplistic view of the workings of power and desire. While the account of ec-centric economics is feminist, that is, the account of power and desire within those economics is not always consistent with that ec-centricity. In order to see how these claims are to be explicated, the next two chapters will deal with the work of Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari. Chapter six will look at Foucault and chapter seven will look at Deleuze and Guattari in order to account for the workings of power and desire in economy.

## CHAPTER SIX

### FOUCAULT

The reading of Foucault to be undertaken in this chapter attempts to show the role of power in the production of value. It has been argued, in chapters two and four, that non-vulgarly feminine economy, being both productive and destructive of value and identity, is occluded, mastered, or, as Derrida has it, produces itself as its own self-occlusion. Ec-centric economy is occluded, then, and masculine, centric economy appears to be and is experienced as the source of all value and identity. Foucault's work will be used to show how power operates and is operated upon in these forms of economy. It will be seen that, as it is found in feminine, ec-centric, economy, power also produces itself as its own self-occlusion and that, appearing in the ways in which it does in centric, vulgarly masculine, economy, it ensures its own legitimacy and the legitimacy of the values which are produced in centric economy. Power in ec-centric economy, that is, will be seen to be both productive and destructive, (constitutive and subversive), of the form of power that is found represented in phallocentric economy in the same way that ec-centric economy is productive and destructive of (the values and identities of) centric economy.



### Juridico-discursive power

It was suggested in the conclusion to the previous chapter that, unless one was fairly careful, Derrida's account of the roles of and relations between power and desire as they are found within centred economy on the one hand and between centric and ec- centric economy on the other would appear to belong to that group of accounts that Foucault has labelled 'juridico-discursive'. As such, it would, in Foucault's view, be traditional, metaphysical and inadequate - ultimately unable to chart the movements of power and desire in economy. Before elucidating Foucault's analytics of power, this section will outline the sorts of power and desire that are to be found in Derrida's account of economy and supplement that account with Foucault's own presentation of juridico-discursive power.

Inconsistent as it appears with the ideas that there exists a tension between centric and ec- centric economy and that difference is both productive and destructive of identity, Derrida says that ec- centric economy, difference, is 'mastered', or 'neutralised' by centric economy<sup>1</sup>. He also says that ec- centric economy is 'supressed' or 'repressed' by centric economy<sup>2</sup>. Within centred economy, not only is difference organised so as to appear and be experienced as opposition, but that opposition is also organised in terms of a 'violent hierarchy' - one

term has 'the upper hand'<sup>3</sup>.

As seen in chapter two, it is the relation to the centre, whether privileged or not, that determines one term's position in the hierarchy. Supplementary terms are thus said to be 'limited' for 'motivations and relations of force yet to be analysed'<sup>4</sup>. And the centre is said to 'govern'<sup>5</sup> the terms within centred economy, forbidding by means of an 'interdict' certain relations and substitutions of terms<sup>6</sup>. In preparation for Foucault's and Deleuze and Guattari's account of those motivations and forces, the consistency of Derrida's outline with Foucault's presentation of the juridico-discursive model of power will be illustrated.

In an interview with Lucette Finas<sup>7</sup>, Foucault gives a sort of thumbnail sketch of what he considers the traditional, inadequate and metaphysical notion of power to consist in. Such a notion presents power as 'essentially a juridical mechanism which says the law, which interdicts, which says 'no' ... and is associated with a whole litany of negative effects'. Resembling those to be found in Derrida's account, these negative effects take the form of 'exclusion, rejection, obstruction, denegations, occultations etc'<sup>8</sup>. Also involved in this idea is 'the idea that power is something that is possessed'<sup>9</sup> and that it is possessed either by people or by groups of people. In a role seemingly analogous to Derrida's

centre, the sovereign or state bureaucracy, for example, are said to possess power and to exercise it by means of interdiction and so on.

These principle features are given a little more definition in the first volume of The History of Sexuality<sup>10</sup>. Under the heading of 'the negative relation', Foucault notes that on this view, power 'can do nothing but say "no"',<sup>11</sup>. Power never establishes any relation that is not negative and these relations take the form of rejection, denegation, refusal and so on<sup>12</sup>. On the juridico-discursive model, then, power is never considered as being in anything but a negative relation to whatever it is in relation to: to that, sexuality, for example, or those, the ill or insane, for example, with which it has to do.

The juridical aspect of this conception of power is discussed under the heading of 'the insistence of the rule'. Power having dictated its law to whatever it is in relation to, sexuality, for example, that thing is organised in terms of a binary system - 'licit and illicit, permitted and forbidden',<sup>13</sup>. In so doing, power prescribes an order on the basis of which that thing may be said to be intelligible. So the juridical aspect of power is manifest in that it lays down the law to whatever it is in relation to.

The discursive aspect is also discussed here. Foucault says that power's hold or control over what it is relation to is established and maintained through language or the act of discourse.

'[Power] speaks and that is the rule'. Power, then, is juridical insofar as it is cast or manifests itself in the form of law and it is discursive insofar as it is paradigmatically 'through the act of discourse',<sup>14</sup> on the part of the legislator that the rule of law is established and maintained.

These laws that power uses to establish its control over whatever it is in relation to are, on the juridico-discursive account, no more than laws of prohibition<sup>15</sup>. They say 'thou shalt not ... ': 'thou shalt not go near, touch, consume, experience pleasure etc'<sup>16</sup> and, according to this notion of power, these laws are all that is available to power. This general form of prohibition or interdiction takes three specific forms; 'affirming that such a thing is not permitted, preventing it from being said [and] denying that it exists',<sup>17</sup>. These three forms, although perhaps difficult to reconcile, may, as Foucault suggests, be taken as the 'paradoxical logic of a law that might be expressed as an injunction of non-existence, non-manifestation and silence',<sup>18</sup>.

And finally, it is supposed, on the juridico-discursive view, that power 'is exercised in the same way at all levels', that it operates according to the 'simple and endlessly reproduced mechanisms' that have just been described, law, taboo and censorship. That is, 'from state to family, from prince to father, from the tribunal to the small

change of everyday punishments ... one finds a general form of power varying in scale alone'<sup>19</sup>. Corresponding to the homogeneity of the form of power noted above, then, is a 'general form of submission in the one who is constrained by it'<sup>20</sup>; whether the subject who is 'subjected' is the 'citizen opposite the state, the child opposite the parent or the disciple opposite the master'<sup>21</sup>, the form of submission is always held to be the same on the juridico-discursive model.

These are the principal features of what Foucault calls the juridico-discursive conception of power. It is essentially a power to say 'no'; 'capable only of posting limits, it is in no condition to produce'<sup>22</sup>. Appearing in the same form on all levels, it has the same methods or modes of operation at its disposal. And it is based on a juridical and discursive model, that of the declaration of the law by a sovereign power which may be the prince or the state apparatus. It remains to outline Foucault's unease with this conception and to elaborate the moves he makes to deal more adequately with the workings of power.

On Foucault's account, there are at least three reasons as to why this conception is inadequate. The first is that such a notion cannot account for the 'productivity there is in power'<sup>23</sup>. In

identifying power with the 'force of an interdict', it is difficult to account for what Foucault sees as the fact that it 'runs through and it produces things, it induces pleasure, it forms knowledge, (savoir), it produces discourse'<sup>24</sup>. A power that could do no more than say 'no', than repress and inhibit, could not, claims Foucault, be of any use in accounting for the productivity of power, for the fact that it has a sort of creative role. The traditional, juridico-discursive, notion of power cannot account for or consider power as 'a productive network that runs through the social body'<sup>25</sup> and would be entirely insufficient for Foucault's task in such works as Discipline and Punish, for example, where power is productive of any number of practices and discourses.

The other side of this problem is that, working with this traditional notion of power, it is equally difficult to account for how positions of dominance are ever tolerated by those in positions of subordination, for how dictates issuing from positions of power are ever accepted as legitimate. As Foucault says, 'if power was never anything other than repressive, if it never did anything other than say 'no', do you suppose that we should ever manage to obey it?'<sup>26</sup>. According to the juridico-discursive model, the story is that, since time began, sovereign power has been exercised over various groups always

in the same fashion and always having recourse to the same impoverished operations. It is also suggested that these groups have never managed to question or resist their subordination. Foucault argues that this cannot be the case: if power really did work like the juridico-discursive model says it does, we should never manage to obey it.

Thirdly, Foucault seems to think that what has appeared and been experienced in western political science as the juridico-discursive version of power, the exercise of the power that lays down the law and prohibits, can only occur on the basis of some other form of power. In the same way as power's legitimacy cannot be simply taken for granted, and as the effects of power on discourse cannot be explained only by using the idea of power as 'no' saying legislative decree, so sovereign power cannot be accounted for simply on its own terms.

Foucault says that sovereign power is 'only the terminal form ... power takes',<sup>27</sup> and that its existence and legitimacy must be explained by recourse to another form, or as he has it, another conception of power<sup>28</sup>. This other form or conception of power must, on Foucault's account, play something like the role of 'condition for the possibility of the functioning',<sup>29</sup> of sovereign power.

Micro-power

It is the first of these three problems that Foucault perceives with regard to the juridico-discursive notion of power that furnishes the clue to the treatment to be adopted with regard to the others. Dreyfus and Rabinow suggest that it is to Foucault's lasting credit to have argued that power does not simply stifle or inhibit knowledge but that more significantly it is productive of knowledge<sup>30</sup>. There is, however, more to be said of Foucault's account than that. Having ascertained the productive nature of power, Foucault goes on to suggest that it is partly this productivity which ensures that it appears to be legitimate - that it is tolerated or obeyed. As he says, what makes power acceptable is 'quite simply the fact that it does not ... weigh like a force that says "no",<sup>31</sup>.

It is power as a productive substrate which runs through the entire social body<sup>32</sup> that ensures that dictates made from positions of power are accepted. However, this productive network which ensures power's acceptability only does so on condition that it is hidden, that it does not appear and is not experienced as sovereign power. Foucault says that it is partly the fact that power 'masks a substantial part of itself',<sup>33</sup> which ensures its acceptance. Thus the productive nature of power and the fact that most of its operations remain occluded



ensure that power is accepted and tolerated as legitimate.

So it is this form of power, which is not experienced and does not appear as sovereign power, that provides the basis, as it were, for the representation of sovereign power. Foucault says that sovereign power, with its negative resources and prohibitions, 'can only take hold and secure its footing where it is rooted in a whole series of multiple and indefinite power relations that supply the basis for the great negative forms of power'<sup>34</sup>. This productive, (and, as shall be seen later, destructive), form of power that is occluded and not experienced as sovereign power is, nevertheless, held to provide the basis for the terminal forms of power, sovereign power.

That 'other' form of power, as a set of 'multiple and indefinite power relations', must now be elaborated. The account of this other 'economy' of power<sup>35</sup> that founds what is experienced and appears as sovereign power may be found in Part 4, chapter 2 of The History of Sexuality. Foucault introduces this account by distinguishing 'Power' from 'power'<sup>36</sup>. He says that, by 'power', he does not mean 'Power', he does not refer to power as it is represented on the juridico-discursive model of power. His 'power' does not take the form of 'a group of institutions and mechanisms that', by

means of juridical declarations, 'ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state',<sup>37</sup>.

More originally, or in the first instance, he says, power should be understood

as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organisation. 38

Power is essentially relational, then<sup>39</sup>, and is to be found within, rather than outside of, the sphere or area with which one is concerned. That is, rather than power being exercised from without and over or via those areas as a means of dominating subordinates, power is more originally manifested within them. The sorts of oppositions of forces within them operate as the grounds for what appears and is experienced as the workings of sovereign power.

Those 'spheres' or areas include those systems of relations, power relations, between 'a man and a woman, in a family, between a teacher and a pupil',<sup>40</sup>, as well as those between workers and bosses, priests and laity, doctors and patients, since 'between each point of the social body ... there pass relations of power'. To refer back to the last criticism noted of the traditional notion of power, this form of power or these relations of forces 'are not the projection of the great sovereign power over individuals: rather they are the mobile and concrete ground upon which that power comes to be anchored',<sup>41</sup>.

Power must also be understood as 'the

process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens or reverses' the balance of forces in those relations<sup>42</sup>. Power is also a sort of movement, then, a process in which relations of force are transformed or consolidated in the interaction of those various points of the social body. The ceaseless struggles and confrontations, the interrelating that goes on between parent and child, foreman and operative, for example, in the everyday business of life, 'transforms, strengthens or reverses' the relations between those members. In so doing, power is the process which changes, consolidates or reverses, the relations and tactics that exist between those points and the sort, the relations and tactics, of power that could be grounded upon them.

These forces and the relations between them are themselves related. They are, in a sense, diacritical. Foucault says that power manifests itself as 'the support that these power relations find in one another ... or on the contrary, [as] the disjunctions and oppositions that isolate them from one another'<sup>43</sup>. So power is also the way that these relations of force enter into relations, of either support or opposition, with other relations of forces. Some relations between parent and child, for example, may be either supported by or in opposition to other relations that exist between the

parents and the medical profession or the school and the parents, for example.

These relations would find support in one another if, within the family, for example, both of two parents wanted to punish an unruly child and in disjunction if only one did. These intra-familial relations also exist in relation to a body of medical, physiological and psychiatric relations, for example, which could be used to support or oppose any of the positions taken on the punishment of the child.

Closely related to, indeed almost a generalised version of, this point is Foucault's assertion that power should be conceived 'as the strategies in which ... [relations of force between the points of the social body, along with the process in which they undergo transformation and the system of support/opposition which is set up among or by those relations] take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallisation is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formation of the law'<sup>44</sup>. Without referring to subjective agency<sup>45</sup>, this characteristically concise and opaque formulation refers to the way in which relations of force between various points of the social body are exercised or manifested in relation to wider trends or movements in society.

If, for example, it was the case that,

within the family, the values of strong discipline and conscientiousness were important and esteemed and that these characteristics also were popular with industry, that they were informative of society as a whole, then the strategies within the family might be said to be embodied in the state apparatus. The family would be 'in tune' with the wider society. As Foucault says, 'for the state to function as it does, it is necessary that there be between the man and the woman or the adult and the child quite specific relations of domination'<sup>46</sup>. The existence and organisation of the state and state power are dependent upon the organisation of forces within the family.

Thus, and it is a point of central importance for this chapter, 'power's condition of possibility ... must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point'<sup>47</sup>. It is not, on Foucault's view, as if there is a central and sovereign point which forms the origin or source of power and from which minor and subordinate powers may be said to emanate. Nor is it, as it is on the juridico-discursive account, as if the meaning or intelligibility of actions is generated by their relation to that central or sovereign point and its embodiment in the law. Power's condition of possibility and the intelligibility of its operations are to be found in what has just been described as 'the moving substrate of

force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power'<sup>48</sup>.

For these reasons, then, one must say that power is omnipresent, not because everyone and everything is under its sway, but rather because everyone and everything, the relations of force that exist between everyone and everything, are productive of power. Mirroring a move to be seen later in the chapter on Deleuze and Guattari, power on the juridico-discursive model would seek to arrest the movement of these shifting relations. It would seek to 'consolidate everything under its invincible unity'<sup>49</sup>, even while it rests or is dependent on them. So, rather than being a certain strength that either we or institutions are endowed with, which can be exercised over others, power is 'the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society'<sup>50</sup>.

### Resistance and Strategy

Foucault summarises and develops this position by advancing five propositions. First, and most briefly, power is not originally something that may be acquired, possessed and lost. Being produced from 'innumerable points, in the interplay of mobile and non-egalitarian relations', it cannot be represented in that way<sup>51</sup>. Secondly, 'relations of power are not in a position of exteriority with regard to

other types of relations'<sup>52</sup>. Relations of force are immanent to economic, educational, sexual and medical relations, for example, and, rather than having a purely prohibitive role within those relations, are both the effects and the conditions of the 'divisions inequalities and disequilibriums'<sup>53</sup> that are to be found in those relations.

If this is the case, then there can be no 'binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations'<sup>54</sup>. The interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations is rather the basis for what appears and is experienced as 'dominations'. So, instead of power consisting originally in the rulers, the possessors of power, employing that power to dominate those who are powerless, these myriad confrontations should be conceived as the basis, as the support and condition, for the great negative forms of power that are represented in the juridico-discursive model.

Fourthly, and most obscurely, Foucault says that 'power relations are both intentional and non-subjective'<sup>55</sup>. The sort of relation of force that he wants to chart are intelligible, they may be made sense of, but, as noted above, not because of some relation to some sovereign point from which power emanates and not because subjective agency can necessarily be seen in them. There are any number of strategies within which any particular tactical

operation of power may be inscribed or against which it might be directed. Thus, (despite what Foucault calls the 'local cynicism' of power, the cases in which the rationality of power is 'quite explicit'), there is no 'transcendental subjectivity', either in the form of governing caste, controlling groups or decision makers, that could be appealed to as the source or origin of the intelligibility of any of the operations of power.

As Foucault says, the various and multiple strategies of power may 'become connected to one another',<sup>56</sup> support and give rise to each other, and eventually form comprehensive and comprehensible systems. Their aims and objectives may be clear but 'no-one is there to have formulated them',<sup>57</sup>. Consequently, Foucault says that the sort of power relations that constitute what appear and are experienced as sovereign power are 'intentional and non-subjective'.

Finally, and again most importantly for this chapter, we learn that 'where there is power, there is resistance',<sup>58</sup> or that resistance, that towards and against which power is 'directed', is never 'in a position of exteriority with regard to power',<sup>59</sup>. However, 'that one can never be "outside of power"', that there are no 'golden sands of basic freedoms', 'does not mean that one is in every way trapped',<sup>60</sup>. If, and as has been suggested above, power is



essentially and originally relational, then power depends for its existence on 'a multiplicity of points of resistance'<sup>61</sup>. Consequently, although there can be no outside of power, since power depends for its existence on resistance, that resistance is 'all the more real insofar as it is there where power is'<sup>62</sup>.

Another consequence of this point is that there is and can be no 'soul of revolt', no 'pure law of the revolutionary'<sup>63</sup>. 'Instead there is a plurality of resistances'<sup>64</sup> - to each instance or manifestation of power, there is resistance. But these resistances do not form a merely passive and reactive 'rebound' or 'recoil', nor are they 'doomed' to perpetual defeat. And neither are they a 'lure or promise' that is always and of necessity betrayed. Although there may occasionally be radical ruptures and decisive breaks, revolutions in the popular or vulgar sense of the word, it is only 'the strategic codification of these points of resistance' that make them possible.

These points of resistance that are to be found everywhere that power is are what Foucault refers to elsewhere as 'plebness'. Avoiding the decidedly 'sweet' thesis that 'the pleb' is the natural locus of revolutionary energy by a hairsbreadth, Foucault accounts for 'plebness' or resistance as 'the odd term in relations of power' and says that

they are 'inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite'<sup>65</sup>. Plebness, then, is that excess which power cannot cope with, that it cannot endure and which always escapes its workings to at least suggest its downfall.

As he says, the 'pleb' 'undoubtedly has no sociological reality'<sup>66</sup> - it will not be encountered as a sociological category or walking the streets. '"The" pleb, undoubtedly, does not exist': it is not as if there is an essence of the pleb or of resistance that could be distilled and put into handy handbook form. But if power is originally relational and always in relation to resistance, then resistance will constitute the 'limit' of power relations, their 'underside' or 'counterpunch' and may be found in bourgeois and proletarian movements alike. An example of plebness, perhaps, would be the ways in which sovereign power was undermined by the festivities that accompanied the great displays of power at executions and which are described in Discipline and Punish.

### Power and power

This, then, is the basis of Foucault's account of power, of what he calls the 'economy' of power<sup>67</sup>. Before looking again at certain features of that account, and indicating their relevance for this chapter, it should be pointed out that, and in what sense, this is a particular reading of Foucault.

There are other versions of Foucault to be found, in commentaries and, indeed, in Foucault himself. The one to be presented here should be distinguished and defended from them. That is, Foucault and his interpreters present various versions of what is happening in his texts. This essay, however, will assume and attempt to explicate the idea that what is referred to as 'micro-power', power with a small 'p', is the occluded ground of what appears and is experienced as sovereign power. This is claimed to happen in the same way as ec- centric economy was seen to be the occluded ground of centred economy in chapter two.

The first version, and one which Foucault has himself suggested, especially in connection with Madness and Civilisation, assumes that between the 17<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries the actual nature of power changed. It proposes the idea that, between these dates, one sort of power was replaced by another sort. It proposes that sovereign power was superseded, as a result of certain tactical developments and in order to achieve certain advantages, by micro-power, the sort of power that involves surveillance and minor controls in the fine fibres of a society. Such a view may be found, then, in Madness and Civilisation and in Power, Truth, Strategy. In this latter, Foucault says that micro-power 'came into being' and that power 'changed' 'from binary to complex and

multi-form'<sup>68</sup>.

The second version is one that has been proposed by Finas, among others. It is that Foucault is offering a 'new conception' of power and the ways in which it operates<sup>69</sup>. This idea, that until now power has been thought or conceived wrongly and must be rethought, also finds its support in Foucault's words. In volume one of The History of Sexuality, for example, he is found saying that political science and philosophy have for too long been restricted to a particular grid of thought and that, if power is to be thought adequately, they must 'advance ... toward a different conception of power'<sup>70</sup>.

And the third view of Foucault's works would suggest that there were two sorts or forms of power, two different ways in which it appeared and was experienced. On such a view, political scientists would need to replace the theory of power, which assumed that power manifested itself and operated in the same ways and at all times. It would need to replace that theory, (or those theories constitutive of that way of theorising), with an 'analytics' which would chart the particular and specific movements of force relations<sup>71</sup>. Should these dichotomous fictions exist as ideals, the sort of power that an analytic would concern itself with would, presumably, be as inaccessible to a theory of power, and for the same sort of reasons, as the workings of the bricoleur's

mind would be to the engineer.

While in no way suggesting that any or all of these versions are incompatible with the others or that they are misrepresentations of Foucault's work, (each of them is eminently compatible with at least one other and all are to be found endorsed by Foucault at some point), this section must distinguish the version to be proposed here from them.

It is suggested that these accounts are strategic, and therefore partial, accounts of what Foucault is doing in his work. They are strategic in that each is adopted in order to perform a particular task, to counter some tendency in the matter of the theorisation of power with another. And they are partial in the sense that they therefore give more or less weight to certain aspects of that strategy while leaving out certain others.

Thus, while the nature of power may well have changed between the 17<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, if the thesis that Foucault's micro-power is the set of shifting force relations that go to support the great negative forms of power is to be retained, then it cannot be the case that one form of power simply gave way to another. Rather, it will have to be said that in order to achieve sovereignty, those desirous of power had to, in any case did, adopt a different set of strategies. The ground for their sovereignty had to be prepared in a more meticulous method than was

sufficient before.

Similarly with regard to the second and third versions of what Foucault is doing. It is not as if what he calls the juridico-discursive theory of power should simply be discarded and replaced by the analytics. And it is not as if all experience and appearance of power are ideological or the result of some unfortunate mishap of consciousness<sup>72</sup>.

Rather, and again, if what is distinctive of Foucault's account is to be taken seriously, that power is productive and that micro-power underlies sovereign power as basis or footing, then these accounts will be seen to be in need of supplementing. No-one, least of all Foucault, will deny that sovereignty and domination are experienced<sup>73</sup> but, in order to account adequately for those phenomena, Foucault is saying that their bases in micro-power must be analysed.

Thus the version of what Foucault is doing that will be adopted here is that power is not originally to be found in the form of sovereign power which is possessed and exercised in prohibitive, 'no' saying fashion. Nor are there two sorts of power and two corresponding accounts to be given of it, one juridico-discursive and the other analytic. Rather, it is suggested that what appears and is experienced as sovereign power is grounded in a whole series of of force relations that are essentially productive

and immanent to the sphere in which they are found. Micro-power is productive, (and destructive, as will be shown below), of sovereign power and there can, therefore, be no question of there being two forms of power or two accounts to be given of it in the sense that those two versions could be simply distinguished as the three accounts noted above would suggest.

### Power and Economy

Having outlined Foucault's account of the juridico-discursive model of power, of what he considers to be wrong with it and of what he intends to do about it, this section will continue by giving a little more detail to that outline and relating the more important themes to the notions of centric and ec- centric, masculine and feminine, economy. As far as this chapter is concerned, the themes in Foucault's account of power that are most important are those concerning power and its relation to resistance and the ways in which power is both constitutive and subversive of sovereign power. The task will be to relate the former to the notion of the disruptive and hence feminist element in the matter of economy, (the undecidable, difference), and the latter to the ways in which ec- centric economy is both constitutive and subversive of the values and identities to be found in centric economy.

Basically, the idea is that Foucault's account of the ways in which micro-power occludes itself as the production and destruction of sovereign power is an account of the power relations between and within centric and ec-centric economy. Chapter two has shown how, and in what sense, ec-centric economy is feminist and centric economy is phallogentric economy. Thus, the account of power that can chart the relations of forces between and within centric and ec-centric economy will be of special use to a feminist or transgressive discourse that will not be immediately accommodated by that which is being opposed, phallogentric economy.

So, power as 'the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations' of forces<sup>74</sup> is both constitutive and subversive of sovereign power in that it is the former upon which the latter is based. As has been seen above, sovereign power depends for its existence on the grounding it receives from these shifting relations of forces and power, with a small 'p', is thus constitutive of sovereign power. And, as has also been seen, there is no sovereign power that is not dependent upon micro-power: power's condition of possibility or intelligibility is not to be sought in a central, self-present or self-powerful point. In this sense, micro-power is destructive of sovereign power: it would take apart the appearance by which sovereign power passes itself off as



the source of all other subordinate powers.

Power as the interplay of mobile and non-egalitarian relations is to power as sovereignty, then, as ec-centric economy is to centric economy. It is productive insofar as it provides the grounds for 'the great negative forms of power'. And it is subversive or destructive insofar as it is no ground at all in the sense of a fixed or limited origin but would rather disperse or defer sovereignty as an effect of a set of shifting force relations.

Similarly, if the undecidable is that which cannot be accounted for or mastered by centric economy, then 'plebness', resistance, is that which cannot be accounted for or mastered by sovereign power. Power is essentially relational, as Foucault says, and it is always in relation to resistance. As such, plebness will constitute the underside or limit of power, that 'region' where, in Adorno's words, power as sovereign cannot afford to go. Between sovereign power and micro-power, as between centred, phallogcentred, and ec-centric, feminist, economy, then, there is a relation of constitution/subversion. The supposedly stable, self-present and self-identical values of the former are ultimately rendered undecidable. And within the operations of centred economy and sovereign power is a force that is produced but not mastered or accounted for by those operations, the pleb or undecidable.

## Conclusion

It was noted at the end of chapter five that, although power and desire played large roles in the production and legitimation of value, Derrida's account of economy had surprisingly little to say about them. It was also suggested that what was said appeared to refer only to power and desire as they manifested themselves in phallogentric economy. Having briefly developed what Derrida said about the role of power in economy, this chapter showed in what respects it would be conceived as inadequate and metaphysical on Foucault's account.

The few remarks that were to be found in Derrida's account were shown to belong to the juridico-discursive conception of power. Foucault's presentation of the main features of this model was outlined, as were the various points at which he considered its inadequacy and metaphysicality to be manifest. Finally, the notion and workings of the sort of power relations that Foucault conceived the notion called juridico-discursive needed in order to exist, along with the relations between them, were illustrated.

At the same time, however, and despite working on quite different levels, Foucault's account of micro-power was seen to be analogous to Derrida's account of differance. Where the economy of differance was said to both produce and destroy the value

of a term that appeared to be stable and self-identical in centred economy, the power relations within ec-centric economy were seen to be both productive and subversive of what appeared and was experienced in centric economy to be sovereign or absolute power.

Similarly, as the sorts of power relation that Foucault called juridico-discursive required an occluded and forgotten basis in micro-power in order to exist and be seen as legitimate, so what metaphysics presents as the centred production of value requires a 'non-full, non-simple "origin"',<sup>76</sup> in ec-centric economy. And where the value of the undecidable, that which could not be accounted for in centric economy, as undecidable was occluded by centric economy in order that value be seen to issue from some self-identical source, so resistance or 'the pleb', as that without which power could not exist, was occluded in order that sovereign power be seen as a simple, 'external' limit and so be accepted.

Thus this chapter has accounted for the sorts of power relations to be found within economy. It has accounted for the sorts of power relations that exist within centric and ec-centric economy, on the one hand, and for the power relations that exist between centric and ec-centric economy on the other. The next chapter will consider the work of Deleuze and Guattari in order to elucidate the workings of desire as they are found within and

between centric and ec- centric economy.

What is metaphysical and inadequate about Derrida's presentation of desire as desire for something that is simply absent and as something everywhere and always the same will be detailed. Of course, Derrida's account of economy and the role of desire within it as it will be dealt with here dates from 1966: whether he would still be happy with that account nearly twenty years later, his work on ontological/sexual difference, geschlechte, will 'tell'.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### DELEUZE AND GUATTARI

In "An Anti-Sociology", Jacques Donzelot suggests that Deleuze and Guattari used Foucault's work, Madness and Civilisation, as their starting point for volume one of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Anti-Oedipus<sup>1</sup>. In Modern French Philosophy, Vincent Descombes asserts that Deleuze and Guattari's version of desire is none other than Nietzsche's will to power<sup>2</sup>. In this chapter, Deleuze and Guattari will be read as providing an analysis of the nature of desire as it is found within and between centric and eccentric economy. That is, where Foucault has been seen to account for will to power from the side of the ways in which sovereign power occludes its basis in micro-power, Deleuze and Guattari will be read as accounting for will to power from the side of that with which power is always already in relation, desire.

On Foucault's account, power is always already in relation to resistance, that resistance is what Deleuze and Guattari analyse as desire. The metaphysical and inadequate account of power which presents and experiences power as sovereign power is based on a sort of power that is to be 'presented' and 'experienced' as its non-full, non-simple 'origin'. And thus the account of desire as it is presented, or rather occluded, in phallogentric economy, as

being in relation to sovereign power, must be shown to be based on a different sort of desire. This latter desire is that which is always already in relation to micro-power. It is so in such a way that, as Foucault says, it provides the 'grounds' in which the desire that is supposedly in relation to sovereign power occludes itself.

Foucault analyses sovereign power as being dependent for its existence on what has been seen above to be an ec- centric economy of power. This chapter will read Deleuze and Guattari as providing an analysis of that which is always already in relation to it as resistance, its negation, desire<sup>3</sup>. It will use Deleuze and Guattari to show how the desire that is metaphysically, phallocentrically, presented and experienced as being in relation to sovereign power is at once constituted and subverted by what might be called 'micro-desire', desire that is in relation to, the other side of, Foucault's micro-power. This desire is what Deleuze and Guattari analyse as schizo-desire.

So, where power is to be conceived as the strategic situation in which force relations exist and which is productive of the effects of knowledge, commodities and so on, and which serves to legitimate, (by occluding the origins of), what appears and is experienced as the possession and exercise of sovereign power, desire may be conceived as the other

side of power. It may be conceived as one half of the power/desire complex in that it is at once the 'force' behind the exercise of power and that with which power is always in relation. Consequently, there are at least two accounts to be given of the two versions of desire depending on whether it is (metaphysically) conceived as being within or for centred economy, in relation to sovereign power, or within or for ec- centric economy, in relation to that micro-power that Foucault has analysed.

Thus, if one can conceive of sovereign power requiring, as non-full, non-simple 'origin', the organisation of the multiple and indefinite power relations between all points of the social body, then the sovereign's desire can be conceived as requiring an analogous organisation and mobilisation of the desires of those points. And thus will the works of Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari be brought together to show the workings of power and desire in economy. Derrida has been seen to outline the workings of economy. Foucault has been, and Deleuze and Guattari will be, seen to provide the accounts of power and desire as they are found in those workings. As Clément says of this connection, 'the work of deconstruction ... responds to a desire to interrupt syntheses, to a schizo-desire'<sup>4</sup>. So far, Derrida has not accounted for this response and this chapter attempts to chart it.

### Freudo-Marxism

As both Descombes and Patton have noted, Deleuze and Guattari's project in Anti-Oedipus bears on the questions that the various brands of Freudo-Marxism associated with the names of Reich, Marcuse and the Frankfurt School attempted to deal with<sup>5</sup>. Before them, however, Spinoza had also apparently formulated their problems; how is it that people will desire and fight for their servitude as though it were their salvation? Like Foucault's, then, Deleuze and Guattari's task is to account for how it is that power and desire operate so that they are accepted, desired, even, and yet constitutive of servitude<sup>6</sup>.

Declaring that 'there is only desire and the social, nothing else'<sup>7</sup>, Deleuze and Guattari must differentiate themselves from Freudo-Marxism, which, as might be imagined, is also concerned with desire and the social. The move of differentiation is effected, basically, by their saying that desire is part of what Marxism calls the 'infrastructure' or base<sup>8</sup>. For Marx, Marxists and even Freud-Marxists, desire is part of the superstructure, represented in ideology, and thus no part of the productive forces of the economic, political and social fields. Analyses along these lines will thus see their role as accounting for how the masses were fooled or how their desires were irrational or mistaken in desiring servitude.



For Freud, Freudians and Freudo-Marxists, on the other hand, desire would be articulated in terms of what Deleuze and Guattari never cease to oppose, the representation of desire in terms of law, lack and signifier<sup>9</sup>. Whether the law, power, was constitutive of desire or simply repressive of it, desire would be represented as lack. As Donzelot has noted, that lack takes two forms: it is either the lack of some originary past or the lack of the real. 'The first claim is that desire is reactionary in its essence ... [that] it seeks a reactivation of the past' and the second claim is the more Lacanian one that 'desire is a denegation of the real since all desire is desire of images or, worse still, of images of images'<sup>10</sup>.

Deleuze and Guattari will say that all desire is not, as Freudo-Marxists would have it, part of the superstructure and no part of the infrastructure or production but that it is part of that infrastructure. Similarly, they will say that all desire is not produced in the Oedipal scene, the theatre of 'Daddy, Mommy, Me', and that it is not organised in terms of law, lack and signifier, as Lacan says.

As they say, 'the schizo-analytic argument is simple. Desire is a machine ... a machinic arrangement, desiring machines. The order of desire is the order of production: all production is at once desiring production and social production. We

therefore reproach psychoanalysis for having stifled this order of production, for having shunted it into representation'<sup>11</sup>.

Thus they say that it is simply not the case that desiring production, the production of fantasy, exists 'on one side' and that social production, the production of man's material reality, exists on 'the other'. The 'Marx-Freud parallel' between the two is 'utterly sterile' as long as they remain 'alien' to each other. Rather Deleuze and Guattari would have it that 'the social field is immediately invested with desire ... and that libido has no need of any mediation ... in order to invade and invest the productive forces and relations of production'<sup>12</sup>.

Having looked briefly at the relation of Anti-Oedipus to Freudo-Marxism, however, it should be pointed out that Deleuze and Guattari are in no way concerned to reject psychoanalysis or Marxism wholesale. In a move reminiscent of Deleuze's book on Nietzsche, and of Derrida's statements regarding critical and metaphysical propositions, they say that revolutionary and reactionary moments co-exist within the same corpus<sup>13</sup>. As with Derrida, then, they will show the tension between the various strands of Marxism and psychoanalysis and 'take what they want', take whatever works or does the job they want from each<sup>14</sup>.

### Desiring Machines

So, with the intentions of instituting a 'materialist psychiatry' and of being more Marxist than Marx in this regard on the one hand, and of countering the familial and theatrical representations of desire and the unconscious on the other, Deleuze and Guattari posit the notion of desire as a machine or machinic arrangement. Basically, the idea of desire as a machine is to present desire as only functioning or existing in relation to other machines: there is not, as there is in the theatrical and familial models, an already organised system of images or representations of desire that involves the organising work of a privileged representation or represented. But, in order to get some idea of what Deleuze and Guattari intend by desire as a machinic arrangement, this section will consider how it differs from what it is set up to counter, theatrical and familial models of desire and the unconscious, before looking at how desire relates to eccentric and centric economy.

As noted above, one of the more significant moves Deleuze and Guattari make is to introduce desire into production and production into desire in such a way that talk of desire or talk of production 'on their own', as it were, is rendered completely inadequate. Moreover, not only are desire and production not to be considered separately, as two

disparate economies<sup>16</sup>, they are not to be conceived, as did Reich, as two economies each of which carries on the other's work. 'There is not a libidinal economy that would subjectively prolong, through other means, political economy'. Rather, 'what is at stake is the libido as such, as the very essence of desire and sexuality; it invests and disinvests the flows of all kinds that flow through the social body'<sup>17</sup>.

Scorning the 'right-minded psychoanalysts and epistemologists' who would balk at what would appear to them as a simple confusion of levels, Guattari defends the practice of a materialist psychiatry or 'schizo-analysis' that would chart the flows of libidinal energy in production, in desiring/social production<sup>18</sup>. Thus they say in Anti-Oedipus that the problems of desire and power in contemporary society 'must be posed at the deepest level of a single and same economy, of a single and same process of production'<sup>19</sup>. 'Desiring machines are the fundamental category of the economy of desire'<sup>20</sup> and it is what happens to these desiring machines under capitalism that Deleuze and Guattari are interested in.

Where what may be called the traditional and metaphysical notion of desire involves desire as productive only of images or phantasms, ideology, and thus no part of material production, Deleuze and Guattari posit the notion of desiring machines, desiring production that would, as will be seen later,

both produce and destroy traditional notions of base apart from superstructure, desire apart from production. Far from producing only representations, signs that are part of the theatre of the unconscious, and which signify something lacking, either contingently (Freud) or necessarily (Lacan), and far from being a denegation of the real, desiring production is productive of the material reality in which mankind lives everyday<sup>21</sup>.

So, theatrical and familial models of desire would present desire as a denegation of the real, desire and production as completely separate, and desire as productive only of representations. Deleuze and Guattari posit desiring machines, at home in the factory, and say that desiring production is production of the real, desire 'and' production are one economy. This economy, however, like that of difference, is subject to various organising operations. Desire may be such sometimes that it desires its own repression: this question, noted above, Reich's and Spinoza's question, is also Deleuze and Guattari's question<sup>22</sup>.

Machinic desire, desire as productive and material, then, is more a system of forces or flows of energies and of breaks or changes in direction in those flows than either the necessary or contingent desire for something that is represented in the unconscious as lacking. As they say, 'desire

does not lack anything; it does not lack its object'. The idea of desire as lack, they say, collapses into some form of absurdity: Lacanian statements concerning the lack of being that is life itself seem to reduce to the claim that 'there exists some other place that contains the key to desire'<sup>23</sup>. Consequently, 'desire is a machine and the object of desire is another machine connected to it'<sup>24</sup>.

If this is the case, that there is no 'gap' between desire and its object, that 'each' desiring machine is only what it is, only functions, in its relations to other machines<sup>25</sup>, then it must be the case that desire is not to be found in isolated cases but that what is called desire is more accurately to be conceived along the lines that Foucault lays out for the notion of micro-power. 'One machine is always connected to another'<sup>26</sup>, then, and although these machines may be 'disparate' in one sense, they are also always connected together to form another machine<sup>27</sup>.

Thus desire is at once that which joins, breaks or re-directs the flows in production and constitutive of those flows: 'desire causes the current to flow, itself flows in turn and breaks the flows'<sup>28</sup>. So, having introduced production into desire and desire into production, by way of the schizophrenic perception of the self and the body, (which is that they are machines or factories), and by way of a machinic conception of society<sup>29</sup>, different

social formations may be seen as 'so many different sections of coordinating or encoding the mass of desiring machines that go to make them up',<sup>30</sup>.

The child, for example, constitutes a particular organisation of the desiring machines that go to make him/her up. The child at the mother's breast constitutes the mother and child machine and, while being themselves constituted by the many different machines that go to make them up, also form the components of various other machines - they may form part of the various State-welfare machines, for example.

While the child's mouth-machine functions along with the breast-machine, causing and breaking the flow of milk, the various desiring machines that constitute the mother-and-child machine are operative. The child may disconnect one machine in order to connect another and the mother, similarly, may decide that the child has had enough, that she does not wish to feed the child or that she does not want the child at all, thus breaking, re-directing and so on, the different desiring machines that go to make up the arrangement.

The factory where the child's father works is also a machine in this sense. It is constituted by desiring machines and fits into larger machinic arrangements. The father, then, stands in many

different relations of power with the people around him. There are different flows of desire between him and the supervisor, him and his colleagues and between him and the bosses so, in addition to being made up by various machines, the desire to keep his family, to retain his job and self-respect with regard to his relations to those around him and so on, he is also a working part of the factory. Similarly, the factory, constituted by the various machines that go to make it up, supervisors, operative, bosses, is also a part of the Union-machine's affairs, the government-machine's affairs and the boss-machine's affairs. The factory has a part to play in a larger machinic organisation.

In this way, social and economic production may be seen as a particular arrangement of desiring machines. Social production, the collection of institutions, (church, education, army, welfare, unions and so on), is made up of a multiplicity of desiring machines and these machines are connected, disconnected and reconnected to one another in the daily life of society<sup>31</sup>. Thus the child, for example, progresses through the various stages of the school machine, under the eyes of the church-machine, perhaps, to be disconnected and reconnected to the factory machine or the welfare machine. The various relations in which the child exists, the different social formations of which s/he is a part, are organisations



of desiring machines.

Reference has been made to organisation and to schizophrenia. Before looking at Deleuze and Guattari's relation to centric and ec- centric economy, it would be useful to account for these terms. In addition to introducing the relation to and the role of ec- centric economy, this will relate back to the discussion of Freud-Marxism and to the references to Foucault and Nietzsche in the introduction. Basically, the claim is that the ec- centric economy of schizo-desire is organised, (or, as Deleuze and Guattari have it, axiomatised), into manageable shapes within centric economy for much the same reasons and in the same way that Derrida's difference and Foucault's micro-power are reduced and occluded.

However, as noted above, the schizophrenic self-perception is of a body that is made up of a multiplicity of machines, a factory. Each of these machines is working away, connecting and disconnecting itself from the other machines, breaking and joining flows. The organisation of these machines constitutes the repression of desire since that organisation establishes what become familiar and represented as fixed and proper assemblages of desire. For example, once the desiring machines have been organised and they exist in various stable relationships to one another, they may be identified as a certain sort of machine, as paranoid or perverse

desiring machines, for example.

It is a form of this organisation or axiomatisation which Deleuze and Guattari claim Freudian and Marxist analyses have perpetrated: they have thus contributed to the repression of desire that they supposedly abhor in the economies of libido and capital. Thus while Marxism analyses the ways in which capitalism frees desiring machines from their old connections and roles to connect them to other machines, while it discovers the activity of productivity in general (labour)<sup>32</sup>, it nevertheless petrifies that productivity within a purely historical formation. And while psychoanalysis analyses desiring production and attempts to liberate that production from the constraints it existed under before, it nevertheless forms the concept of the libido and ~~represents~~ this libido in the form of an eternal Oedipal situation.

On the other hand, according to Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism similarly decodes the flux of desiring machines, these machines are disconnected from the assemblages they were connected to, the flows of libidinal energy are redirected, but these desiring machines are immediately reorganised or axiomatised and become the means of a novel form of subjugation<sup>33</sup>. That is, capitalism liberates the subject's productivity, people move from the land to the factories, for example<sup>34</sup>, but this liberation

of desiring machines is seen or presented only in economic terms, not in terms of desiring production. As a result, the subject's private labour is axiomatised as private labour, (as opposed to production which is both desiring and social), and as found in those new relations to the factory or to industry<sup>35</sup>.

The process of decoding, of scrambling the flows of desires, which is what Deleuze and Guattari consider capitalism to do, constitutes, they say, the or a, (for there is no ideal form of this process, as there is no ideal form of control<sup>36</sup>), process of schizophrenisation. Every machine may be disconnected and reconnected elsewhere with no privileged organisation being 'sacred'.

But this productivity, the material form of subjectivity, is 'repressed' through being masked or represented in the Oedipal triangle. Productive desire, which is at once productive and social, is presented under capitalism as private productivity, as an individual's labour power, on the one hand, and as subjective familial libido on the other. The former conceals the desire in productivity and the latter occludes the productivity in desire. Desire is thus axiomatised or Oedipalised in order to form the structures of desire prevalent and familiar under capitalism.

It is thus that schizophrenia is 'in opposition' to the axiomatisation of organs into fixed

subjective structures in which each organ has a limited range of connections which it can make before it is called perverse or whatever. Schizo-desire would burst apart all those structures of desire which capitalism and psychoanalysis have legitimated and tend towards what Deleuze and Guattari call the 'body without organs'. The body without organs is a surface upon which desires are inscribed in such a way that no one organisation or axiomatisation is privileged over any other. Although 'organ machines attach themselves to it, the body without organs remains without any organs at all since they lead only to axiomatisation',<sup>37</sup>.

The body without organs, then, is the body, but the body considered or experienced, (as in schizophrenia), as being 'divested of that arrangement of organs that makes of it an organism',<sup>38</sup>. As Deleuze says in his Dialogues, 'it seemed to us that desire was a process and that it unfolds in a plane of consistence, a "body without organs" as Artaud put it',<sup>39</sup>. That is, without the arrangement of organs that make the body a particular sort of body, (the disciplined body, the body of the child, the worker and so on), the body is a surface of intensities, of flows of desires that are not organised in terms of any transcendental signified. So Deleuze and Guattari say that 'desiring machines make us an organism; but at the very heart of this production,

the body suffers from being organised in this way, from not having some other sort of organisation, or no organisation at all,<sup>40</sup>.

It is the becoming organised of this body, the body without organs, that Nietzsche and Foucault have analysed in works like The Genealogy of Morals and Discipline and Punish for example.

In these works, the operations of micro-power in its work of organising the body, in arranging or constructing a particular disposition of machinic desire, are accounted for. As Foucault says in this latter work, the body is embedded in a political field and subject to a multiplicity of power relations which 'invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs',<sup>41</sup>.

Thus Deleuze and Guattari's work is a continuation, or the other side, of Foucault's and Nietzsche's work in that it charts the construction of desiring machines or organs on the body without organs. The body without organs, then, is a tension between a libidinal surface of intensities and nomadic desires which traverse and inscribe it and which constitute schizo-desire on the one hand and the fixed subjective structures (Oedipus) by means of which that nomadic desire is 'domesticated' or given a proper home, repressed through being organised.

Deleuze and Guattari consider desire to be that which is 'revolutionary in its essence',<sup>42</sup>,

as that which would 'scramble all the codes'<sup>43</sup> by which it has been organised but which has been axiomatised<sup>44</sup>, rendered harmless in such a way that it can and does desire its own repression<sup>45</sup>. Without suggesting that desire may be simply liberated, that natural flows of desire may be freed by removing the regulations under which desire is constrained, they suggest that desire is that which both constitutes and threatens the order of society.

If desire threatens the very being of society, as Deleuze and Guattari say<sup>46</sup>, then that society must find some way of 'repressing' desire, 'and even ... find something more efficient than repression, so that repression, hierarchy, exploitation and servitude are themselves desired'<sup>47</sup>. This something that is more effective than simple repression, than the simple yoke placed on revolutionary desire, they call Oedipalisation. Desire is so constituted that it desires its own 'repression' by way of being constituted by micro-power, by the various micro-powers that capitalism has at its disposal. So, rather than being constituted by a sovereign law, it is constituted by a multiplicity of relations of force and, as has been seen with regard to Foucault, it is that it appears as being constituted in such a way, and thus that sovereign power may be removed and desire simply liberated, that ensures desire is 'able' to desire its own 'repression'.

In this way, then, although capitalism liberates the subject's productivity, although it is 'born of the encounter of two sorts of flows, the decoded flows of production in the form of money capital and the decoded flows of labour in the form of the "free worker"',<sup>48</sup> that productivity is axiomatised or Oedipalised by the multiplicity of the relations with power that capitalism sets up in such a way that it is rendered harmless<sup>49</sup>. Thus they argue that the 'liberation' of desiring production is accompanied by a perpetual 'reterritorialisation' or axiomatisation. There is not a desiring machine that is not at once both a threat to, (decoded, explosive), and constitutive of, (axiomatised, organised), society<sup>50</sup>.

Through this constitutive relation with micro-power, desire is 'taught' in a sense to desire what it desires, to flow in certain ways and not in other ways. Oedipalisation, then, is the multiplicity of ways in which desire is constituted in relation to micro-power.

### Desire and Economy

Having outlined what Deleuze and Guattari consider psychoanalysis and capitalism to do to desire and having outlined the idea of schizo-desire as an 'unbroken and polyvocal flux',<sup>51</sup> that is not found outside of, but which does not necessarily

fit into, or only fit into, the shapes that capitalism has organised it into, this section will show that and how schizo-desire constitutes eccentric economy and is 'repressed' by being constituted as Oedipal, as centric economy. It may thus be read as providing an account of what Clément has called the schizo-desire that invests deconstruction.

In a later work, entitled Mille Plateaux, the notion of the 'rhizome' begins to take over from that of the desiring machine and that of the 'root tree' begins to take on much of the work that had been done by the idea of desire that has been Oedipalised. As Patton says, 'On one level, greatly simplified, the opposition between rhizomes and root trees is the opposition between the productive, creative and revolutionary aspect of desire and its petrification in structures of power'<sup>52</sup>. Inspired by whatever reason, and Patton suggests a few in his essay, the rhizome carries on many of the tasks begun by desiring machines in Anti Oedipus.

'Rhizomatics = Schizo-analysis ... = micro-politics'<sup>53</sup> is one of the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari connect the later talk of rhizomes with both the earlier analyses and Foucault's work in the essay which forms the preface to Mille Plateaux. And it comes as no surprise to see that, like desiring machines and their connections in production, rhizomatic arrangements are 'a-centric', non-hierarchical 'systems' that are 'without a general, without



any organising memory or central automaton, uniquely defined by a circulation of states'<sup>54</sup>. The relation between desiring machines, then, may be described as forming ec- centric economy where there is no transcendental value or state of desire that would organise, once and for all, the flows of desire.

Instead, like Derrida's differance and Foucault's micro-power, Deleuze and Guattari's desire is an immanent conception of desire; desiring machines are only defined by their relations to other desiring machines. Moreover, those relations may be broken and re-established without reference to, or prohibition by, a centre, a desiring machine that would ultimately account for the value of all the others. It is only in Oedipalised desire, desire that has been organised and legitimated in terms of a fixed, subjective and familial structure, that desiring machines are defined in terms of one privileged machine. In such a centred economy of desire, the privileged machine is what Deleuze and Guattari call Oedipus. The Oedipal configuration orders and organises all other machines such that their values, as preverse, paranoid and so on, may in turn be decided.

Thus, desire, as Deleuze and Guattari 'analyse' it, is not, or is not originally, a centred economy, governed by the 'sovereign' Oedipus<sup>55</sup> which

regulates the values and relations of the terms in order to form stable structures of legitimated desire. Those fixed structures are the work of desire that has been constituted to desire its own 'repression' in those structures or centric economies. As in Foucault's account of power, those economies in which desire is 'repressed' are legitimate by virtue of the micro-power that has so constituted desire as to desire them.

In being presented as a sovereign power repressing desire from outside, or as sovereign power repressing desire through constituting it, the power/desire complex that is prevalent under capitalism has succeeded in occluding its own non-full, non-simple 'origins' in the relations that ec-centric power establishes with ec-centric desire. If it is seen at all, then, it is seen as legitimate. Thus, 'the fundamental notions of the economy of desire - work and investment - keep their importance, but as subordinated to the forms of an expressive unconscious and no longer to the formations of the productive unconscious',<sup>56</sup>.

Three important points follow from the subordination of the ec-centric economy of schizo-desire to the centric economy of Oedipal desire. First, ec-centric, non-Oedipal desire is both constitutive and subversive of the Oedipal formations and of the social systems that it invests or

animates. Second, schizo-desire is also undecidable in terms of representation. Where centric desire is represented in terms of the family, for example, schizo-desire, (being originally neither representation nor expression, but production and destruction), presents problems for representation in that it both constitutes and subverts it. And thirdly, if it is not a question of simply liberating desire, a natural force or flow, and if it is not a case of simply removing the sovereign power in terms of which it might be held that desire was constituted, then, as they say, schizo-analysis is left only the recourse to strategy.

With regard to the first point, then: if desire is conceived as being a natural and spontaneous energy which power, the law, simply dams or keeps in check, then it may be said that desire is simply subversive of that power and a transgressive operation would be to just lift the barrier. If, on the other hand, desire is considered as being constituted by sovereign power and therefore in support of the social organisation that is thereby constructed, then, as Foucault says, desire is always already trapped<sup>57</sup> and the only transgressive practice would be to remove the power that laid down the law.

However, in the same way that Foucault's micro-power is always already manifested against resistance, in the way that it is both constitutive and

subversive of sovereign power, so schizo-desire is also undecidable with regard to the opposition constitutive/subversive. That is, although the multiplicity of desiring machines that go to make up a social formation go, precisely, to make up that formation, they are also the potential destruction of it. Another way of saying this would be to say, with Patton, that 'revolutionary movements are not immune to repressive forms and practices'<sup>58</sup> and with Deleuze and Guattari that there are 'nodes of arborescence in rhizomes' as there are 'rhizomatic shoots in roots'<sup>59</sup>.

So desiring machines or, as the later formulation has it, rhizomes, are at once the subversion of, and the energy behind, economies of desire. It is not the case that desire simply repressed, such that it could be freed by the lifting of a prohibition. Nor is it as if desire is simply constituted by power, so that it is always trapped by and solidary with that power. Rather, decoding and axiomatisation are found in the same desiring machine<sup>60</sup>, just as power is always manifested against resistance and micro-power is at once the 'source' of, and a threat to, what appears and is experienced as sovereign power.

Schizo-desire is similarly undecidable with regard to representation. As noted in the earlier sections, 'The order of desire is the order

of production ... We therefore reproach psychoanalysis for having stifled this order of production, for having shunted it into representation'<sup>61</sup>. It is in this way that the 'de-materialisation' of desire that takes place with Freudian and Marxist accounts robs desire of most, if not all, its productive force. To remove desire from the register of social production, or to make it productive only of phantasies, is to consider it as primarily a system of representations, as expression.

Desiring machines, however, are neither representation nor expression, they do not signify, but rather produce. And they produce the real as opposed to chains of signifiers or the imaginary. Consequently, for psychoanalysis to account for desire in the form of representations is to reduce that desire. So, while desire desires what capitalist micro-powers present to it as desirable, that desire is also something other than what is presented to it. Desire, on Deleuze and Guattari's account, is thus productive and destructive of representation and hence undecidable in terms of it.

Given all this, Deleuze and Guattari are left only the recourse to strategy, to what Patton calls 'prudence', in attempting to deal with Oedipalised desire. In statements reminiscent of what Derrida says when he argues that critical and metaphysical motifs coexist even in the same

proposition and thus that it cannot be a case of simply reversing a privilege or of avoiding all privilege whatsoever, Deleuze and Guattari say two things. The first is that, in any particular arrangement of desiring machines, 'the choice is between ... the paranoid counter-escape that motivates all the conformist, reactionary and fascisizing investments and the schizophrenic escape, convertible into revolutionary investment'<sup>63</sup>. The second is that they 'invoke one dualism only to ward off another'<sup>64</sup>.

That is, if, as they claim, reactionary and revolutionary investments are to be found within the same desiring machine, then there can be no question of simply freeing desire from the workings of power for the simple reason that desire does not work like that. Nor, on the other hand, is it a case of avoiding all positions and relations of desire, since even that would count as a desiring machine - Deleuze and Guattari would probably call it a celibate machine. And, similarly, if desire is constituted in relation to micro-power, it cannot be a matter of removing a form of domination because desire is not originally in relation to power as sovereign domination.

Thus it is a question of mobilising the various dualisms or dichotomies that desire is organised in terms of against themselves. On this

account, schizo-analysis would seek to 'liberate' the desire that does not admit of Oedipalisation but which has, nevertheless, been so constructed as to 'fit' into the Oedipal structure. The dualisms or dichotomies that are inherent in desiring machines, those of revolutionary/reactionary, de-coded/coded, territorialised/deterritorialised and so on, must be 'worked with' since that is what desire is: desiring machines are the connection of the two as power is always in relation to resistance.

Deleuze and Guattari's strategy, as with Foucault's is to chart those flows that are revolutionary, resistant to the work of power in coding and organising desire, and the attempt to render undecidable the desire that has been made manageable by capitalism and Oedipalisation.

### Conclusion

Thus this chapter has attempted to complete the analysis of economy, power and desire by accounting for the role of desire in economy. Deleuze and Guattari's work has been used to show how the sort of desire that is found in eccentric economy, schizo- or machinic desire, is mastered to form the sort of desire that is found in centric economy. Schizo-desire, which is constructed by the relation to Foucault's micro-power, and which is found in eccentric economy, is both constitutive and subversive

of the supposedly fixed and stable forms of desire to be found in centric economy.

In phallocentric economy, that is, desire is presented as either constitutive or destructive of the economies in which it is found: it is presented as decidable. But, as Deleuze and Guattari show, desire is more 'originally' conceived as being in relation to micro-power and as being undecidable. It is the energy which invests and proves a threat to the organisations in which it is found. And thus this chapter claims to have completed the task of accounting for the possibility of feminism, having shown how the final ingredient in economy escapes the attempt to reduce it to an identity.

In looking at the work of Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari, chapters five, six and seven claim to have illustrated the possibility of feminism insofar as they have elucidated the various ec-centric moves made by these thinkers in the face of what they perceive as metaphysics, phallocentric economy which privileges identity and decidability over a difference that is irreducible to identity or decidability. In that the privileging of identity is the vulgar masculine concern, a difference that does not thus reduce to identity may be said to be part of a non-vulgar femininity.

The following chapters will show how these concerns manifest themselves in more 'concrete'



economies, attempting to illuminate the 'gap' that is held to exist between these perhaps more 'philosophical' concerns and the actual struggles of women. Chapter eight will look at the work of Freud on female sexuality and of Gallop on the relation between women, feminism and Lacan. Chapter nine will discuss the various strategies that are available to feminism in the critique of the phallogentric production of value.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### WOMEN AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

This chapter sees the return of what are more obviously or 'vulgarly' feminine or feminist concerns. In chapter two, the production of value and identity, economy, was seen to be a matter of a relationship between identity, difference and some form of opposition. Two accounts of two 'sorts' of economy were given here. On the one hand, there was restricted, phallogentric economy which was productive of value and identity by means of the relation to the centre or transcendental signified. This 'sort' of economy was said to be phallogentric in a 'vulgar' sense in that the privileging of self-present and self-identical values has traditionally been the male concern.

On the other hand, there was feminist or ec- centric economy which would at once produce and destroy stable identities and values. This 'sort' of economy was labelled 'feminine' or 'feminist' for want of a better word to indicate a transgressive moment that would not simply and immediately be appropriated and rendered harmless by phallogentric economy. 'Feminist' or 'feminine', here, then, were intended in a non-vulgar sense since the value of the feminine had hitherto been produced in

relation to a centre, phallic or phalломorphic values. The relation between these 'sorts' of economy was seen to be a 'tension', hence the inverted commas.

In chapters three and four, the matter of identity, difference and opposition was traced through the work of Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Adorno on dialectics, showing how the question of the possibility engaged with the problems of the limits of thought and language. In addition to showing that and how the problems of feminism were problems of economy and that they concern the very limits of thought and language, these chapters showed how the relations of these thinkers to economy, and the matter of economy itself, provided for the possibility of feminism, as this latter is to be found in the work of Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari. Lastly, chapters five, six and seven looked at the work of these latter in order to show how ec- centric economy operates and is operated upon, how it is constituted and subverted, how it is traversed by relations of power and desire and how it relates to phallocentric economy.

In the light of all this, the present chapter intends to begin the analysis of how the identity and value, (and hence status and worth), of female sexuality is, or has been, produced in economy. The particular aspect of the value or

identity of women that will be dealt with here is that of female sexuality as it has been described in the work of Freud and as it is dealt with by Gallop. This aspect has been chosen because, as Marks and deCourtivron note and Mitchell implies<sup>1</sup>, Freud's work in this area has been the subject of much feminist attention in the past and because it is one of the areas in which much critical work is presently being done.

So, this chapter is concerned first with the production of value in sexual or libidinal economy, (in a vulgar sense, again), that is described in and by the work of Freud. It will be shown that this economy is phallocentric insofar as it is a centred economy and insofar as the phallus or phal-  
lomorphic values are privileged as transcendental signified. It will also show how the value and identity of female sexuality that is produced within this economy appears and is experienced as being produced by relation to that centre in the occlusion of ec- centric economy.

That is, it will show how difference, ec- centric economy, and the relations of power and desire that are to be found within it, are organised by centric economy in the production and legitimisation of the value and identity of female sexuality.

Having looked at these aspects of Freud's

work, "The Ladies' Man", an essay by Jane Gallop which relates Freud, Lacan and feminism, will be discussed. Among other things, the essay concerns Lacan's relations with his female readers and critics, his position with regard to phallocentrism and Freud and the question of the feminist critique of the production of value. As such, it relates back to the earlier concerns of this essay with economy 'in itself' and forward to the discussion of strategy to be found in the next chapter, in addition to dealing with some of the issues with which contemporary feminism is concerned.

Consequently, this chapter may be seen as providing a fairly concrete illustration of how precisely economy works in the production and legitimization of value and identity and as continuing the discussion concerning what a feminism, a discourse that would critique and transgress that production, would look like. This chapter does not attempt to give a complete and entirely 'authentic' account of the work of either Freud or Lacan.

## FREUD

### Introductory

Basically, then, this chapter is attempting to show that and how the perhaps more philosophical concerns of earlier chapters manifest themselves in more 'concrete' instances and how the

value and identity of female sexuality is produced in phallogentric economy. The things that it is not trying to do should also be emphasized. First, it is not trying to show that Freud's accounts of female sexuality are all hopelessly phallogentric and should be disregarded wholesale. And, second, it is not interested in proposing an 'authentic', definitive or even necessarily accurate account of Freud's views on the matter.

That is, although there are metaphysical elements to be found in Freud's work, although it is to be shown that his version of psychoanalysis operates a phallogentric economy in the question of female sexuality, there are also, nevertheless, various important critical motifs in that work. As has been seen, Derrida suggests that, 'in every proposition ... metaphysical presuppositions co-exist with critical motifs'<sup>2</sup>. As his treatment of Husserl and Saussure, for example, makes clear, a text exhibits and makes sense on the basis of the co-existence of both centric and ec-centric elements. General and restricted economy are not to be separated in such a way that one could be written without the other. So, although it will not be a matter of simply rejecting Freud's account on the basis of it exemplifying phallogentric economy, they are, nevertheless, those aspects of the account that the later sections of this chapter will be interested in.

Secondly, with regard to this point, Mitchell notes in the introduction to her Psycho-analysis and Feminism that Freud is offering a description of, rather than a prescription for, patriarchal or phallocentric society. Others have argued, however, that Freud cannot but have been offering support, if only tacit and unwitting support, for phallocentrism and that he cannot but have been subject to the ways of thinking about female sexuality that he describes. And Freud's 'own' account of the matter is that psychoanalysis does not attempt the almost impossible task of describing what a woman is 'but sets about enquiring how she comes into being'<sup>3</sup>.

Nevertheless, the ideas that no description of a state of affairs can be free from pre-suppositions and that a text only makes sense on the basis of the presence of centric elements should be sufficient to prevent the simple rejection of Freud's work.

With regard to the idea that this chapter does not attempt an 'authentic' or even chronologically accurate account of Freud's theories of female sexuality, it may be said in explanation that this is neither a psychoanalytical nor an 'intellectual-biographical' account of his work. The role of his account of female sexuality here is to illustrate first how various elements work together in economy

to produce the value and identity of female sexuality and second to show in what ways that economy is phallogentric. Objections along the lines of 'Freud changed his mind on this in 19 ... ' are therefore irrelevant.

So, if, as this essay claims, there exists a tension between centric and ec- centric economy, that a value or identity is at once produced and destroyed by its place in ec- centric economy, and that that value or identity is rendered decidable only in centred economy, then this chapter must show that the ec- centric economy in which the value and identity of female sexuality is undecidable is reduced by centred economy in which female sexuality is given a stable identity.

As a form of economics, the production of the identity of femininity, Freud's account of female sexuality is closely related to the perhaps more general account of sexual difference per se. The treatment of female sexuality, that is, is linked to the treatment of the different ways in which the little boy and the little girl relate to the affairs constitutive of the Oedipus and castration complexes. While the nature of this relation between Oedipus and the construction of female sexuality will not be explicitly dealt with in this chapter, some of the ways in which each operates as a set of economic practices will be dealt with below.



### Undecidability

One aspect of ec- centric economy that is to be found in Freud's work, which provides the 'tension' with centric economy and which must be 'reduced' by centric economy in order that the text on female sexuality be written, consists in his treatment of the female genitalia. That tension will be illustrated here before looking at the treatment of sexual difference and female sexuality.

On Freud's account, the female genitalia consists of both 'feminine' and 'maculine' elements; being 'improperly' both, it is 'properly' neither. That is, of the two parts of the female genitalia that Freud refers to, he refers to the clitoris as either being or being like a penis<sup>4</sup>, and to the hole or absence that the vagina is presented as as the, or a, more properly feminine organ<sup>5</sup>.

In possessing what would, in 'proper' terms, or centred economy, be referred to as both 'feminine' and 'maculine' characteristics, the female genitalia possesses no stable identity. Its value, as either masculine or feminine, is both produced and destroyed by the interplay of differences or oppositions that constitute sexuality. In ec- centric economy, then, the difference between two forms of sexuality is not reduced to an opposition or contradiction.

It is, rather, seen to constitute and

subvert the identity of both the two poles of the difference at once. It is in centric economy that that production/destruction must be reduced and made decidable. The value of either pole must be seen to derive from some stable identity in centred economy and, it will be shown, that is what Freud's work on female sexuality tends to do.

One version of this sort of argument is to be found in Sara Kofman's l'Enigme de la femme. In this text, she claims that Freud operates a double gesture, analogous to the tension between centric and ec-centric economy. On the one hand, he recognises the enigmatic or, as Kofman puts it, unheimlich, figure of the woman. And, on the other, that undeidable and threatening aspect of femininity is supposedly sublated, it is presented as having been accounted for and mastered by the theory of penis envy.

As has been seen with regard to Derrida and as will be seen in the sections on Gallop, it is the role of difference that 'begins' Freud's, (and Kofman would say 'vulgar' males' in general), dealings with the figure of the woman. Freud argues<sup>6</sup> that men question the nature of women because they are different; this makes them 'anxious and fearful'<sup>7</sup> and gives them a sense of the uncanny, of the unheimlich. Sexual difference, especially the '"small differences" in that which otherwise resembles one

the most,<sup>8</sup>, arouse anxiety and fear in men - a state that must be overcome in some way and rendered as harmless as possible.

One of the ways in which this disconcerting state of affairs is dealt with involves the setting up of a whole series of taboos around female virginity. These taboos, moreover, revolve around the role of penis envy. The taboos of virginity, ways of distancing oneself, (that is, a male oneself), from virginal women, are set up in order to defer contact with a woman who is supposedly even 'more redoubtable at the moment of her first sexual relations'<sup>9</sup>. So, in order to overcome what Freud calls a 'fundamental fear in regard to women',<sup>10</sup>, men set up a series of taboos around virginity in order that they can avoid women's mastery.

However, according to Kofman, there is more to this story. It is women's penis envy which apparently begets a 'bitter hostility',<sup>11</sup> on her part and which the male must protect himself from. It is, then, this envy that man fears, since the hostility it engenders leads men to think that the woman will revenge herself upon them for being so inadequately equipped. On Freud's account, man's fears of being castrated by the woman as revenge for her not having a penis and thus the woman's penis envy are thus at the root of the various taboos surrounding virginity.

Kofman's response to this is to argue

that woman has had penis envy foisted upon her as a result of the woman's enigmatic differences which result in the feeling of the uncanny, unheimlichkeit. Thus she says, and it is of great importance for this chapter, that 'it is woman who is said to have an incomplete sexuality, to suffer from penis envy ... while man ... finds nothing to envy in woman'<sup>12</sup>. In the context of this section, woman's enigmatic sexuality which, as suggested above, partakes of both vulgarly masculine characteristics, (the clitoris), and vulgarly feminine characteristics, (the vagina), must be reduced or 'domesticated' in order that it no longer pose a threat to the male.

Another version of this move is made by Culler in his On Deconstruction. Here<sup>13</sup>, he is looking at Freud's treatment of sexuality in the essay "Femininity", where psychoanalysis is said to ask 'how a woman develops out of a child with a bisexual disposition'. Culler gives an account of how, from this original bisexual disposition, which gestures towards a non-vulgar femininity, female sexuality is reduced and rendered decidable. Moreover, the identity that results from this ordering of sexual difference is one that allows femininity to be presented and experienced as a derivative and parasitic form of sexuality.

The role of ec- centric economy and the tension in which it exists with centric economy

becomes clear when Freud's account is read as showing how both vulgar masculinity and vulgar femininity are the result of the vulgarly masculine reduction of non-vulgarly feminine economy. As Culler puts it, 'man and woman are both variants of archi-woman',<sup>14</sup>.

That is, with vulgarly masculine clitoris and vulgarly feminine vagina, the woman gestures beyond both to the undecidable, the non-vulgarly feminine or Culler's archi-woman. The reduction of this ec- centricity, in the thoroughly ironic ascription to woman of an incomplete and derivative sexuality and the privileging of the male penis, allows vulgar masculinity to 'forget' or occlude the 'fact' of women's enigmatic non-identity. It allows vulgar masculinity to set itself up as privileged, as the norm, rather than be recognised as lacking and derivative which, in relation to non-vulgar femininity, it most certainly is.

Through the economic work of the penis, as transcendental signified, which orders and regulates identity out of the enigmatic play of sexual differences, woman is simply constituted as the sex which does not have the penis and therefore the incomplete sex. Man, proud, if anxious, possessor of the penis, no longer finds anything to envy and no longer finds anything to be afraid of, having secured the identity of female sexuality as a lack. In both these examples, woman's enigmatic or

undecidable sexuality has been reduced to a manageable identity by virtue of the relation to the penis as transcendental signified.

### Sexual difference

Thus there are ec- centric elements to be found in Freud's account of female genitality. As noted above, before looking at the account of female sexuality, sexual difference itself will be examined. That is, although they are in no sense separate operations, this section will consider how sexual difference is produced in Freudian economics before looking at the account of how the value or identity of female sexuality itself is generated.

It should, perhaps, be stressed that these are in no sense separate operations: where the transcendental signified was said to both produce differences out of difference and to regulate the relative values that were generated by those differences, so the penis in Freudian theory regulates both the production of sexual difference and the value of female sexuality 'within' that difference. The passage through the Oedipus and castration complexes, and the differences between the ways in which the little boy and the little girl accomplish that passage, produce both gendered human subjects and the relative value and identity of those subjects.

Prior to the Oedipal phase, there is no sexual difference, at least as far as the infant is concerned. The same libidinal forces are 'at work' in both 'male' and 'female' children in the various economies of object, aim and pleasure that constitute pre-Oedipal sexuality<sup>15</sup>. So the child of the oral and anal stages of sexuality, in which object, aim and pleasure are united in the ingestion of food and the mastery over the musculature of the bowel respectively, is not a gendered subject<sup>16</sup>.

In these stages, then, the child's body is a field traversed by libidinal forces. Pleasure is generated in a movement of objects and aims, (the mother's breast, the child's mouth and so on), none of which are stable and all of which are 'intra-familial'. In these stages, there is no relation to objects that are outside of the familial situation. There is no gendered subject and pleasure is produced in a shifting economy in which there is no single, stable value to organise the relations of objects and aims in the production of pleasure.

In no sense separable or discrete<sup>17</sup>, these economies of sexual value do not produce a gendered human subject. It is with the onset of the 'genital' or, as Freud called it later, the phallic stage and the development of the Oedipal situation, that sexual difference and, along with it, the respective sexual identity of the little boy and the

little girl, are produced. Somewhat obscurely, that is, the phallus 'comes into account',<sup>18</sup> for both male and female children and begins to organise pre-Oedipal sexuality into post-Oedipal differences.

In the phallic phase, contemporaneous with the Oedipus complex<sup>19</sup>, the penis begins to assume its role as the centre of sexual economy and to organise sexual difference. The little boy is said to desire union with his mother, perceiving his father as a threat and rival. While the little girl, whose earliest desires had been homosexual, turns her attentions to her father<sup>20</sup>. It is the castration complex, the threat or perceived fact of losing the penis, that is at work throughout this development.

The castration complex destroys the Oedipus complex in little boys and leads up to it in little girls<sup>21</sup>. That is, the threat of being castrated leads to the boy forsaking his mother as sexual object and, submitting to the authority of the father, realising that he will occupy such a position as he now desires at a later date. As Freud says, the discovery of the threat of castration leads to the formation of the super-ego and initiates the process that will lead him to find a place in the cultural community<sup>22</sup>.

The situation is more complicated with the little girl<sup>23</sup> and there are numerous problems with Freud's account, some of which have been hinted



at above. However, those problems will not be dealt with in any detail here and the basic mechanisms only will be described. The little girl acknowledges her castration as a fact<sup>24</sup> and turns her attentions from her equally ill-equipped mother to her father. There are now three paths open to the female child at this stage. The first is a revulsion from sexuality altogether, the second consists in the defiant assertion that she really has a penis. And the third is the 'normal female attitude'; it consists in wanting to substitute her father's child for the penis she does not have.

Freud says that it is the difference in the relation to castration and Oedipus between boys and girls which 'gives its special stamp to the character of females as social beings'<sup>25</sup>. Women, lacking the penis, lack also the relation to the values of society that are embodied in the paternal authority on incest. Similarly, they have less motivation for the setting up of the super-ego<sup>26</sup>. As was seen with Hegel, in chapter three, Freud's account of sexual difference involves the exclusion of women from the social and ethical aspects of life, confining them to desiring the father's child or some substitute for it, confining them to the hearth.

This is the context, then, for the production of the value of female sexuality. It is to the production of the value of female sexuality in

this difference that this chapter now turns. The account of this economy will be carried out under five headings.

### Female sexuality

The five headings under which the account of the production of the value and identity of female sexuality will be divided are as follows:

1) The suppression of difference; how the centre operates in subordinating difference to form differences organised in relation to itself.

2) The regulation of economy; how the centre balances, orients and organises the centric economy that is established in the suppression of difference.

3) The nature of the centre as 'out of play', as immune to or beyond the play of deferral and differentiation that all other terms in the economy are subject to.

4) The supplementary nature of the repressed term in that economy; how female sexuality is excluded and contained outside the realm of the centre.

5) The nature of power and desire; the roles and relations of power and desire as they are found within centred and ec-centric sexual economy.

It will be noted that these headings are taken from the account of economy in chapter two.

# 1) Suppression of differance

It was noted in chapter two that the centre of economy had at least two functions. The first was to 'master' differance, 'to limit what we might call the free-play' of differance<sup>27</sup>. It was to put an end to or curtail the endless dispersal and deferral of identity in the systematic play of ec- centric economy. So, if differance is a 'complex interplay of presence and absence'<sup>28</sup> and must be thought as predating even as it produces the conceptual oppositions of language<sup>29</sup> then, since the economy that is found in Freud's work operates in terms of presence and absence, the presence or absence of the penis, it is therefore centred economy.

It was also noted above, with regard to female genitality, at least, that the value or status of that genitality was defined in terms of a lack or absence, the lack or absence of the penis. The vagina, that is, is not defined as 'something having a form and different constitution', as something 'dissimilar and distinct'<sup>30</sup> and nor is it said to be something the value of which is problematic.

If the economy in which its value was produced was a gynocentric economy, the vagina would be said to have a different and distinct constitution and if it were produced within ec- centric economy it would be said to have an undecidable value.

However, it is said to be the effect of castration, an absence or lack at the place where the penis would be in the male<sup>31</sup>. Like any other, according to such feminists as de Beauvoir and Feral, who was quoted above<sup>32</sup>, female genitality can only be described in negative terms, defined by what it is not<sup>33</sup> in relation to the penis in the male.

Similarly with regard to the clitoris, it is in terms of the presence or absence of the penis that its value or identity is generated. In this case, however, the penis is almost present, it is not fully present, but exists in the form of an inferior version of the penis. As Freud says, 'it is a small penis' and, although it behaves like a 'real and genuine penis', it is still not quite real<sup>34</sup>.

It is claimed that this illustrates that the economy in which the value of female sexuality is produced is an economy which involves the suppression of difference. The ec- centric economy of difference as productive of the values of presence and absence has been suppressed in favour of an economy that conceives difference, and regulates the production of value, on the basis of the opposition presence/absence - the presence or absence of the penis.

## 2) Regulation of economy

The second role of the centre in economy was seen in chapter two to be that of organising, balancing and orienting that economy. In, or in addition to, mastering difference, the centre provides an organising pole around which the terms within the resulting centred economy may be arranged and in terms of which they are said to have the value they have. This duality of function may be said to correspond to Freud's concern with accounting for sexual difference on the one hand and with female sexuality on the other. That is, the centre at once organises difference into centred economy, producing stable differences, and regulates the values and relations of those differences. In this way, female sexuality is not only different from male sexuality, but also of a different, inferior, status.

One way in which the penis as centre organises those elements which are part of sexual economy may be seen if the example of female homosexuality is considered. The penis, or phallogomorphic values in general, in this case, provide the source for the value of female homosexuality. They provide the pole around which female homosexuality is said to have the identity or meaning it has in that, crudely and as Irigaray puts it, female homosexuality is reduced to 'acting like a man'<sup>35</sup>.

That is, female homosexuality is explained or made meaningful, its identity is generated, in terms of phallomorphic values. Value and identity are here produced in relation to phallomorphic values which are themselves fully and simply present and not defined by their relations to other terms. It is made meaningful or valuable in this way rather than being explained on its own terms, (whatever they would be and as gynocentric economy would do), or in terms of the ec-centric economy of difference, (in terms of a value that is undecidable).

Noting again, as does Freud, that the opposition male/female is conventional rather than scientific<sup>36</sup>, the centred economy in which the value of female homosexuality is produced generates that value in terms of acting like a man. As Freud says, for example, the girl 'changed into a man'<sup>37</sup>. Any form of specificity that might be held to pertain to female homosexuality and any question of the 'propriety' of ascribing stable identities or essences to any form of sexuality are suppressed or subordinated in this account and phallomorphic values held to provide the key to the production of the identity and meaning of female homosexuality.

The girl in Freud's case chooses a female object. Freud merely says that this is to act as men do, in choosing a woman as object of their

attentions. Moreover, in choosing a specific sort of woman, Freud tells us that she was what he referred to in "A special type of choice of object made by men" as a 'cocotte', she is corresponding to the male choice of object<sup>38</sup>. Similarly, the way in which she goes about 'courting'<sup>39</sup>, (a word laden with phal-  
lomorphic associations), this woman of low repute is said to be a 'masculine attitude towards that object'<sup>40</sup>. In behaving in this way, Freud's female homosexual is apparently doing nothing that is not in keeping with female homosexuals generally, who, he says, 'exhibit masculine characteristics, both physical and mental, with peculiar frequency'<sup>41</sup>.

Thus it is claimed that the production of the value or identity of female homosexuality is governed by the penis or phal-  
lomorphic values, acting like a man. Female homosexuality is not considered to be problematic, nor is it held to have any value or identity of its own. It is explained, rather, in terms of phal-  
lomorphic object choices and ways of relating to those objects.

The role or rule of the penis and phal-  
lomorphic values within Freud's sexual economy may also be seen in relation to the last of the three paths which he says are open to the woman in the essay "Female sexuality"<sup>42</sup>. Having acknowledged the 'fact of her castration', the 'superiority' of the male sex and the 'inferiority' of her own, there are,

apparently, three paths a woman's sexuality may travel. The first, as seen above, consists in a 'general revulsion from sexuality',<sup>43</sup> and the second in clinging with 'defiant self-assertiveness to her threatened masculinity',<sup>44</sup>.

On the third path, however, the position of the woman with regard to the penis and phallomorphic values is that of trying to appropriate it and them, of trying to possess a penis or a version of a penis. The identity of female sexuality is defined in terms of the penis at least twice here in that it involves the subjugation of femininity to maternity and in that it defines the value of motherhood as an attempt to possess the penis or something like the penis, in the form of the husband or the husband's child.

That is, where any gynocentric account of the value of female sexuality would presumably account for motherhood in its own terms, this phallogocentric explanation defines it in terms of the desire to possess the penis. And, where that gynocentric account would presumably, and as Feral suggests, not involve the subordination of female pleasure to maternity, phallogocentric economy determines that 'pleasure [la jouissance] no longer comes first',<sup>45</sup>. Woman's pleasure is no longer that which provides the 'defining element',<sup>46</sup> for sexual relations. In the same way as infantile sexuality comes 'under the sway'



of the reproductive function, then, it is the end result, the telos or sens, of sexual relations, in the form of the child rather than sexual pleasure, that generates the value of female sexuality.

### 3) Out of play

It was noted above, in chapter two, that where, in ec- centric economy, value or identity was at once produced and destroyed by its relations to all other terms, in centric economy, one term was privileged and held to be a full, simple value. The value and identity of all other terms was held to derive from their relation to this term, the centre or transcendental signified. The centre, moreover, was not held to be valuable as a result of its relations to all other terms. It was, rather, absolutely valuable, self-identical.

The centre, then, was held to be a value which escaped, or was outside of, the play of referrals and deferrals that characterised the values of all the terms it was thus said to govern. The centre regulated the values of those identities in that it determined which could be substituted for which other, (governing the exchange rate, as it were), but was not itself to be exchanged or substituted for anything else. It was in this sense out of play.

Similarly, in the sexual economy being considered here, the centre as full and simple value

is held to provide a source of sexual value without itself being valuable in terms of anything else.

The penis, as centre of sexual economy, is held to be immune in some sense from being defined in terms of anything else: its identity is not seen as being conditional upon a relation to any other element in that economy.

Thus it is, for example, that the pleasure obtained via the mastery over the musculature of the bowel may give way or be substituted, in the normal course of events, for the pleasure that is generated in the phallic stage and that both these economies come under the sway of the reproductive function. In this way, they obtain their value from the relation to phallomorphic values but phallomorphic values are not themselves defined in terms of anything else.

One more example would be that of female genitality. As both *de Beauvoir* and *Feral* note, it is woman or female genitality that is defined in terms of the penis but not the other way round. As has been seen above, the vagina is the lack or absence of the penis and the clitoris is a small penis but not, in the end, a real or genuine one. The penis does not receive its value from anything else but is rather held to be the presence from which everything else receives meaning and value.

So, it is that the penis is not defined and does not have its value produced in terms of the

vagina. And so it is, in the phallogentric economy described in the work of Freud, that the penis and phallogentric values are held to be outside or beyond the differences and deferring relations that give all the other elements within the economy the value they are said to have.

#### 4) Suppleментарity

These points are closely related to the idea of suppleментарity. It was seen in chapter two that those values which were not 'of the order' of the centre were held to be secondary or suppleментарary to that centre and the terms which were of its order. Thus it was indicated how, in the tradition Derrida is apparently most concerned to deal with, logocentrism, those values associated with writing, that are not of the order of full and present speech, logos, were held to be secondary and suppleментарary by

Plato, Saussure and the others. Writing, that is, is held to be secondary, the sign of a sign, and the guise and disguise of living speech: as such, it was held to be exterior, inferior and suppleментарary. As Derrida says, 'that which represents a force in the form of writing and essential to it has been contained outside speech'<sup>47</sup>.

An important aspect of the notion of suppleментарity is that the element or term that is thus held to be suppleментарary is, or may be, obliged

to 'make good' its deficiency. Thus Plato says that writing is in need of its father, speech, in order that it be protected from the attacks that its deficiency leave it open to and in order that it be of some value that is not merely supplementary. Speech is necessary to writing in order for it to be 'redeemed', for it to escape the weaknesses that it has as a result of being secondary.

In sexual economy, these ideas may be seen in the way in which those elements that are not of the order of the penis, the elements constitutive of female sexuality, are held to be of supplementary status to that of the penis and phallomorphic values. Women and female sexuality have been represented as being outside the realm of the penis and phallomorphic values, as being either wholly or partly other than it and as being a potential threat to it. Where, then, female sexuality has not been represented as beyond and inferior to the realm of phallomorphic values, (where it has not been represented as the other, the lack or absence of the penis), it has been represented as outside insofar as it is not a real or genuine phallomorphic sex.

Similarly, it is held that this supplementary sex which is that of the woman may be, or is obliged to be, made good. Thus the woman may aspire to possess the penis through the possession of the husband or the child that is preferably a male child.

In this case, she attempts to make her supplementary sexuality into a proper sexuality, one that is like the male. As noted above, her sexuality may also be made phallomorphic through the rejection of pleasure, the subordination of jouissance, that is involved in maternity.

The woman, then, may attempt to make her sexuality phallomorphic through the acquisition of a penis in the husband and/or male child, or through subordinating the feminine pleasure that might be involved in sexual relations to the phallically defined role of motherhood. In both cases, the different and the threatening (that is, for men) aspects of female sexuality are organised in terms of the penis and phallomorphic values in the attempt to make women's sexuality phallic.

'The deconstructive project', on the other hand, is to show how the setting up of the centre as absolute value and the repressing of the supplementary term involves the subordination of difference and the setting outside of the supposedly inferior term. Deconstruction tries to show, that is, that the supplementary term is 'actually' of the same order as, and interior to, the supposedly superior, full term. Thus Derrida tries to show that the properties which Plato, Saussure et al find in writing and consider to justify its supplementary status are to be found within speech as well. Speech, no less

than writing, is the sign of a sign and unless it were so, it could not function as it does in communication.

Thus, without going into too much detail, for that is properly the concern of the next chapter, the moves made by Culler and Kofman which were dealt with in the section on 'undecidability' above would be examples of how that which was supposedly superior was worked over by that which had been excluded and held to be supplementary. The next section will look at the workings of power and desire in Freudian economy to complete this account of sexual economy.

##### 5) Power and desire

This section will begin to chart the roles of power and desire in Freud's account of female sexuality. There are at least two relations which such a charting might take up with regard to that account. The first concerns what might be called the 'internal economy' of Freud's work - the position of the centre as desiring and powerful figure, for example. And the second concerns what might be called the 'external economy' of that work, in which the value and meaning of Freud's text is itself produced as scientific and truthful, for example.

The latter, which would involve reference to such things as the ways in which a text is

constituted as meaningful and authoritative in society for example, will not be considered here.

Rather, it is the position of the transcendental signified, phallomorphic values, and hence masculinity as powerful and desiring, that will be considered. That is, these terms or values, along with the other terms to be found in Freud's account, will be considered as forces that differ from and oppose one another in the production of the value or identity of female sexuality.

It will be recalled that in chapter six, the version of Foucault's account of power that was adopted was that micro-power was both productive and destructive of what appeared and was experienced as sovereign power. However, the destructive aspect of those shifting relations that constituted micro-power was occluded by the operations of sovereign power which thus appeared to be independent of the terms it governed. To chart the positions of the terms or elements within Freud's sexual economy in terms of sovereign power would thus be to continue the occlusion of the sorts of power relation which were to be found in ec-centric economy. Since it was also argued that ec-centric economy was feminist in a non-vulgar sense, such an occlusion would be to contribute to what was supposedly being analysed - the phallogentric tendencies of Freudian economics.

Thus, according to the juridico-discursive notion of power, power is essentially a juridical mechanism 'which says the law, which interdicts, which says "no"',<sup>48</sup> and which is associated with 'a whole litany of negative effects',<sup>49</sup>. It is also held to be something that can be possessed, exercised and lost, either by individuals or by a group of individuals. The paradigm case of power from which the general title is taken is therefore the Prince who is said to have power and to exercise it by means of spoken interdicts which take the form of laws. Such, crudely, is the basis of the juridico-discursive notion of power as presented and criticised by Foucault.

If the sexual economy that is to be found in the work of Freud is considered, it can be seen that the role/rule of the penis and phallomorphic values as centre of that economy can be accounted for in terms of the juridico-discursive notion of power. For example, it could be said that the penis as centre is the sovereign point that is absolute or beyond the laws that it supposedly lays down. It would, for instance, be above or beyond the operations in terms of which female homosexuality is opposed to and defined in terms of acting like a man.

The penis/phallomorphic values as centre, then, would dictate the laws that bind the actions and transactions of all other elements within sexual economy, without itself being subject to similar



binding or relation to anything else. What appears and is experienced as the absolute power and value of phallomorphic values in Freud's account may be compared, then, to the absolute power (or Power) supposed to be held by the sovereign on the juridico-discursive account of power. This, however, would be to assume a position of complicity with precisely what is being analysed and critiqued in this chapter.

As Foucault is concerned to show, there are a number of problems involved in the juridico-discursive model of power and these problems contribute to the occlusion of the production and destruction of sovereign power in micro-power. Briefly, as seen in chapter six, the juridico-discursive account of power cannot explain the productivity of power - that it 'runs through and produces things ... pleasure ... knowledge'<sup>50</sup>. Secondly, it is difficult to see how power should ever have been accepted or tolerated - how and why dictates made from a position of power should ever be tolerated as legitimate given that all it does is say 'no'. And, thirdly, the juridico-discursive notion seems to require some sort of basis or condition for its functioning - it is hard to understand how the 'terminal forms' of power, sovereign power, could be exercised unless some 'basis' were laid for that exercise.

The sort of power that Foucault says serves as 'basis' or 'origin', which has hitherto

been occluded as condition for the functioning and exercise of sovereign power, consists in a 'multiplicity of relations of force immanent to the sphere in which they operate'<sup>51</sup>. Sovereign power's 'condition of possibility' 'must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point ... but rather in ... the moving substrate of force relations which ... constantly engender states of power'<sup>52</sup>.

So, if the operation of the penis and phallomorphic values, the masculine operation, is that of occluding difference and of providing some principle or source for the regulation of value in phallogentric economy, then the exercise and existence of that power must be said to be based upon the occlusion of its sources in a multiplicity of force relations. Thus, where difference provides the non-full, non-simple 'origin', (the production and destruction), of the centre's value, Foucault's micro-power provides the condition, (the production and destruction), of the power of the sovereign. The operation of the penis and phallomorphic values as absolutely powerful in centred economy is to occlude the origins of its power in the multiplicity of force relations that would, precisely, both produce and destroy its power.

For example, although the penis and phallomorphic values appear and are experienced as governing the other values in sexual economy, and to

govern in the manner of the sovereign, the source of that power, (and the potential undoing of it), is to be sought in the shifting multiplicity of relations in which the penis is not (yet) centre but is rather of the same order as those elements in relation to which it obtains its value and power. That is, although the meaning and identity of female homosexuality, for example, is produced in terms of its relation to the penis as transcendental signified, (as 'acting like a man'), that centred economy has occluded the origins of the penis and phallomorphic values so that they appear and are experienced as simply dominant over female homosexuality. In ec- centric economy, the value of any term, and also the power of any term, would only be generated by its relations to or differences from all the other terms - there would be no privileged or dominant term that was set up as absolutely powerful.

So, what is presented and experienced in phallocentric economy as the sovereign power of the penis and phallomorphic values over all the other terms is dependent upon the occlusion of the non-full, non-simple origin of that power in the ec- centric economy of shifting and multiple relations of forces. The penis and phallomorphic values, like the other terms, are invested by various degrees of force which differ from and oppose one another, thus both creating and destroying their power in ec- centric

economy. Only in the move to masculine, centric, economy, does one term, the penis, become privileged, solidary with the values of identity and presence and begin to take on the role of sovereign, that from which supplementary powers derive.

The desire that is in relation to both micro-power and sovereign power must also be accounted for. It will be recalled from the previous chapter that desire is that which power is already in relation to. The tension between ec-centric and centric economy, which manifests itself on the level of power in the relation between sovereign power and micro-power, will be seen in the register of desire as the difference between schizo-desire and Oedipal desire. Schizo-desire, which is in relation to micro-power as plebness, the resistance which cannot be completely mastered, therefore provides the basis for Oedipal desire, the desire for something that is lacking and which is presented as being in relation to sovereign power.

Thus, if feminine desire was to be accounted for in the terms of phallocentric economy, in relation, that is, to sovereign power, it would be said that either that desire was simply repressed or that it was simply constituted by that power. Female homosexuality, for example, would be theorised either as being dammed, channelled or otherwise throttled by sovereign power or as being simply constructed

by that power. In both cases, female homosexuality would be represented as being in relation to sovereign power.

If, on the other hand, the penis or phal-  
lomorphic values were theorised as desiring to govern and regulate the production of the value of all other terms in sexual economy, that desire would be presented as the desire for something that was simply lacking. It would be presented as the desire for stable and self-identical values that were lacking either contingently (Freud) or necessarily (Lacan). Masculine or phallogentric desire, as presented in the terms of phallogentric economy, therefore, would be presented as that which desired to be sovereign.

This desire, to govern and regulate by means of a stable and self-identical value, is what has traditionally and vulgarly been the masculine concern. Such is the desire and the power that is found within centric, phallogentric economy. Such, also, is the desire for and the sort of power presented as appropriate for the establishing of centric economy.

However, as has been shown, this sort of power, sovereign power, and the sort of desire that is in relation to it, only obtain on condition that the multiple and shifting relations of forces that constitute micro-power on the one hand and the sort of desire that is in relation to micro-power on

the other have been occluded. It is this latter power and the schizo-desire that is in relation to it that has been presented so far as feminist in a non-vulgar sense and which is never mastered or regulated by sovereign, phallocentric, power.

Consequently, feminine desire, as it is found in Freud's sexual economy, in female homosexuality, for example, would be theorised as that which would both produce and destroy the appearance of Oedipal desire from an anti-Oedipal standpoint. The value or identity of female homosexuality, that is, would itself be both produced and destroyed by its relations to all other forms of sexuality rather than simply being repressed or simply constituted in relation to male power.

And thus, to present masculine desire as the desire to provide a stable source of value that was lacking would be to repeat the very move that was supposedly being resisted - the attempt to reduce difference to something manageable. Rather, that desire would have to be seen as being constituted in relation to the power relations between all the other elements of sexual economy. To present the masculine concern as the desire to provide a full and stable origin for identity is to perpetuate the occlusion of the origins of desire in schizo-desire - it is to repeat and partake of that concern.

So, on this account, masculine desire to govern and regulate the production of value would be theorised as just another desiring machine which, in the manner of Oedipus, had been removed from its connections with all other desiring machines and made into an eternal structure of desire.

### Conclusion

These sections have thus accounted for the phallogentric tendencies of Freud's account of female sexuality. Although it was seen in the earlier sections that there were ec- centric moments in that account, the latter sections have been concerned to elucidate how female sexuality is produced in phallogentric economy.

### The ladies' man

The following sections will look at an essay by Jane Gallop which deals with Freud, women readers and Lacan. It will be seen to relate the earlier concerns of this work with identity, difference and opposition to those of the following chapter with strategy.

Gallop's Feminism and Psychoanalysis is, as she says, a study of the relations between 'contemporary feminist theory and the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan'<sup>53</sup> and, as the title suggests, the continuation of a debate concerning and opened by

Juliet Mitchell's Psychoanalysis and Feminism. It is a collection of interesting and complex essays that are connected by the desire to be both feminist and psychoanalytical and to create exchanges between 'people who do not speak to each other'<sup>54</sup>, exchanges within and between these generic groups. Thus, the essay that these sections will consider, "The Ladies' Man", elucidates the possibility of a psychoanalytic feminism by confronting Lacan first with Freud and second with Irigaray. The concerns of "The Ladies' Man" with feminist strategies in the face of the various manifestations of phallocentrism will thus introduce the concerns of the next chapter as well as relating back to the concerns of the preceding chapters.

The essay begins by reading an issue of the French journal l'Arc. More precisely, it looks at issue number 58 which has been produced by a group of women and is devoted to Lacan. Gallop makes much of the notion of devotion elsewhere<sup>55</sup> and it is perhaps the wrong word to use to describe the relation of the women of l'Arc 58 to Lacan<sup>56</sup>. However, it appears that Lacan's practice earns him the title of 'The ladies' man', that he is what Gallop calls a 'prick' and that, because of this and despite themselves, the ladies find him 'irresistible'<sup>57</sup>.

For a long time, Lacan says, he has desired to speak to the women, to stroll among them.



'A real ladies' man, there is nothing he wants more that to be with the women'. Moreover, what he wants to talk to the ladies about is 'the other satisfaction, that which responds to phallic pleasure'.

Lacan, then, 'desires to stroll through the audience ... to ask the question Freud avoided, "Was will das Weib?"',<sup>58</sup>.

However, Lacan's seminars for the year 1972-3, (Encore: Seminaire Livre XX), state, 'over and over again' that 'the phallic order and phallic enjoyment are ... a failure to reach the other'. As Gallop puts it, 'the sexual relation, as relation between the sexes, fails' and Lacan, who wants to stroll among the women as 'cock of the walk', is denied his pleasure. 'The cock is that which by definition cannot be with the women' and Lacan, who cannot 'strut among the women, joins the women in the analysis of the failure of his desire'<sup>59</sup>.

Undeterred, Lacan gallantly begs the women to tell him something of that other satisfaction: the entire seminar asks 'but one thing, Was will das Weib?'. The answer he gets is 'tauntingly ambivalent': 'Encore'<sup>60</sup>. He wants to know about the other satisfaction. To the ladies' man, 'Encore' 'calls for something else', something he refers to as 'beyond the phallus'. But, as 'cock of the walk', 'he cannot help but want to give another phallic performance'<sup>61</sup>.

Thus Lacan is not always 'seductive and elusive'<sup>62</sup>, his 'poetic' and 'allusive' flirting with the women<sup>63</sup> 'continually tends to freeze into a rigid system centred on the phallus as transcendental signifier'<sup>64</sup>. The ladies' man risks being turned into the man's man, the frank and serious philosopher, and for Gallop it is only the ladies' man's continually posing the question, without being satisfied with any 'recuperative' answer that might be provided by the earnest philosopher, which prevents the system solidifying around the phallus and phalломorphic values. Dishonourable Lacan is on feminism's side, with the women, against the philosopher who is honourable and surrounded by all the virile, phallocentric, values.

### The Prick

So, Lacan at his most 'stimulating and forceful' escapes the accusations made, as Gallop notes, by Derrida among others, that he is phallocentric. There are two problems with the claims of people like Derrida, according to Gallop. On the one hand, Derrida is a philosopher. To call Lacan phallocentric is thus to 'approach the proper epithet' but to 'misfire' through adhering to 'polite, discursive philosophical terms'. Lacan, on the other hand, is not 'simply a philosopher': his flirtatious and cocky discourse is more a performance that is 'attuned to the register of aggression and desire'. On

Gallop's view, he is more than phallocentric.

'He is also phallo-eccentric. Or, in more pointed language, he is a prick'<sup>65</sup>.

It is Lacan the prick that the ladies, despite themselves, find irresistible. The prick is in some way undecidable - 'both resented by and attractive to women'<sup>66</sup> as a 'narcissistic tease who persuades by means of attraction and resistance, not by orderly systematic discourse'<sup>67</sup>. Lacan's trick is to lay bare his desire, to show his prick and 'let the girls know he wants them'<sup>68</sup>, whereas the honourable philosopher cannot reveal his sexualised relation to his audience. The phallocentric order demands impassivity and that the law, rather than desire, issue from the paternal, philosopher's position.

Thus, as seen in chapter two, phallocentrism and the polemic, the idea of serious, earnest and terminable debate, 'are masculine, upright, matters' while the prick and the idea of philosophy as housework, as something that must be returned to again and again, 'in some crazy way is feminine'<sup>69</sup>. And Lacan, who taunts and insults his audience, who does not 'play by the rules', escapes the polite, paternal and non-sexualised role ascribed the philosopher and obviously enjoys his teasing. It is 'the evidence of the pleasure' that undermines the rigid authority of the paternal position.

It is at this point, and via their

relations to Freud, that Lacan is confronted with Irigaray. Where Lacan suggests that Freud's success with his hysterics was due to the 'attentive court' he paid them, Irigaray suggests that 'it would be too risky ... to admit that the father could be a seducer' but that this risk is avoided by the 'cloak of the law with which he covers his desire and his sex organ'<sup>70</sup>. That is, where Freud pays attentive court to his hysterical patients, where he manages to unveil at least a part of his sexualised relation to them and thereby achieve some success with the girls, Lacan 'gets all the girls because ... he unveils his desire'<sup>71</sup>.

As Gallop says, 'in Lacan's writing, the Name-of-the-Father is the Law'<sup>72</sup>. And, if the Name-of-the-Father is phallogentric law, designed to curtail speculation as to the identity of the father and the paternity of the child, 'then the father's prick is the derision of his name'<sup>73</sup>, reminding us of 'the extra-legal beginnings of the child'<sup>74</sup>. So, if the risk of suggesting that the father could be a seducer is avoided by 'the cloak of the law with which he covers his desire', and if Lacan manages to show his prick, then 'the enquiry into Freud's phallogentric cloak reveals Lacan's prick'<sup>75</sup>.

In this way, then, for Irigaray to refuse to mention Lacan's name in her essay "La 'mechanique' des fluides" 'is to refuse to read him as

Law-giver'<sup>76</sup>. It is not to read him as being in a paternal position, the identity of which is guaranteed by law. It is rather to read him as a body, in a position of desire and 'open to intercourse'<sup>77</sup>.

Into Lacan's textual body, then, she weaves her own sinuous text and, where Lacan declares that 'woman does not exist', where the honourable and solid system of philosophical discursivity cannot account for woman 'because it demands the solid, the identical, to the exclusion of the fluid', she declares that 'the woman creature does speak' but that 'it speaks "fluid"'.

On Gallop's account, this 'fluid' speech is not presented by Irigaray as the simple opposite of the solid: Irigaray would rather study the fluid as having a mechanics of its own. But at the same time, the fluid 'resists any attempt at static identification'<sup>78</sup>. However, Lacan the man threatens to envelope Lacan the prick and, according to Irigaray, it is precisely the failure of desire, noted above, that poses this threat. Lacan's theory of the objet a signals the return of a protective rigidity to the unprincipled teasing of his feminism.

As noted above, the relation to the Other (Autre) fails. Phallic enjoyment, as an attempt at sexual relations, fails and 'in the place of the Woman ... is the objet a'<sup>79</sup>. Thus Lacan's desire, (both in his theory of desire and in his desire to

be with the women, the ladies' man), fails to reach the women and 'short circuits' itself by fixing itself onto an object. Fluid desire is reduced or domesticated by fixing itself onto the objet a, a solid, identifiable object. As Gallop puts it, 'the relation to the Other fails whereas the relation to the object works: so the object a allows for a mechanics that describes its workings',<sup>80</sup>. And it is Irigaray's task to stir the fluid that is to be found around Lacan the prick in order to drown Lacan the man who, in his account of the objet a, 'clings precariously to the solid system',<sup>81</sup>.

The final section of the essay connects all these themes with the idea of woman as truth, using Lacan's television appearance in the year of l'Arc 58's appearance. Lacan apparently avoided any 'man to man' confrontation over the very questions that he had himself commanded. Arrogant and imperious, he begins by saying 'I always speak the truth: not the whole truth [pas toute] because one does not succeed in speaking the whole truth',<sup>82</sup>. Such a performance, Gallop suggests, is 'the ultimate in femininity',<sup>83</sup>.

It is the ultimate in femininity because on Lacan's account, 'truth is already a woman by not being the whole truth [de n'etre pas toute] not wholly to be said [pas toute a se dire] in any case',<sup>84</sup>. The truth is not wholly to be said, it is not

reducible to a stable and unitary structure that could be guaranteed by laws because it escapes, like Lacan, from the phallic structure of objects that can be identified. Thus that which is not true in the sense that philosophers understand, as can be guaranteed by laws, the truth of objects, is not true or a lie from the position of the man. And thus Irigaray says that 'Woman never speaks par-eil [similar, like, equal] . What she emits is flowing [fluent], fluctuating. Cheating [flouant].' She is attempting, still, to stir up the current, flowing/lying that is truth/feminine in Lacan the ladies' man<sup>85</sup>.

### Economy

The concerns of Gallop's book generally are those of this essay: identity, difference/opposition and economy. As she says, the 'question of identity poses itself in various fashions throughout the book'<sup>86</sup> and the 'problem of dealing with difference without constituting an opposition may just be what feminism is all about'<sup>87</sup>. Similarly, the notion of economy, of centric and 'excentric' moments of economy, is to be found at numerous points in her analyses<sup>88</sup>.

Moreover, where both psychoanalysis and feminism would want to question 'a rigid identity that cramps and binds' they also want to produce a

new identity. Gallop holds 'the Lacanian view', however, that any form of identity, any attempt to give an identity to the subject of either feminism or psychoanalysis, 'will necessarily be alien and constraining'<sup>90</sup>. This is not to say that identity can or must be escaped from: 'that would only lead to another form of paralysis - the oceanic passivity of undifferentiation'<sup>91</sup>.

Thus difference, which produces great anxiety<sup>92</sup>, must be dealt with in such a way that it is not domesticated through being reduced to polar oppositions between two representable identities. Nor must it be allowed to degenerate into the oceanic undifferentiation noted above. Rather, 'identity must be continually assumed and called into question'<sup>93</sup>. This, for Gallop, entails paying close attention to specific differences between texts and authors: their differences, like those between psychoanalysis and feminism, are productive. So the results of the confrontations between different texts, authors or fields in Feminism and Psychoanalysis 'is not a mystical fusion obliterating all difference and conflict, but a provocative contact which opens each to what is not encompassed by the limits of its identity'<sup>94</sup>.

Although, as Gallop says, with regard to Lacan, 'it is too eloquent, too comfortable, too complicitous with philosophical mastery' simply to claim that anyone is phallogocentric<sup>95</sup>, this section



will attempt to illustrate the tension between eccentric and centric economy in the works of Gallop and Lacan. That is, although there are moments of what has thus far been termed eccentric and hence feminist economy in Gallop's work, those moments do not always or necessarily coincide with what she terms feminist.

In the essay that precedes "The ladies' man", Gallop hints at what this essay is trying to establish: 'it may be that "centric" of any sort is always phallic'<sup>96</sup>. Exploiting the fact that both 'centric' and 'to prick' derive from the Greek ken-trein, she suggests that 'centric' is simply shorthand for phallocentric, that centric economy is, in a vulgar sense and as this essay has argued, the masculine concern. This section will attempt to show that and how, although there are moments of eccentric economy, non-vulgarly feminist economy. in Gallop's and Irigaray's readings of Lacan, those moments exist in a relation to vulgarly masculine moments. That is, Lacan's prick is not necessarily feminine in a non-vulgar sense - rather it is something like the reverse of traditional, masculine values.

Two instances in particular which might be used to illustrate how Gallop's and Irigaray's readings of Lacan approach what this essay has called feminine economy include Gallop's portrayal of Lacan

as both 'resented by and attractive to women'<sup>97</sup> and Irigaray's attempt to designate and study the fluid as having a 'mechanics of its own'<sup>98</sup> - as rendering problematic the distinction between the solid and the fluid.

Lacan the prick is resented for his high-handed disregard for others<sup>99</sup>, for his abuse of phallocentric power which involves flaunting that power. And he is attractive because he manages to let the girls know that he wants them<sup>100</sup>, because he shows himself in a position of desire to them. Thus Lacan the prick is in some way undecidable with regard to the opposition seducer/father. He is at once in a position of authority and of pleasure seeker, each of which is supposed, on the phallocentric register, to be exclusive of the other. So, Lacan as cock of the walk and even as ladies' man combine in some way to produce the undecidable Lacan the prick.

Similarly with regard to Irigaray's attempt to drown Lacan the man, who clings to the system of solids that phallocentric Western science has privileged over the feminine fluid. Irigaray does not simply designate the fluid as the other of the solid, as if it were a simple opposition. Rather, and as if to obscure the distinction between the two, to present the fluid as a moment of the solid, she would study that fluid as having a mechanics of its own.

However, having said that, this section must show that Lacan's femininity, Lacan as prick, is not the saving moment that Gallop and Irigaray appear to think it is. This account of the tension in their readings will differ from their own in that they are saying that Lacan is truly feminine or the 'ultimate in femininity',<sup>101</sup> at some points but not at others. This account will suggest that he is often not even truly feminine, (whatever that would be), at the very moments they say he is. It will suggest, then, that the femininity that is privileged in his and their discourse is, apart from the aspects noted above, produced in phallogentric economy and ultimately a form of vulgar femininity, a reversal of the feminine identity that non-vulgar feminists would object to.

Briefly, almost algebraically, then, the phallogentric law would veil the father's phallus, preventing the view of him as seducer and Lacan's unveiling of his desire would, in Gallop's opinion, 'feminize' him<sup>102</sup>. In terms of what has been presented so far as ec- centric economy, it would have to be said that a veil passes between the term, (the father or the prick/seducer), and itself. That is, the sort of femininity that is supposed to fall to the prick is but a reversal (or the opposite pole) of the masculinity of the man's man. This sort of femininity in a man is no less a traditional category of sexual relation than that of the man's man, something evinced

in the familiarity of the phrase, the ladies' man.

That the position of the ladies' man is but a reversal of, and no less traditional than, that of the man's man may be seen if the idea of the unveiling of the phallus is considered. Lacan says that the phallus works, it can play its role, only when veiled<sup>103</sup> and his appearing in a sexualised and desiring relation to the women around him is supposed to unveil that phallus, to 'spoil its game',<sup>104</sup>. There are at least two problems involved in these claims.

The first is that the practice of unveiling the phallus, of blatantly appearing in a sexualised position, is but a reversal of the phallic, man's man's stance of non-desirous, paternal authority. The second problem appears from an anti-Oedipal point of view. It would be that the supposedly paternal position, that of non-dangerous, non-seductive authority, is itself already a position of desire; that it is already a desiring machine - the father-machine. Thirdly, these problems together raise the possibility of asking whether it is not the case that, rather than reversing the position of the two moments, desiring for non-desiring, a strategy of showing the work of an-Oedipal desire in the position of the father would be more 'successful' as a 'feminist' strategy.

The fourth question to be asked with

regard to Lacan's supposedly feminist desiring and sexualised relation to the women around him would be 'What sort of sexuality is it that he is flaunting, irresistibly, in front of these women?'. That is, as has been seen in chapter two, the decision as to what is and what is not sexual, as opposed to the political, the social and so on, is only made in, or as a result of the reduction to, centric economy. As noted above, then, before the reduction to centred economy, there was no sexuality, it was not possible to designate anything as properly sexual or non-sexual as opposed to anything else. Its value in eccentric economy would be at once produced and destroyed.

The first and third problems raised here permit another parallel with chapter two to be made. It concerns the position of the woman as truth in Lacan's system. His identification of the woman as truth is, like the unveiling of the phallus to reveal the feminised prick, a reversal of the exclusion of woman from the realm of truth. On what might be conceived as a positivist or empiricist account of truth, truth is, as Heidegger says, some form of correspondence with objects. Woman is, as Gallop notes, excluded from this realm as non-truth, and as Derrida notes, for lacking the penis and other phallomorphic values. On a more Heideggerian plane, truth is that which first gives objects; it cannot be an object

itself and cannot consist in any correspondence to objects.

Lacan's positing of woman as truth belongs to this latter section or moment - this form of truth is not the phallomorphic truth of objects. From the perspective of truth as truth of objects, this form of truth is rather a form of lie - the absence of objects. Similarly, woman is, as the absence of phallomorphic values and lacking the penis, represented in Lacan's system as 'already' being the truth. Woman is represented as the more primordial truth that is later veiled and presented in virile economy as the truth of objects.

On both accounts of truth or woman or woman/truth, however, both are presented as decidable: each has a stable identity. On the Nietzschean/Derridean version, however, the value and identity of both would be that of the undecidable - both would be at once produced and destroyed in eccentric economy. This illustrates that Lacan operates a reversal rather than a reversal 'followed by' displacement in the matter of economy and female sexuality.

That is, where phallocentric economy represents the feminine as excluded from the privileged relation to truth, which is the masculine preserve, to be won by means of the earnestness and the other virile values that Gallop notes, Lacan privileges woman with regard to the truth by means of a

reversal of the conception of truth. Where once the phallus and the stable identity of solid objects were the object and the credentials of enquiry, now the vagina, the lack of phallomorphic values and the absence of stable objects, is privileged. So, the vagina and female sexuality are still conceived as lack, as the hole that is not Whole or One, but now it is privileged.

As such, the femininity that Lacan attempts to take on in Gallop's version of his antics is not a revolutionary or transgressive femininity. It is, rather, a reversal of the femininity that has been produced in the economy that both, presumably, are trying to critique or transgress. And this is the result of Gallop's position on identity, difference and opposition, on economy. She says that the basic project of the book is dialectical - it is to open each position to the difference that is not encompassed by that position's identity<sup>105</sup>.

Such a dialectic is necessarily 'recuperative', to use Gallop's own word. It cannot account for that which is irreducible to any identity, but must provide some means of encompassing that excess. Thus this section claims to have illustrated the tension between centric economy and ec-centric economy in Gallop's reading of Lacan. They were seen to exist in a tension and that tension was seen to be reduced by Gallop's recuperative dialectic.

## Conclusion

Thus this chapter claims to have shown how economy works 'in practice' or in a more 'concrete' example than had been presented before. Although there were seen to be moments of ec-centric economy in Freud's work, it was also seen that centric, phallocentric economy ultimately mastered that ec-centricity to effect the production of the value and identity of female sexuality in terms of a relation to the penis and phallic values. Sexual difference in Freud's work was shown to be ordered by the relation to the penis.

In the case of Gallop's reading of Lacan, the same tension was found. Despite moments of ec-centricity and hence non-vulgar femininity, centric economy was seen to govern the production of Gallop's version of Lacan's femininity in that it existed as a reversal of traditional masculinity.

In addition to relating back to the earlier chapters on identity, difference and opposition, this chapter has also made reference to possible feminist strategies. In the next chapter, these strategies will be comprehensively accounted for. The various forms of supposedly feminist or transgressive practice will be seen to reduce to three basic forms and their respective and relative chances of avoiding 'domestication' will be evaluated.



## CHAPTER NINE

### STRATEGY

So far, then, the notion of economy, of the production and legitimation of meaning and identity, has been explicated as a matter of a relationship between identity, difference and opposition. Chapter two argued that that relationship was a matter for feminism and subsequent chapters have elucidated the possibility of feminism via readings of Hegel, Heidegger, Nietzsche and Adorno on dialectics, a thought that is also the thought of a relationship between identity, difference and some form of opposition. In chapters five, six and seven, it was seen that Nietzsche was decisive for Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari in the matter of feminism. His antics at the limits of thought and language provided an instance, and for the possibility, of feminism as it manifested itself at these limits.

That is, if, as was argued, traditional or vulgar masculinity was associated with the values of self-identity and self-presence that were found to be privileged in centred economy, then a discourse or practice that opposed those values on the one hand and that economy on the other was a non-vulgar feminism. It was non-vulgar because it did not oppose, and was not different to, masculinity and phallocentrism in the ways that difference and opposition were

organised in centric economy. Nietzsche's feminism was thus a non-vulgar feminism in that it was non-reactive, it did not oppose itself as self-identical to another self-identity. Rather, it attempted to chart the constitutive and subversive investments of forces in the ec-centric economy of will to power. Ec-centric economy, that is, was non-vulgarly feminine in that it both constituted and subverted the organisation and values of centric economy, that which had traditionally been associated or solidary with vulgar masculine concerns.

Having shown how Heidegger and Adorno related to ec-centric economy, the work of Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari was seen to constitute instances of non-vulgar feminism in that they, too, sought to account for that which both produced and destroyed the identity of the terms of centric economy. While Derrida may be said to have accounted for the work of identity in economy per se, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari provided the analyses of the role of identity in power and desire, thus complementing and completing the account of economics.

Thus, having shown how feminism engages with the limits of thought and language and having referred at various points throughout the essay to the question of the strategies or tactics that these thinkers employ to deal with metaphysical or centred economy, this chapter will provide a systematic and

exhaustive account of those strategies. The task will be accomplished through using the multiplicity of more or less vulgar feminisms as a guide, (for it is to be expected that feminisms as they are found at present will, by definition, propose themselves as critical or transgressive of all manifestations of the masculine concern). The account will be systematic insofar as that multiplicity will be seen to reduce to three a priori forms of transgression that are presented by the nature of economy, power and desire. And it will be exhaustive in that every concrete instance of a feminism may be seen to reduce to one or more of those basic forms of resistance.

Before defending these latter claims in more detail, two related questions must be dealt with. They may both be described as being concerned with the centre or transcendental signified of the economy of which this text is itself a part and which operates within this text. The first question is highlighted by this chapter in particular: the concern with strategy brings into relief the question of the point of such economic analyses. Thus, the first question may be formulated as 'Why bother to critically oppose metaphysical or centred economy?'.

The second question concerns any possible answer that might be given to the first. That is, any answer to the first question would provide a

reason for such activity, in the form of a telos, for example. And, on the grounds of the analyses proposed in the preceding chapters, such a reason or telos would constitute a centre, a privileged term in which relation to which the whole work would be said to make sense, to have the meaning and identity that it has.

With respect to the first question, it need hardly be said that the matters of economy are matters of identity, status, value or rank and, as such, are applicable to matters of human identity, status, value or rank. That is, phallogentric economy, the vulgarly masculine concern, orders and regulates the identity and relative rank or value of all other terms, (be they women and 'female' values, as in this case, or any other supplementary term), by means of the relation to the penis or phallomorphic values. Phallogentric economy involves the privileging of one term or value and one group who are associated with that term or value over other terms or values and groups associated with those terms. It also involves the occlusion of the origins of that privileged position in such a way that even the question as to how that term came to be so privileged is forgotten.

Thus, one term is privileged and held to be the source of value, meaning or identity and the <sup>or groups</sup> group/associated or solidary with it are privileged

over those who are not so associated with it. This latter group, as in the case of women, noted in the previous chapter, is considered to be of supplementary value and subjected to various operations that represent that lack of value or status. This state of affairs is commonly referred to in a number of ways, as injustice, imperialism or barbarity, for example.

However, as suggested, the second question immediately becomes relevant. It may be suggested that, if this is the case, then this essay is proposing a critique of all forms of justice in order to set up some quasi-Platonic metaphysic of The Just. That is, this text is concerned to ascertain the conditions for a practice that will be critical and transgressive of a set of economic operations which are commonly and generically referred to as injustice. Is there not at work some ideal of The Just that functions as centre and thus opens the text to precisely the objections that it is supposed to be making?

An example of a text to which such an objection may be directed would be Ryan's Marxism and Deconstruction. In this book, Ryan seems to favour a state that Nietzsche might have referred to as the lamb's dream of the end of domination<sup>1</sup>. Despite his proclamations to the effect that a 'deconstructive socialism' would be plural, open-ended, multiple and so on, his promise that it would refuse, defuse, undo

or generally put an end to 'all forms of micro- and macro- domination'<sup>2</sup> seems only to work on the basis of some quasi-Platonic notion of the Good and Just life. There is more, that is, to Derrida's strategy without a telos<sup>3</sup> and to Foucault's rejection of the Soul of Revolt<sup>4</sup> than a bourgeois-liberal plurality of resistances. This chapter proposes to illustrate what more there is.

Just as housework, in a vulgar sense, is not undertaken in order to abolish dirt, so the critique of centred economy is not undertaken in order to abolish metaphysics. Rather, and as Derrida points out, the centreless economy represents the unthinkable itself<sup>5</sup> and there is no sense in doing without the elements, the logic, syntax and concepts of metaphysics in order to deal with metaphysics<sup>6</sup>. Thus, if the centre is necessary to thought itself, the critique of centred economy must involve dealing with that centre, (getting one's hands dirty, as it were), and recognising that the task is never finished as long as there is thought. The non-vulgarly feminist critique of phallogentric economy, like the supposedly inferior tasks of women in housework, must be a constant and critical vigil<sup>7</sup>.

The idea of there being a telos to strategy is therefore part of centred economy. Within ec- centric economy, that is, there can be no telos, since that would operate as transcendental signified

which governed the value of all the other elements. Only in centred economy is the telos given any credibility. This credibility or legitimacy can always be shown to be based upon the occlusion of its origins in ec-centric economy. The role and position of a telos as transcendental signified of centred economy may always be deconstructed to show its origins in the relations to all other terms. Thus the task of 'opposing' metaphysics, as non-vulgar housework, as economics, decrees that there can be no telos in any simple sense.

Strictly and simply, then, there can be no telos in the sense of a Platonic/Hegelian final, 'clean' state to be arrived at. Such a notion is itself constitutive of centric economy and perpetuates the situation which is ostensibly being opposed. It does this in the same way as the occlusion of values in ec-centric economy perpetuates, in that very occlusion, centric economy. That is, as to account for power in terms of the juridico-discursive model is to preserve and maintain the role and rule of that power, so to account for strategy in terms of a telos is to preserve and maintain the role and rule of centric economy.

These statements may be taken as a sort of deconstructive version of Hegel's advice to the effect that there is little to be gained from attacking and defeating one's enemies at a place from

which they are absent. Where value is 'originally' both produced and destroyed in ec- centric economy, opposition to centric economy must use that economy in order to work with those forces in ec- centric economy. And where, on the level of power, power operates 'originally' in the micro-practices in which sovereign power occludes itself, resistance to that power must take the form of micro-resistance, the 'pleb', at the places where sovereign power is, precisely, produced and destroyed.

So, what has been presented as a 'vulgar' feminism will ascribe some stable, calculable value to a telos, arguing that a particular task is properly feminist, appropriate to and sufficient for the task of opposing phallogentrism. And what has been presented as a 'non-vulgar feminism' will recognise that the value of any strategy is at once produced and destroyed in ec- centric economy, arguing that ideas of 'the appropriate' and simple 'sufficiency' are themselves ideas the meaning of which is produced only within centric economy.

However, it is also the case that the value of a telos as undecidable, as both produced and destroyed in ec- centric economy, simultaneously allows and disqualifies this vulgar/non-vulgar distinction. That is, as ec- centric economy cannot be simply opposed to centric economy, so non-vulgar feminism cannot be simply opposed to vulgar



feminism. The difference between them is not the difference of centred economy but rather that of ec- centric economy and as such ec- centric economy exists as the forgotten or occluded difference of centric economy.

Thus non-vulgar feminism may be said to exist as the occluded difference of vulgar feminism which would ultimately subvert or postpone the aims of vulgar feminism. Consequently, while the aims of, and tasks undertaken by, both vulgar and non-vulgar feminisms may be 'the same', non-vulgar feminism recognises the 'fact' that the value of those aims and tasks is at once produced and destroyed in ec- centric economy. While of local and, precisely, strategic, value, they are eventually undecidable. In that they are undecidable, non-vulgar feminism refuses to allow itself to be appropriated by that which it attempts to critique or transgress by deconstructing the very values it employs in that critique.

Therefore, the tasks involved in the critique of phallogentric economy must be performed again and again, (there is no end to the process), and entail getting one's hands dirty, (the centreless economy cannot be thought). This chapter will account for the various ways of attempting to critically oppose and differentiate oneself from the production of value in phallogentric economy in such a

way that one's position is not unproblematically appropriated by that economy. It will account for the possibility of feminism by evaluating the chances that those various attempts have of transgressing phallocentric economy.

### Strategies and feminisms

It was claimed above that, given the nature of economy, power and desire, there followed a priori three basic forms of strategy that might be used in the attempt to critique the production of value in phallocentric economy. Within each of these basic forms there are any number of positions that might be adopted but which will not necessarily be dealt with here. And between all three there are, presumably, as many positions to be adopted as there are feminists to adopt them. Moreover, rarely, if ever, are these positions encountered in a pure form. It is the case that in actual examples of feminist strategy, elements from one form are to be found alongside, even contradicting, in some cases, elements from another form of feminism.

However, it will be seen that it is precisely the treatment afforded that difference, whether it is termed contradiction or difference, for example, which at once allows and precludes the attempt to either unify or distinguish vulgar and non-vulgar feminisms. 'Non-vulgar' feminism must partake of

some 'vulgar' feminist practices since the centre-less economy cannot be thought. But, since the value or meaning of those practices is at once produced and destroyed in ec-centric economy, they cannot be taken over in any simple fashion. Thus the between of 'vulgar' and 'non-vulgar' feminism is not difference, (opposition or contradiction, governed by a non-differential value, the centre), but difference, the differential production and destruction of value which would likewise produce and destroy any value held to so govern difference.

The three basic forms that opposition to phallocentric economy may take are as follows:

a) Reversal

i) The privileging of the hitherto supplementary term on the basis of its possessing the value that metaphysics ascribes to it.

ii) The privileging of the hitherto supplementary term on the basis of the claim that it is of the same value as the term that is originally privileged in phallocentric economy.

b) Refusal

i) The refusal of all centred economy and the relations of power and desire that are to be found there on the basis that all are equally phallocentric.

ii) The refusal of the particular centric economy and the relations of power and desire

found there on the grounds that it is phallogentric and that alternative economy and relations exist.

c) Deconstruction

i) The deconstruction of centred economies such that there is no longer any centre from which other values are said to derive; the elucidation of the undecidable. The identification of the relations of power and desire upon which rest the appearance and experience of sovereign power and the desire that is in relation to it: again, the identification of the production and destruction of states of power and desire.

Reversal

i) Where centric economy organises difference into hierarchy, this strategy involves the reversing of the privilege accorded one of the terms of that hierarchy. That is, the privilege that was accorded the term which was solidary with the value of the centre is now accorded the term that was considered supplementary. The justification for this move is that the properties assigned to the supplementary term and held to justify its status are at least as valuable as those held to justify the status of the superior term. Such a strategy would, then, privilege the hitherto supplementary term on the basis of its being all the things that had been held to justify the superior term's superiority.

With regard to power and desire, this strategy would support the institution of such relations as were held to be proper to the supplementary term within the centred economy. Such a strategy would argue that, if a certain form of power/desire had been considered proper to the supplementary term, then that form should be universalised to all terms.

Thus, for example, Leghorn and Parker, exploring what they call 'the economy of the world of women', make a list of some of the characteristics that women have traditionally been supposed to possess<sup>8</sup>. This list of the properties that phallogentric society has ascribed to women also includes ideas as to the sort of power relations that are supposed to be appropriate to women and is to be used as a guide 'in exploring the notion of a woman's culture'<sup>9</sup>.

From this list, one learns that, among other things, women are 'creators of life, nurturing and caring ... clever at making something out of nothing ... [and] getting round barriers erected to keep them back'<sup>10</sup>. These are some of the values which, on this form of feminist strategy, are to be privileged to provide the centre of a female value based economy. They are those which had previously been supposed to justify women's supplementary status within the phallogentric economy that is being contested.

The sort of power relations to be instituted within this female value based economy are also hinted at. They will involve the capacity to 'get round barriers' and they will be 'indirect'<sup>11</sup>. Such a notion of power 'does not imply co-ercion', but 'has more to do with creativity and co-operation'<sup>12</sup>. Again, such a conception of the operation of power is that which was considered appropriate to women within the original economy: this sort of reversal is concerned to valorise and universalise it above the sort of power relation that was supposed to be appropriate to men.

Elements of the same strategy may also be found in the work of Duras and Chawaf. Duras considers women to have been associated with darkness and obscurity in phallogentric economy: 'women have been in darkness for centuries', she says, and 'women have never known what they were'<sup>13</sup>. In the face of this, she advises 'making darkness the point of departure for judging what men call light' and making 'obscurity the point of departure for judging what men call clarity'. That is, those things that women have been associated with or deemed to be in phallogentric economy are now to be made 'the point of departure' for a new female economy - they are to form the origin or transcendental signified of that economy.

Similarly, Chawaf considers that

phallocentrism, in the guise of 'Classicism and rationalism', has repressed the sensual, 'sensorial' and corporeal aspects of language<sup>14</sup>. Women, then, have been associated with these long repressed material aspects, 'material language corresponds to our historical place', and have been similarly repressed. The form that opposition is to take, according to Chawaf, is that of a feminine language which is 'in touch'<sup>15</sup> with those hitherto repressed aspects and which will 'disintellectualise' writing, bringing it back to an appreciation of the organic life of the word.

However, in view of the nature of economy, power and desire, it may be said that this form of strategy is hardly a form of opposition to metaphysics at all. Metaphysics involves centred economy, the production of stable value and identity by means of the relation to the centre and the positing of properties by which supplementarity is justified: this form of strategy affects neither.

Moreover, the values on the basis of which the supplementary term is now to be privileged are precisely those which were originally laid down or ascribed by the economy this strategy should be critiquing. Were it not a thoroughly metaphysical distinction, it could be said that this sort of feminism challenges neither the form nor the content of centric economy since it retains the idea of centred

economy, (with the resulting positions of supplementarity and so on), and since the values it proposes to make the centre of the alternative economy are only those which had been held to be of supplementary value in the original economy.

Similarly with regard to power and desire. To advocate the universalisation of the sorts of power and desire that had been deemed to be proper to women in the original phallogentric economy transforms neither the meaning nor the value of power and desire. It is not considered, for example, whether it is not something that is only valuable or desirable in phallogentric economy to desire power at all. Nor does this strategy consider where the particular versions of power and desire that had been supposed to be proper to women have come from. Those positions and relations of power and desire that phallogentric economy had ascribed as proper are simply taken over and privileged.

Secondly, the attempt to abandon one form of power relations in favour of another is unlikely to be in any way transgressive if it is the case that both of these forms are based upon a series of micro-practices that remain unaffected. That is, if it is the case that, rather than areas of concern being areas in which power is exercised, they are themselves only produced through the operations of power, then the attempt to challenge the ways



in which power is exercised upon those areas will do little to transform the micro-practices upon which their existence depends.

ii) On the other hand, the second form of reversalist strategy would involve the privileging of the hitherto supplementary term on the grounds that it actually possessed the characteristics that were held to justify the superior term's or group's status. That is, this form of strategy would attempt to show that the supposedly inferior term ought to be equally privileged because it was all the things, because it has all the properties, which it had been held to lack and in lacking them was supposed to be inferior.

On the issue of power and desire, this sort of opposition to metaphysics would support the insertion of the hitherto supplementary term into the positions and relations from which it had been excluded in phallogentric economy. Thus, where particular forms of power and desire had obtained in phallogentric economy and where the supplementary term had been excluded from those positions and relations, this strategy would advocate the insertion of the secondary term into those positions and relations.

A version of this second form of reversalist strategy may be seen in what Kristeva summarises as 'the political demands of women, the

struggles for equal pay for equal work, for taking power in social institutions on an equal footing as men and the rejection, where necessary, of the attributes traditionally considered feminine or maternal'<sup>16</sup>. That is, this strategy consists in the attempt to demonstrate that women are all the things that men are supposed to be and demands their insertion into positions and relations of worth and power that had traditionally been denied them. It also involves the acknowledgement that women, no less than men, are in relation, via those positions and relations, to the transcendental signified of phallographic values.

Thus, where in phallographic society, the attributes of aggression, competitiveness and emotional distance, for example<sup>17</sup>, are privileged and held to be the appropriate qualities for those who would be in powerful and important positions, and where men were held to be particularly well-fitted for these positions, this strategy would attempt to demonstrate that women were also competitive and so on. It would attempt to show, then, that women were 'the same as men' and support the insertion of women into those positions that had been held to be important on the grounds that women, too, could wield power.

Similarly with regard to desire, this strategy would assert that, within a phallographic

economy, female desire has been repressed and represented as something other than what it in fact is. It would assert, that is, that female desire was, or could be, the same as male desire. So, if the male form of desire involved violence, passion and possession, for example, then this form of feminism would demand the recognition that female desire also involved these things.

However, like the first, this second form of reversalist strategy admits of the objection that it, too, operates wholly in terms of the original economy that is supposedly being opposed. To privilege the hitherto supplementary term on the grounds that it possessed the properties previously denied it affects neither the idea of centred economy nor the properties ascribed by that economy. This strategy simply shows that the supplementary term is of the same nature, the same metaphysically produced nature, as the superior term: it deals with neither the production of the value of the centre nor the nature of centred economy.

With regard to power, this strategy appears to be misguided on at least two counts. First, in proposing that women be placed in positions and relations from which they had previously been excluded, it seems to assume that power is originally something that can be possessed and transferred. Foucault's account of power, as it was presented above,

would suggest that this is not the case and that this strategy, in itself, will do little to transform the practices upon which the positions of men depend as conditions of possibility. And second, this strategy does not consider whether it is not something that is only desirable and valuable in phallogentric economy to be in positions of power. It does not consider, that is, whether it is a 'good thing' to be in positions of power in the first place or whether it is not something the value of which has been produced as desirable within phallogentric economy.

#### Refusal

i) On the matter of economy, this first form of refusal would consist in the attempt to reject or step outside of all centrism on the grounds that all are inherently phallogentric, based as they are on the privilege of self-present, self-identical values. That is, where it has been seen that the privileging of identity is the masculine concern, this form of feminism would attempt to refuse all instances of centric economy since they all privilege the value of identity. Such a strategy would support all attempts at resisting the ascription of properties to both supplementary and superior terms and would reject the notion of the production of value by means of a self-identical value.

With regard to power, this strategy

would reject or refuse all manifestations of the possession and exercise of power on the grounds that all such practices were phallocentric. This strategy would aim at the destruction of power, at the absence of power relations between, and the non-possession of power by, all elements within economy. Similarly with regard to desire, it would be argued that to desire something was a thing that was only done in phallocentric economy and that a properly feminist thing to do would be to absent oneself from all positions and relations of desire.

Such a form of refusal may also take the form of rejecting all forms of philosophical or theoretical discourse. Philosophy and theoretical discourse being notoriously based on the privileging of identity and self-presence, those discourses would be seen as instances of phallocentric economy and rejected as such. The example used above in chapter one, concerning the feminists who interrupted from the floor at the 1975 Week of Marxist Thought, may be used to illustrate such a strategy. Clément reports that the supposedly reasoned speeches from the stage were disrupted by 'shouts, mimicking, gestures and ... piercing cries of "Hey, Hey"',<sup>18</sup>.

She explains that the feminists who interrupted thus considered articulated speech and theoretical discourse to be phallocentric. They would, presumably, have argued that 'language is always

masculine', since in order for it to make sense, it must be governed by a centre or transcendental signified. Thus those feminists were only 'allowed' shouted speech and 'could not use thought to help free themselves',<sup>19</sup> and other women from inclusion and repression within phallocentric economy.

An example of the feminist attempt to escape all manifestations of power may be found in some of deEaubonne's work. On her account, it appears that all power is in male hands and that all exercise of power is a male thing to do. This is because, at an early stage of civilisation, men took possession of the land, (and thus of productivity), and because they have taken possession of women's bodies, (and thus of reproduction)<sup>20</sup>. Consequently, a 'transfer of power is urgently needed, then, as soon as possible, a destruction of power',<sup>21</sup>. Indeed, the only way 'of saving the world today', man's abuse of power having brought mankind to the brink of global ecological disaster, 'is that of the great reversal ... Not matriarchy, to be sure, nor "power to the women", but the destruction of power by women',<sup>22</sup>.

However, the question<sup>was</sup>/raised above as to whether it was actually possible to step outside all centred economy and, if so, whether it would be a good thing to do so. If, as Derrida says, the centreless economy is unthinkable, and if thought is centred economy then it would seem plausible to suppose that

it would be impossible even to conceive what it would be to refuse all centred economy, let alone communicate one's findings having refused it. Moreover, supposing that it was possible to refuse all centred economy, that incommunicability would be likely to condemn those who had accomplished it to even greater marginality than they enjoyed before.

These objections might be compared with Dews' support of Girard's comments on Anti-Oedipus. The latter says that Anti-Oedipus has about as much effect on our everyday lives as the discovery of a 'new layer of gas in the atmosphere of Venus'. The point Dews makes is that Anti-Oedipus pays for its radicality with 'an almost total vacuousness',<sup>23</sup>. That is, the attempt to step outside all centred economy, if it is possible at all, risks having no effect on that which it is supposed to combat.

Thus, even Clément's shouting feminists manage to make use of some form of centred economy in order to make clear their<sup>dis</sup>/satisfaction with centred economy. That they make clear this unhappiness suggests that some form of centre is operative since some form of centre is necessary for any thought. That Clément can explain their 'be a feminist and shout' policy as 'an unchanged variant of "be beautiful and keep your tongue"',<sup>24</sup> also indicates that the practice is available to interpretation and thus that it is produced in terms of a centric value.

It is just as questionable whether it is possible to step outside of all power relations, whether it is possible to destroy power and relations of power. It might be claimed that all positions and relations of domination and dominated had been escaped, but the question would arise as to where one was having done that. The question would also arise as to whether those relations constitutive of micro-power had also been escaped. It might be claimed that one was outside power, but Foucault's claim that one is never outside power since it works to found sovereign power would cast doubt on such claims.

And, with regard to desire, it is also unclear as to whether it is possible to be in a non-desirous position. Deleuze and Guattari have been seen to claim that desire is not originally manifested on the level of subjectivity and lack, for example, but that it exists as schizo-desire and in relation to Foucault's micro-power. Hence, to say that all positions of desire had been escaped would be to leave oneself open to the claim that this desire that is constitutive and subversive of the desire which is experienced as subjective and lack, schizo-desire, has not been escaped from.

ii) This second form of refusal, the attempt to step outside of a particular economy, aims at the institution of a specific alternative economy



by means of which the first could be opposed. It differs in this last respect from the first form of reversal noted above in that it attempts to set up an economy the centre of which is neither the value which the original economy privileged nor the value which was deemed to be supplementary. The centre of the economy to be set up on this view is rather the value that is specific to the hitherto supplementary term but neither that which was privileged nor that which was supplementary in the first economy.

With regard to power, this strategy would attempt to replace the original and offensive relations of power and desire with new ones. Again, they would not be those which had been considered proper to either the privileged or the supplementary term but rather specific to women. And on the matter of desire, the relations and positions that were to be set up would not have figured in the original and objectionable economy of desire but would reflect some hitherto neglected aspects of feminine desire.

There are difficulties involved in describing this form of feminist strategy. It was noted above with regard to the first form of reversal that the work of Duras and Chawaf could be criticised on the grounds that it merely privileged those aspects of femininity that had been considered of supplementary value. The problem, then, is that any feminism which asserts itself to be creating a specifically

*feminine*

/economy is always open to the charge of being centred, precisely, on those values that were held to be of supplementary status and thus not a specifically feminine economy at all.

However, the work of Duras and Chawaf, along with the others who are concerned with the possibility of an écriture féminine, may be described as attempts at creating such an economy. Kristeva also describes some of these sorts of feminists when she speaks of those who are 'essentially interested in the specificity of female psychology ... [and seeking] to give a language to the intra-subjective and corporeal experiences left mute by culture in the past'<sup>25</sup>.

The same difficulties arise with regard to the question of the specifically feminine relations of power and desire. Those relations offered as specifically feminine are open to the objection that they are only produced in phallogentric economy in the first place. These difficulties may be taken as indicative of at least one sense of Derrida's statement to the effect that it is not a matter of opposing one centre to another in the critique of centric economy.

Nevertheless, the concerns of 'psych and po' with 'the lack of phallic dominance' in their interview with Kristeva<sup>26</sup> may be seen as a part of the attempt to define specifically feminine power relations that do not necessarily receive any value they have

from their position within centric economy. And the various lesbian/separatist groups may still claim to be escaping the particular phallocentric versions of desire to institute properly feminine forms of desire.

The strategy admits of two objections. It consists in the attempt to step outside of phallocentric economy and to set up some alternative economy. This alternative economy will privilege women, presumably, on the basis of the properties they are held to possess but which are not those which were ascribed in phallocentric economy. It attempts, then, to centre an economy on some specifically feminine values and oppose the original economy.

As such, it does not challenge the idea or practice of centred economy. An economy that has specifically feminine values, whatever they would be, as centre is no less a phallocentric economy in that it is the role/rule of the centre that has been seen to be the masculine concern. Kristeva comments on these forms of feminism: they 'revive a kind of naive romanticism, a belief in identity' that is the reverse of phallocratism<sup>27</sup>. deBeauvoir objects analogously; 'it would be a mistake to make of the female body a value and think that the feminine body gives you a new vision of the world. It would be ridiculous and absurd, like constructing a counter-

penis,<sup>28</sup>.

Secondly, and like the first form of refusal, this strategy runs the risk of condemning women to positions of even greater marginality or supplementarity. In a sense, the reception of some French feminism, if not French thought generally, in Anglo-phone countries may be said to illustrate this situation. Jardine comments, in her introduction to Kristeva's "Woman's Time" that many American feminists will experience 'vertiginous and difficult' problems with the text because it is written from an unfamiliar tradition and attempts to articulate unfamiliar problems<sup>29</sup>. That is, the alternative centre and the values it is held to generate may be such that the 'dominant economy' can afford to ignore them and thus that those values do not affect it in any way.

#### Deconstruction

In a sense, the whole of the essay so far has been an elaboration of this third form of feminist strategy. It consists in the attempt to chart the movements of ec- centric economy in what is presented as centric economy. It attempts to show how the identities and values that are produced in centric economy are based upon the mastering and occlusion of ec- centric, non-vulgarly feminine economy.

In one sense, manifestations of this sort of strategy are hard to find in that they seem to admit of the objection that they simply take over the economy that was considered proper to women in the first place and then privilege it over what was considered properly masculine. However, such a strategy consists in the de-centring of centric economy, in the ways in which Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari were seen to do above. It attempts to render identity and property problematic through the demonstration that what was thought to be proper to the supplementary term and held to justify its inferior status was no less, and no more, proper to the supposedly superior term. The second stage consists in what Derrida has referred to as the disruptive emergence of a third term which refuses to settle into an identity. This third term is thus held to defer the possibility of the normalising and appropriating aufhebung that characterises the third term found in dialectics.

Evidence of such a strategy, however, may be found in the work of such feminists as Cixous, Irigaray and Kristeva. Irigaray, for example, has been concerned with the value or identity of female sexuality as it has been produced in phallogentric economy. She says 'female sexuality has always been theorised within masculine parameters'<sup>30</sup>. It has been organised in terms of the opposition "virile"

clitoral activity/"feminine" vaginal passivity' and in relation to the penis and castration<sup>31</sup>.

As such, and as the title of the work from which these comments are taken indicates, female sexuality is a sex 'which is not one'. That is, female sexuality is not considered to be a proper or genuine sexuality within these masculine limits: as has been seen above, the clitoris, for example, is not defined on its own terms, whatever they would be, but rather as a small penis, as homologous to the penis<sup>32</sup>.

Irigaray is keen to stress, though, female sexuality is (also) not one in another sense, in the sense that it is 'always at least double ... plural'. Female sexuality cannot be defined as a unity, as a One, since it consists in at least two lips which constantly touch and retouch each other in such a way that it is impossible 'to distinguish exactly what parts are touching each other'<sup>33</sup>. Irigaray can be read as attempting to establish and emphasise the affinity between female sexuality and Derrida's dissemination. Irigaray's version of female sexuality, like Derrida's dissemination, 'mutilates the unity of the signifier, that is, of the phallus'<sup>34</sup>.

So, there is no unity to female sexuality, it is an irreducible plurality and resists appropriation into phallogentric economy. This is held to be the case not only on an anatomical level,

as noted above, but also on the level of pleasure. In addition to the vaginal caress, there are 'gently stroking the posterior wall of the vagina, lightly massaging the cervix etc', to 'evoke some of the more specifically feminine pleasures' and to disrupt the phallogentric economy of pleasure, which operates in terms of active and passive principles and is organised in terms of the telos of orgasm<sup>35</sup>. Thus 'woman's pleasure ... poses a problem for any current economy in that all computations that attempt to account for women's uncalculable pleasure are irremediably doomed to fail'. This is because, like schizo-desire, female sexuality 'diverts the linearity of a project, undermines the target object of a desire, explodes the polarisation onto only one pleasure and disconcerts fidelity to only one discourse'<sup>36</sup>.

Thus, where phallogentrism 'mercilessly represses the uncontrollable multiplicity of ambiguity, the disseminating play of writing, which irreducibly transgresses any unequivocal meaning'<sup>37</sup>, and where a phallogentric economy produces identities by means of the relation to a value which reduces difference, Irigaray posits a radical plurality, (which is not, as Foss says, to be confused with the fashionable use of a casual epithet<sup>38</sup>). Property and identity are foreign to this plurality, as Irigaray says; 'property and propriety are undoubtedly quite foreign to all that is female'<sup>39</sup>.

On Irigaray's account, then, female sexuality is ec-centric economy which resists identification and appropriation by phallocentric economy and which disrupts and de-centres that economy. It does this in such a way, moreover, that it cannot strictly be said, as was said above, that 'female sexuality is such and such a thing'. And, although there is no explicit mention in her text of a third term, it is claimed that Irigaray's feminism may be seen as an example of deconstructive feminism in that it attempts the disconcerting of property and identity.

A general problem that has accompanied both psychoanalysis and feminism in various forms may be raised at this point. In a letter to Müller-Braunschweig, Freud says that he objects to all those who 'do not distinguish more clearly and cleanly between what is psychic and what is biological' and who 'try to establish a neat parallelism between the two'<sup>40</sup>. The problem is that, like psychoanalysis, feminism runs the risk of reducing one set of phenomena to another - here Freud is objecting to the biologism of Horney, Jones and Rado.

It is perhaps fitting that Juliet Mitchell, the author of Psychoanalysis and Feminism, should quote Freud's letter in her introduction to the work of Lacan on feminine sexuality since it introduces a number of issues which are pertinent to feminism's relation to psychoanalysis on the one hand and to charges



of biologism on the other. Monique Plaza, for example, has argued that Irigaray does not distinguish between what is biological and what is psychical and that, attempting to establish a neat parallelism between the two, she condemns women to the prison of their biology or anatomy<sup>41</sup>. A concern with the seemingly natural differences found in biology, she says, can only 'compound patriarchal logic and not subvert it'<sup>42</sup>.

Such a criticism, and the question of feminism's biologism is becoming increasingly important, relates to those made of the other forms of feminist strategy - that either they tie women ever more firmly to the values that had been ascribed them, or that they find some new and equally constraining identity for them. Deconstructive feminism, then, in addition to the reversalists and refusalists feminisms noted above, runs the risk of becoming a reductionism. One way of dealing with criticisms like those of Plaza lies in the moves made by a double strategy. It will be shown that deconstructive feminism operates just such a double strategy. The work of Biddy Martin will be used to show how such criticisms may be dealt with.

Martin's essay, "Feminism, Criticism and Foucault"<sup>43</sup>, may also be used to show how deconstructive feminism deals with the question of power. This essay provides a good example of the sort of double

strategy which, in addition to being able to deal with charges of naturalism, was claimed above to both differentiate vulgar from non-vulgar feminism and to signal the collapse of that distinction.

Martin's discussion explicitly raises the question of a role of a telos in deconstructive feminism and in her treatment of this issue allows the gap between vulgar and non-vulgar feminism to be at once opened and closed.

Martin begins, in Foucauldian vein, by arguing that American Marxist feminism suffers from a functionalist conception of both capitalism and patriarchy: these latter are conceived as 'monolithic and total systems of oppression'<sup>44</sup>. In the same vein, she continues by suggesting that it is this very conception of capitalism and patriarchy that makes it impossible to 'get at the operations of power and the possibilities for resistance in Western societies'. Foucault's work, however, as a deconstruction of 'traditional conceptions of power', questions the history, validity and consequences of this form of theory and opens up a space in which feminist questions 'which have been obscured, marginalised and/or subsumed under the teleological projects of other theories' may be raised<sup>45</sup>.

Some of these questions have been raised by Foucault himself: feminist analyses of the history of medicine, psychiatry and education, for example,

support and find support in Foucault's investigations of the subjects<sup>46</sup>. It is, however, in relation to what Martin calls 'classical liberationist approaches to questions of sexuality and power' that she sees the greatest lessons being learned from Foucault's deconstructive analytics. It is also here that the issues of a double strategy and the ultimate undecidability of vulgar and non-vulgar feminisms are to be found.

While a classical liberationist approach runs through much feminist theory, claiming on the one hand that female sexuality is a naturally subversive energy which has been repressed and on the other that male sexuality is naturally aggressive and repressive, Foucault's work would challenge any 'easy division between a dominant and essentially repressive discourse and one oppositional, pure voice of liberation'<sup>47</sup>. Although Foucault's work may consist in just such a challenge, Martin wants to suggest that there is a level of strategic political and historical necessity to the classical liberationist view. This necessity arises as a response to the 'forms of violence against women which have been ignored or accepted by the society as self-evident for too long'<sup>48</sup>. As a moment of opposition, such an approach is necessary since a 'voice' different to that of male violence is needed. But, following Foucault, such an approach also involves various theoretical and

strategic shortcomings.

The forces constitutive of the tension between these two approaches consistently disturb any simple distinction that might be made between vulgar and non-vulgar feminism and raise similar questions concerning the value of a telos to feminist strategies. This tension, which has so often in this essay been seen to arise at moments crucial to the question of the possibility of feminism, is the topic of the central section of Martin's essay.

While there is a need for a different voice, a female voice, something with which to oppose male dominated discourse, there is the danger of that voice or those voices subsuming 'difference ... under the conceptual and strategic grasp of a unitary identity of woman'<sup>49</sup>. There is the danger, that is, of falling foul of the objections that were noted above with regard to the first and second forms of feminist strategy, that a new tyranny is established by the new 'experts'. So, some form of a telos is at once desired and to be avoided: the difference that is to be presented by feminism must not be allowed to be subsumed under a new and equally constraining identity.

Although not going as far as this essay, which claims that deconstruction is already a form of non-vulgar feminism, Martin says that feminism can be deconstructive<sup>12</sup>, showing how phallocentric culture

'appropriat [es] difference, nam [es] it opposition and subsum[es] it under the "Identity of Man"',<sup>51</sup>. And, although not going so far in the other direction to say, with Bartowsky, for example, that post-structuralist males are effectively precluded from dealing with the effects of marginalisation since they have always occupied a privileged position with regard to speech and 'Man',<sup>52</sup>, Martin suggests that female feminists are consciously involved and therefore situated quite differently to men in the question of women's 'exclusion from struggles over representation',<sup>53</sup>. It is thus the 'necessity of a doubled strategy' that concerns Martin in this essay.

That is, female specificity, informed by the history of male violence that has shaped it, has just as valid a part in deconstructive feminism as the deconstruction of any form of specificity, that specificity being seen as potentially a masculine and repressive value 'in the end'. So, the classical liberationist approach, of constructing some natural feminine essence that is other or different than masculinity is, on this deconstructive view, valid insofar as it is necessary to oppose something to the phallogentric version of 'Man'.

However, Foucault's 'deconstructive methodology' warns against the 'commitment to any confessional mode as necessarily liberating'; he provides an immanent critique of 'a search for the

authentic female voice or the sexuality'<sup>54</sup>. With reference to the last paragraph, then, Martin says that 'our deconstructions are neither identical nor synchronous with those of the male avant-garde in spite of some very significant points of convergence in our interests'<sup>55</sup>.

Some of Kristeva's work may also be used to illustrate the workings of this 'double strategy'. She says, for example, that for the various women's groups it is a question of moving from patriarchal society 'towards - who knows?'<sup>56</sup>. There is no telos in any simple sense to be arrived at and no ideal the realisation of which will itself secure feminism's success. However, in the same essay, she also says that 'there are still many goals which women may achieve' and goes on to name a few of them: 'freedom of abortion and contraception, day-care centres for children, equality on the job etc'<sup>57</sup>.

As in Martin's case, no-one is suggesting that female circumcision, for example, is a matter for the endless freeplay of deconstructive parody: there is historical and political necessity behind women's abhorrence of such practices. However, in order that women are not subsequently constrained by an alternative and equally vicious set of practices, the ending of these practices cannot be the end of the strategy. Irigaray, too, may be said to be using anatomy as a strategic ploy to show how, even within

biology, the question of female sexuality is not as simple as is assumed.

So, this 'double strategy' renders the value of the telos to deconstructive feminism undecidable: recognised as being both produced and destroyed in ec-centric economy, it is at once a necessary moment and something to be treated with care. Since this is the case, it is also the case that the difference between vulgar and non-vulgar feminism has also become, or is revealed as, undecidable. Deconstructive feminism partakes of moments of vulgar feminism in that it adopts a telos, but it ultimately becomes undecidable in the terms of vulgar feminism in that it adopts the telos only for strategic purposes. In this way is the gap between the two forms of feminism opened and closed simultaneously; like the hymen, this deconstructive form of feminism is radically undecidable and cannot be contained by that which it subverts.

### Conclusion

It has been argued, then, that this third form of feminist strategy alone constitutes a transgressive or critical discourse that will not be simply and immediately appropriated by that which it attempts to critique. In that it is neither a form of reversal, amounting to little more than a 'clamorous declaration of the antithesis'<sup>58</sup>, nor a form

of refusal, a simple opposition which, as opposition, is already swallowed up in the discourse which it claims to have refused<sup>59</sup>, deconstruction does not differ from and oppose phallogentric economy in the way that difference and opposition are organised in phallogentric economy. Consequently, and like Nietzsche's self-differentiating, noted in chapter three, it constitutes non-vulgar feminism, a feminism the value and identity of which is not derived from its phallogentric difference from and opposition to masculinity.

That is, centric economy was said to be a matter of a relationship between identity, difference and opposition. These latter were organised in a particular way, such that stable identities and values were generated by virtue of the relation to the centre which oriented the differences between the other terms by means of opposition and hierarchy. In that centric economy was traditionally or vulgarly associated with masculinity, this economic organisation of identity, difference and opposition was called phallogentric economy.

Phallogentric economy organised difference and opposition in a particular way. Thus any discourse attempting to be different from and opposed to (transgressive of) phallogentric economy which was different from it and opposed to it in the ways that phallogentric economy organised difference and opposition could not, ultimately, be transgressive of that



economy. In that such differentiation and opposition were only those to be found in phallogentric economy, a discourse that made use of them could only be a vulgar feminism. As such, it would be just another version of phallogentrism, of the masculine concern. And, as such, it would already have been appropriated by, rendered harmless because proper to, the masculine concern.

Thus the sort of difference and opposition exemplified by both forms of reversal consists, as their names suggest, in but a reversal of the privilege accorded one of the two terms of the hierarchy. And the sort of difference and opposition exemplified in both forms of refusal consists in the rejection, the simple negation, as it were, of the centre of the economy that is being contested. In both cases, difference and opposition are organised in relation to the value of the centre. Both sorts of feminism, then, both forms of strategy, are vulgar feminisms.

They correspond, thus, to the two forms of reactive feminism noted in chapter two. It will be recalled that in Spurs/Eperons, Derrida attempts to formalise, for what Argyros calls pedagogical purposes, the organisation of women in the work of Nietzsche. That is, the multiplicity of females in that work, which would form ec- centric economy and who have no stable identity or value that issues from a relation to the centre until they are mastered by

male discipline, the whip, may be formalised 'in order to mark the limit of such a codification'<sup>61</sup>.

Three positions or propositions were found the principle of which could be related in a number of finite statements, even though the 'heterogeneity' of Nietzsche's women could not be so ordered. In the first of the positions accorded woman, she is given the value or identity of a figure of falsehood. Lacking the penis, and therefore the relation to phallogocentric values in general, woman is and women are debased and despised by man, who offers his phallus and his privileged relation to phallogocentric values as the only worthy possessions.

In the second position, woman is and women are again debased and despised. This time, however, it is as a figure of truth. As in Heidegger or Lacan, for example, truth is not wholly to be found or wholly to be said. Rather, some part of it, or all of it, is lacking. Woman, as the absence or lack of the penis, is thus in a privileged position with regard to man and phallogocentric values, since they are 'nearer' or more proper to the value of truth. Man, as possessor of the penis, debases and despises woman, who is perceived to be nearer or more proper to the values he would like to have such a relation to.

The sort of feminism that corresponds to the first position is that of reversal. Where woman is said to be inferior or of supplementary

status because she lacks the penis, this sort of feminism says that women, too, have the value they have because of the relation to the penis or phallic values and that she is of at least equal value. That is, whether the reversal is that of the supposed position of women with regard to phallic values or of the supposed position of specifically feminine values, this form of strategy sets up phallic economy. This supposedly feminist economy may privilege women's relation to the (vulgar) penis or provide an equally vulgar counter-penis, but it still constitutes a reactive and vulgar feminism.

The sort of feminism that corresponds to the second position is that of refusal. Where women are debased because they represent an economy to which men cannot have full access, feminism either says that this economy is proper to women or it says that all centric economy is phallic. In the first case, a particular centred economy is refused and in the second, all centred economy is refused.

And the sort of feminism that corresponds to the third of these positions is that of deconstruction. In the first two, women were debased and despised, as both truth and untruth, because of their castration, because of the lack of a relation to the privileged phallic values. Woman, then, is twice castration, twice the absence of a privileged relation to phallic values. However, beyond

what Derrida has called this 'double negation',<sup>62</sup>, beyond this dialectic, the relation to the centre is rendered undecidable. This is the position that corresponds to ec- centric economy, where value and identity are at once produced and destroyed in difference.

That is, in phallocentric economy and the two 'feminisms' noted above, value and identity are governed and generated by the relation to the transcendental signified of the penis and phallic values in general. Rather than reverse or refuse either the privilege involved in centric economy or the idea of centric economy itself, this strategy attempts to show how the value of the centre is itself only produced (and destroyed) by its relations to all other terms in economy. The deconstructive move here is to show how the relation to the privileged values that constitute the centre in centric economy both produces and destroys the identity and value of all terms and that the value and identity of the centre is itself similarly produced and destroyed.

Beyond the 'double negation' of woman in the first two positions, then, and beyond the reactive feminisms to which they give rise, the identity of woman is rendered undecidable. It is both produced and destroyed by the relation to castration which is itself something the value of which is produced and destroyed in ec- centric economy. That is, woman's

relation to the centre has been shown to both produce and destroy any value or identity that might be ascribed, it is undecidable in ec-centric economy.

And, where identity, difference and opposition are ordered in centric economy to produce stable, self-identical values, this third form of feminism, informed by ec-centric economy, differs from and is opposed to centric economy in a way that is not that in which difference and opposition are organised in centric economy. It is therefore a critical and transgressive discourse that will not be appropriated by, rendered proper and harmless to, phallocentric economy.

Finally, the treatment of the various feminist strategies in this chapter may be compared with Culler's discussion of 'reading as a woman' in his On Deconstruction<sup>63</sup>. He, too, divides the multiplicity of feminisms into three categories or moments and, although these moments do not always correspond with the a priori divisions in this chapter, they consist, nevertheless, in elements from those divisions. It is, however, precisely the account of how these different elements relate to one another, the question as to how the differences between them are to be dealt with, that distinguishes the account given here from Culler's.

Culler's first moment of feminist strategy consists in a mixture of the two sorts of

reversalist strategy noted above. The first kind of reversal is evinced by those women readers interested in the 'situations and psychology of female characters'<sup>64</sup>. And the second is seen in that form of feminist criticism which 'puts itself in the position that phallic criticism usually attempts to occupy'<sup>65</sup>. Culler's second moment consists in what has been presented in this chapter as the second form of refusal. It is the appeal to a potential female experience which would escape the limitations of the male and then the developing of questions which could actualise that experience<sup>66</sup>.

So, where Culler's modes of feminism first privileges actual female experience and second privileges potential female experience, the third moment he describes attempts to show that the concepts used in the first two moments are themselves products of phallogentric economy. The third form of feminism he describes, that is, attempts to show that all experience has this duplicitous character - 'always already occurred and ... still to be produced'<sup>67</sup>. Although it was seen in chapter one that he refers to the 'gap' between 'work on or against the institution' and 'philosophical deconstruction'<sup>68</sup>, and although it has appeared in the difference between the first/second and the third forms of feminism, Culler gives no account of its workings.

As Martin has shown and as seen

throughout this essay, the 'gap' demands that a transgressive discourse/practice be a 'double strategy'. And this means that some form of either reversal or refusal, which make use of and partake in centric economy, is a necessary 'phase' of deconstructive feminism. Consequently, it is not the concern with the duplicitous character of experience that is 'deconstructive'; empiricists and neo-positivists from Hume to Husserl have dealt with that without anyone calling them deconstructive feminists. It is rather the reversal and displacement that such a notion may be made to effect within concrete economies, without being reduced to centric economy, that provides the transgressive force it possesses.

This is clearly not to say that Culler is mistaken in his account - it is simply to say that the 'gap', the production and destruction of the telos or other transcendental signified, manifests itself in the treatment of the differences between the various forms of feminist strategy. It is that deconstructive feminism can bridge the gap, without reducing it, that constitutes it as a transgressive discourse/practice.

## CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION

### THE POSSIBILITY OF FEMINISM II

Where it was noted in chapter one that the word 'feminism' was used in at least two senses and that the various relations of forces and desires that surrounded it were to be found at numerous strategic points throughout the essay, so the word 'possibility' also has at least two senses. It is the task of the present chapter to summarise the events of the preceding chapters, to account for the various moves involved in the task of ascertaining what sort of thing an '-ism' would have to be in order for it to be a feminism. And it will note again the other sense of possibility - the sense in which feminism, as it has been accounted for here, already relates to other, indeed all, economies in which identities are produced, distributed and legitimated.

So, chapter one introduced what contemporary feminism conceived as its problems as problems of economy, power and desire. Through a reading of Saussure, chapter two introduced the matter of economy as a matter of a relationship between identity, difference and some form of opposition. And, through a reading of Derrida's reading of Saussure, it explained the tension between centric and ec-centric economy, along with the versions of power and desire to be found there, as the difference between phallocentric



and feminist economy.

It was then a question of accounting for how what was presented as a non-vulgar feminism was possible: what were the issues and moves that constituted a non-vulgar feminism? The ideas of identity, difference and opposition, of economy, which could, to put it as simply as possible, be either centric or phallocentric on the one hand or ec-centric and non-vulgarly feminist on the other, were also seen to be the stuff of which dialectics was made. By looking at the works of Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger who, it was suggested, were the cardinal figures in the development of non-vulgarly feminist thought, it was possible to see what they did with economy and how they prepared for the possibility of feminism.

Their positions on the matter of identity, difference and opposition and thus their relation to a non-vulgar feminism provided a kind of genealogy, not without its occlusions and obscurities, for the work of Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari. The inclusion of Adorno alongside Heidegger in chapter four provided the opportunity to compare 'contemporary French Nietzscheanism' with a strand of another form of critique that was influenced by Hegel, 'German Marxist critical theory'.

Chapters five, six and seven looked at the works of Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari as they illuminated the workings of identity,

difference and opposition in economy, power and desire. The tensions between centred and ec- centric economy within their own works and the ways each dealt with aspects of non-vulgar feminism that the others did not were also dealt with in these chapters. As ec- centric economy could not be simply differentiated from and opposed to centric economy, so these chapters showed that 'contemporary French Nietzscheanism' could not present a united front.

Having accounted for the various aspects of the work of Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari as non-vulgar feminists, chapter eight began the attempt to 'fill the gap' between vulgar and non-vulgar feminism. It did this by showing how the concern with such ethereal entities as identity, difference and opposition manifested themselves in 'concrete' economy. The work of Freud on female sexuality and of Gallop on the relations between feminism and Lacan were chosen to illustrate these issues since the positions of Freud and Lacan with regard to female sexuality are matters of some concern to both vulgar and not-so-vulgar feminism.

Chapter nine continued and explicitly commented on this task of 'filling the gap' between a non-vulgar and philosophical feminism and the actual struggles of women by outlining the various forms of critical strategy that are available to feminism in the light of the workings of economy and the workings

of power and desire within it. 'Deconstructive feminism', which was informed by the tension between centric and ec-centric economy, the simultaneous production and destruction of value, was alone in terms of non-vulgar feminism. The other two forms, refusal and reversal, were seen to reduce to versions of vulgar masculinity in that they each posited a simple telos as specifically and properly feminist. Deconstructive feminism could posit the value of a telos to its strategies but only as both produced and destroyed in ec-centric economy.

Having accounted for the possibility of feminism, of a critical and transgressive discourse/practice that will not be simply and unproblematically assimilated into and rendered harmless by what it attempts to critique and transgress, it remains for this chapter to look at the other sense of the word 'possibility' in 'the possibility of feminism' and account briefly for its own position with regard to economy.

It was suggested in chapter one that it might be considered 'arbitrary' and thus 'improper' to talk of a discourse/practice that would critique and transgress, but not be appropriated by, centric economy as a feminism. This was because the production and legitimation of value and identity in centric economy was not only the or a masculine affair but was also solidary with white and bourgeois interests, for example. The operations that were to be found in

what was called phallogentric economy were also to be found everywhere else that value and identity were produced and legitimated - in the treatment of the old and the unemployed as well as that of the mentally and physically handicapped and disabled, in race-relations, politics and so on.

A number of reasons were produced to account for the choice of the name 'feminism' for such a discourse and they need not be repeated here. However, that the same operations are to be found in all these other areas means that a similarly critical and transgressive discourse/practice is relevant to those other areas. The possibility exists, then, that feminism, in the sense developed in this essay, is the sort of '-ism' that is of use to all disadvantaged or marginalised groups.

And, indeed, elements of a 'deconstructive feminism' may be found in the strategies employed by groups working with various supplementary or disadvantaged groups. Just two of the various groups are those concerned with the welfare of the physically disabled and the mentally handicapped and ill. Before looking, finally, at how this essay itself relates to a 'deconstructive feminism', the relevance of these examples will be examined.

There is an advertisement which has appeared in the press<sup>1</sup> aimed at recruiting nurses who will care for the mentally ill and handicapped. It

consists in two pictures and a text. One of the pictures shows a man, untidily dressed, with a contorted expression and knotted fingers. The other picture shows a man who is relaxed and neatly dressed, the sort of man anyone might expect to see around town. The text asks, 'Which of these men is mentally ill?'

It then goes on to explain that, contrary to popular belief, which would 'naturally' pick the unkempt for man with the wierd expression, it is the tidy, apparently 'normal' man who is mentally ill. The other one is, in fact, mentally handicapped. So, in addition to revealing the work of metaphysics, which results in constructing those with mental problems in general as totally 'other' than 'us', this advertisement shows that those with a particular type of mental problem are, for all intents and purposes, just like 'us'.

The demonstration that what is thought to be a position of deviant supplementarity is actually a position that inhabits the norm is a tactic that is also found in the work of those dealing with the social construction of physical disability. One argument to be found in this area is that if public buildings, for example, are so constructed as to make it impossible for someone in a wheelchair to use them, then it is no surprise that they are considered disabled. Consequently, it is no surprise that people who cannot so manage these buildings are seen as different

and exiled to positions of marginality with regard to the norm.

Strategies like these, which point out, in the manner of Cohn Bendit's 'nous sommes toutes indésirables' or the Italian labour organisation who's slogan is 'the margins are at the centre', that what is constructed in society as undeniably other and supplementary is also part of what has been constructed as the norm, may be said to illustrate the workings of 'deconstructive feminism' in areas other than those usually considered proper to feminism.

The all too brief reference to other areas in which such strategies may be found and the suggestion of the idea that 'we are all at least potentially mentally ill or physically disabled' is clearly insufficient. However, having accounted for the critical or transgressive force of such strategy, the job of examining how other concretely transgressive practices are, are not or may in future be informed by 'deconstructive feminism' has been proposed as a task to be accomplished.

So, having summarised the various events in the development of this thesis, having elucidated the second sense of 'possibility' in 'the possibility of feminism' and having illustrated how the concerns and practices of a non-vulgar feminism are to be seen in areas other than those usually considered proper to feminism, this conclusion will account for the

essay as a whole's relation to non-vulgar feminism. This task will be accomplished by discussing the treatment afforded the various dichotomies, differences or oppositions in terms of which this essay itself makes sense. It will be seen that, as non-vulgar feminism was seen to exist as a tension between centric and eccentric economy, so this essay, dealing with the production and destruction of those dichotomies, likewise exists as a tension, a non-vulgar feminism.

In much work in this sort of area, lip-service is commonly paid to the idea that Foucauldian, Derridean or anti-Oedipal economics are ongoing reflexive activities and not, therefore, to be treated as systems 'capable of summary description'<sup>2</sup>. Equally common is the way in which such dichotomies, while recognised as being in some way a problem, are allowed to perform their various tasks unhindered. It is as if the problematic status of these distinctions is permitted on the proviso that it and they will be dealt with later and elsewhere but that for the moment the business in hand can proceed.

The distinction 'activity/system' will not be dealt with here except insofar as it will become apparent that, along with all the other oppositions in terms of which this and every other text makes sense, it is at once opened and closed by the work of eccentric economy. That is, there are many oppositions in terms of which this text itself makes sense.

Moreover, the treatment of those oppositions, itself presented as a matter of economy, is said to distinguish, among other things, vulgar from non-vulgar feminism.

However, it will be seen that all of the various dichotomies which arise in this essay, (feminist/non-feminist, vulgar/non-vulgar, metaphysical/non-metaphysical, centric/ec-centric, telic/non-telic and so on), are subject and subjected to being both made possible and precluded by the treatment of difference that this essay adopts. In addition to dealing with the work of difference in various texts, then, the concepts/oppositions which this text uses to deal with that work are themselves shown to be inhabited by the sort of tension that at once produces and destroys them. In that feminism was shown to also encompass non-feminism, (chapter one), metaphysics to consist in non-metaphysical moments, (chapter two), and so on, this essay may be said to 'practise what it preaches' insofar as it is possible in a text of this kind.

So, housework, for example, on what might inadvisedly be called a vulgar account, would be described as a thoroughly centrist affair. The attempt to achieve and maintain order in one's own and proper home seems only to have any value on the presumption that ownness, property and good order are themselves both possible and desirable. The will



to housework, that is, seems predicated on the values of self-identity and self-presence which must be protected from the insidious effects of that which threatens the home from within.

However, it can be seen, on what might, equally inadvisedly, be referred to as a non-vulgar account, <sup>that</sup> the notion and practice of housework is invested by various forces, none of which assumes a governing role. The value and identity of housework is both produced and destroyed by the differences and relations between those forces. It can be seen, for example, that feminism or the sort of philosophical activity that has been characterised as housework so far operates not only in what might be expected to be its own home but also in places which might be thought to be most improper to it. Feminism was seen to apply to all other economies, not just that one usually labelled 'the feminine concern'.

The tension between centric and ec- centric economy, which demands that neither can be simply or decidably presented, manifests itself in the tension between the various senses of housework. Thus the value or meaning of housework, dealing with the production and destruction of value and identity, is itself produced and destroyed in the differences and relations between forces that constitute the economy of difference. Housework, then, partaking of both centric and ec- centric investments, is strictly

undecidable with regard to the various dichotomies and dichotomous values used to describe it.

At the risk of labouring these points, at least one other area where the tension in which this essay exists manifests itself may be pointed out. In the essay, "Cogito and the history of madness"<sup>3</sup>, Derrida reviews Foucault's Madness and Civilisation. He argues that Foucault charts the development of the treatment of madness in the terms of Western reason and that this must necessarily reduce the 'otherness' of madness. The 'force' of madness, as the 'other' of Western reason, the Cogito, cannot but be domesticated by being described in the terms of that reason.

Similar claims might be made concerning this essay. It might be said, for example, that it discusses and accounts for the possibility of feminism in the language of phallogentrism. It might also be said that the essay's having produced as a doctoral thesis, a text that is written to conform to numerous standards and rules of both content and form, and which is, moreover, to be defended by means of the author's 'living voice', qualifies it as a product of the most classical phallogocentrism.

However, in that centric economy has been seen only to make sense on the basis of the occlusion of its non-origin in ec-centric economy and that the forms of economy cannot be simply presented

in themselves, such claims are at once pertinent and disqualified. They are pertinent in that this essay must make use of various terms and practices, for strategic purposes, as if they were unproblematic with regard to the questions of presence and absence noted above. And they are disqualified in that those terms and practices are shown to be of strategic use only, both produced and destroyed in the ec- centric- ity that this essay also attempts to partake of.

That is, the oppositions used in this text to make sense of the treatment of difference found in other texts are themselves shown to be inhabited by the very tensions which, it has been argued, both produce and destroy the terms of those oppositions. Consequently, insofar as it is also argued that ec- centric economy, the conflict of forces which at once produces and destroys value, is non-vulgarly feminist economy, the treatment of difference to be found in this essay is itself non-vulgarly feminist. Similarly, insofar as its value as non-vulgarly feminist is both produced and destroyed, the essay also partakes of vulgarly masculine moments.

There are, doubtless, other questions, other issues and oppositions 'within' the text which have not been dealt with here and which may prove to be unsuspected funds of phallocentrism. The role and voice of the author, for example, has not been dealt with in any way. However, that further tasks remain,

that the possibility of feminism has not been exhausted, is perhaps to be expected and is certainly not conceived as a failing.

AFTERWORD

In the 'Preface' a first 'precautionary' attempt was made to clarify the relationship between 'vulgar' and 'non-vulgar' feminisms. This relationship is also the subject of this 'Afterword'. Here, though, it is to be discussed in terms of the following related topics:

1. Alternative readings of Nietzsche;
2. 'Reversal'/'Refusal' feminism and 'non-vulgar feminism';
3. The telos of feminism and local ends;
4. Practical or strategic demands that determine the type of feminism adopted.

There are, obviously, other readings of Nietzsche beside this one. Some of those other interpretations have been noted on page 88. Although it is not and cannot be part of this essays brief to claim that the interpretation it chooses to explore is somehow truer or better than any other, it has been suggested that account be taken of a possible 'feminist' objection.

Basically, the objection is that some, if not all, of Nietzsche's pronouncements on the subject of women are anti-women, that he is often virulently misogynist and that he can therefore be no feminist. In a little more detail, the objection bears strong resemblances to that advanced by

Adorno, noted above on page 142. Adorno begins with the premise that Nietzsche's 'scrutiny stopped short' of women; that despite an acknowledged critical energy, when it comes to the subject of women Nietzsche simply takes over 'a second hand and unverified image of feminine nature from the ... civilisation he otherwise so thoroughly mistrusted'<sup>1</sup>. As a result, Nietzsche's comments on women are actively anti-women and he can be no feminist.

In the face of Nietzsche's seeming misogyny it will certainly not do to suggest that he is being ironic. As argued above on page 337, it would be tasteless at best to offer endless ironic play as the appropriate behaviour to be adopted when confronted by either what Adorno calls the scars of social mutilation<sup>2</sup> or the physical mutilation that this essay has already referred to on page 337. It is, of course, not impossible that Nietzsche himself went too far with his 'Whip' 'joke'.

It is, alternatively, only slightly less unsatisfactory to suggest that Nietzsche was providing an analysis of the linguistic and cultural production of the value and identity of women in society. The much used quotes to the effect that man 'created woman out of a rib of his ideal'<sup>3</sup> and that truth is a 'mobile army of metaphors, metonymies and anthropomorphisms'<sup>4</sup> would be wheeled out to support such a claim. Even such a mobile army of Nietzsche quotes might have trouble countering what he says of

independent women, however: 'Woman wants to be independent: and to that end she is beginning to enlighten men about "woman as such" - this is one of the worst developments in the general uglification of Europe'<sup>5</sup>.

This claim, picked almost at random, that feminism is contributing to the 'general uglification of Europe', could be considered fairly conclusive evidence of how unsympathetic Nietzsche is to the cause of feminism. However, in the course of an interview with Christie MacDonald<sup>6</sup> which deals with the notions of woman's proper place, woman's proper identity, Derrida proposes what may well be a more successful account of Nietzsche's pronouncements.

'Can one not say', Derrida says, 'in Nietzsche's language, that there is a "reactive" feminism, and that a certain historical necessity often puts this form of feminism in power in today's organised struggles. It is this kind of "reactive" feminism that Nietzsche mocks and not woman or women'<sup>7</sup>. He goes on to say that, in the most 'perfunctory' cases of the mis-, or as he has it 'non-readings' of Spurs/Éperons, the 'simplification reverts to the isolation of Nietzsche's violently anti feminist statements (directed first against reactive ... feminism ...), pulling them out ... of the movement and system that I try to reconstitute'<sup>8</sup>.

That is, although Derrida has perhaps simplified the matter himself here, there are "reactive" forms of feminism, (what this essay has for strategic reasons called 'vulgar' feminism), which, in themselves, will not necessarily advance women's causes. Derrida is suggesting, then, that Nietzsche is against, and often, it must be said, violently against, this form of feminism when it is proposed as any form of rigid telos or one proper way for feminism to proceed. It is the system and movement, difference with an 'a', which 'vulgar' feminism and 'non-readings' of Spurs/Éperons reduce to an identity, that Derrida and this essay try to counter.

Alternatively, and this is where Derrida may have simplified matters, Derrida says that such 'reactive' or 'vulgar' feminism has been put in power in today's struggles as a result of a 'certain historical necessity'. He says this, moreover, in a tone that does not appear to be entirely approving. This essay, however, has endeavoured to show that such so-called 'vulgar' or 'reactive' feminism may well be entirely justified by 'historical necessity': the discussion of the work of Biddy Martin between pages 332 and 338, for example, is intended to demonstrate just this. Thus, following on from the 'Preface', the two forms of so-called 'vulgar' feminism, reversal and refusal, may well be and indeed very often are justified for a particular strategic task that is demanded by historical or political necessity.



Insofar as this is the case, it cannot also be the case that 'vulgar' or 'reactive' feminism is intended in any simple or simplified derogatory sense.

What was referred to in the 'Preface', and what has been referred to throughout the essay, as the 'undecidability' of 'vulgar' and 'non-vulgar' also has consequences for the idea of the telos of feminism and the strategic use of each 'sort' of feminism. It would, perhaps, be useful to take another look at those consequences. The following should be read with Chapter Nine especially in mind.

The ultimate 'undecidability' of 'vulgar' and 'non-vulgar' feminism means that reversalist and refusalist strategies (which have been seen in Derrida's work as the first stage of a deconstruction<sup>9</sup>) are no less a part of and no less proper to deconstructive feminism than what has been called, by Martin as well as in this essay, deconstruction. Thus, there cannot be, as Martin and Kristeva have been seen to point out, a telos to feminism in a strict sense - at which point feminism could declare itself finished and completed. But there can, indeed must, as Martin and Kristeva have also been seen to make clear, be local or strategic tasks to be achieved. As Kristeva, for example, has said, although feminism is a move towards 'Who knows?', although there can be no Hegelian or Platonic last place for feminism, 'there are still many goals which women

can achieve: freedom of abortion and contraception, day-care centres for children, equality on the job etc,<sup>10</sup>.

Thus local exigencies may demand that any number of so-called 'vulgar' practices or strategies are necessary in order to bring about any particular effect, be it freedom of abortion or equal pay, but care should perhaps be exercised in order to prevent what Martin is attempting to prevent, the setting up of a new tyranny under new 'experts',<sup>11</sup>. It may be this point, that a new identity would prove equally constraining and certainly no less metaphysical, that Nietzsche is referring to when he objects so strongly to the idea of 'woman as such'. It is in this sense that this essay argues that a telos is at once to be desired and avoided, that value is at once produced and destroyed in ec-centric economy.

NOTESCHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1. See her Translator's Preface to Derrida's Of Grammatology p. lxvi. Henceforth OG
2. Derrida OG pp. 52-5
3. Culler On Deconstruction p. 56
4. Eagleton Literary Theory p. 150
5. Derrida Speech and Phenomena p. 142
6. Clement "Enslaved Enclave" in Marks and deCourtivron eds New French Feminisms pp. 130-36. All quotes from Clement in this chapter are from this source.
7. Dworkin Pornography p. 25
8. Millet Sexual Politics p. 24
9. deBeauvoir The Second Sex in Marks and deCourtivron eds NFF p. 45
10. Firestone The Dialectic of Sex p. 123

CHAPTER TWO: ECONOMY

1. Nietzsche On The Genealogy of Morals II 2 p. 70
2. Deleuze Nietzsche and Philosophy p. 1
3. Saussure Course in General Linguistics p. 79
4. Ib p. 79
5. Ib p. 79
6. Ib p. 79
7. Ib p. 79
8. Ib pp. 65 ff
9. Ib p. 80
10. Ib p. 80
11. Ib p. 81
12. Ib p. 87
13. Ib p. 120
14. Ib pp. 122-3
15. Ib p. 123
16. Culler Saussure pp. 48-9
17. Ib p. 48
18. Ib p. 49
19. Saussure Course p. 79
20. Ib p. 110
21. Derrida Positions p. 8 (Abbrev Pos)
22. Ib p. 29
23. Derrida Speech and Phenomena p. 141 (Abbrev SP)
24. Derrida Writing and Difference p. 271 (Abbrev WD)
25. SP p. 140
26. Pos pp. 8-9
27. SP p. 152
28. Pos pp. 20, 27
29. Derrida "Structure, Sign and Play" (Abbrev "SSP") p. 248 in Macksey and Donato eds The Structuralist Controversy (Abbrev SC)
30. Pos pp. 29, 41, 44
31. Derrida Dissemination p. 6 (Abbrev Dis)

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## Chapter Two (Cont)

32. OG p. 47
33. Pos p. 29
34. Ib p. 27
35. OG p. 49
36. Pos p. 29
37. "SSP" p. 248 in Macksey & Donato Eds SC
38. Ib
39. Ib. p. 247
40. Ib
41. Ib
42. Pos p. 27
43. OG p. 50
44. SP p. 156
45. Derrida "Limited Inc" in Glyph II p. 236
46. Ib
47. Ib
48. Pos p. 71 emphasis added
49. "SSP" pp. 264-5 in Macksey and Donato eds SC
50. Derrida Spurs/Eperons p. 57 (Abbrev S/E)
51. Ib p. 59
52. Derrida "Avoir l'oreille de la philosophie"  
quoted by Culler On Deconstruction (Abbrev OD)  
p. 172
53. S/E p. 41
54. Pos p. 8
55. Ib p. 71
56. S/E p. 111 but see original
57. OG pp. 52-5
58. S/E p. 97
59. Ib p. 111
60. Culler OD p. 175
61. Derrida "Entre Crochets" quoted by Culler  
OD p. 158
62. "SSP" p. 271 in Macksey and Donato eds SC
63. Ib p. 250
64. Ib
65. SP p. 7
66. WD p. 197
67. "SSP" pp. 248, 252 in Macksey and Donato eds SC
68. Pos p. 36
69. S/E pp. 117-9
70. Spivak
71. CSE pamphlets No 2, 1977; "On the political  
economy of women" pp. 3-16
72. Ib p. 3
73. Ib p. 13
74. Ib
75. OG p. 13
76. See Semiotext(e) 2:1 1975 "Saussure's Anagrams"  
See also D. Shepherd "How many Saussure's?" in  
Paragraph 2 pp. 42-52, who complains that the Cours  
is often conceived apart from the work on anagrams

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## Chapter Two (Cont)

The following elucidates a tension between the two poles of Saussure's work - Shepheard argues that a simple dualism somehow reduces Saussure.

- 77. Derrida "The Retrait of metaphor" in Enclitic 2:2 p. 14
- 78. Dis p. 207
- 79. Culler Saussure p. 48
- 80. OG pp. 27-65

CHAPTER THREE: HEGEL AND NIETZSCHE

1. Heidegger at various places, Identity and Difference, passim, for example. Adorno in Negative Dialectics, passim. Foucault in "The Order of Discourse" in Young, ed. Untying the Text p. 74. Derrida in "From Restricted to General Economy" in Writing and Difference.

- 2. Sarlemijn, Hegel's Dialectic pp. 61-2
- 3. Hegel Science of Logic p. 411 (Henceforth SL)
- 4. S. Rosen Hegel p. 116
- 5. Hegel SL p. 411
- 6. Ib
- 7. Rosen Hegel p. p. 67
- 8. Hegel SL p. 581
- 9. Ib p. 412
- 10. Ib p. 413
- 11. Ib
- 12. Ib pp. 413-4
- 13. Ib p. 414
- 14. Ib p. 415
- 15. Ib p. 416
- 16. Ib p. 421
- 17. Ib p. 417
- 18. Ib
- 19. Ib p. 431
- 20. Ib p. 438
- 21. Ib p. 439
- 22. Ib p. 835
- 23. Rosen Hegel p. 121
- 24. Hegel SL p. 442
- 25. Ib p. 443
- 26. Ib p. 54
- 27. Rosen Hegel p. 121
- 28. Ib p. 256
- 29. Ib p. 256
- 30. Translator's Note to Derrida's "From Restricted to General Economy" in Writing and Difference, p. 335.
- 31. Hegel SL p. 415
- 32. Hegel Phenomenology of Spirit § 178/p. 111

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33. Ib. § 182/pp. 111-2
34. Ib.
35. Gadamer Hegel's Dialectic p. 64
36. Hegel PhS § 182/p. 112
37. Ib. § 184/p. 112
38. Ib. § 186/p. 113
39. Ib.
40. Ib.
41. Ib. § 187
42. Ib. § 187/pp. 113-4
43. Ib.
44. Ib. § 188/ p. 114
45. Ib. § 188/ pp. 114-5
46. Ib. § 189/ p. 115
47. Rosen Hegel p. 116
48. Hegel PhS § 190/ p. 116
49. Ib. § 190/ p. 116
50. Ib. § 192/ pp. 116-7
51. Ib. § 191/p. 116
52. Ib § 192/ p. 117
53. Ib § 193/ p. 117
54. Ib § 194/ p. 117
55. Ib § 193/ p. 117
56. Ib § 194/ p. 117
57. Ib § 195/ pp. 117-8
58. Ib § 194/ p. 117
59. Ib § 188/ p. 114
60. Ib § 189/ pp. 114-5
61. SL p. 419
62. Derrida Glas p. 154
63. Ib
64. Hegel PhS p. 266
65. Ib § 445/ p. 266
66. Ib § 445/ p. 266
67. Ib §§ 447-8/ pp. 267-8
68. Ib § 449 / p. 268
69. Ib § 450/ p. 268
70. Ib § 451/ p. 270
71. Ib § 452/ p. 270
72. Ib
73. Ib § 457/p. 274
74. Ib
75. Ib § 459/ p. 275
76. Ib § 458/ p. 275
77. Ib § 475/ pp. 287-8
78. Ib
79. Ib
80. Ib
81. Ib § 476/ p. 289
82. Derrida Glas p. 128
83. Hegel PhS § 459/ p. 275
84. Philosophy of Right § 165/ p. 114
85. Derrida Glas pp. 188 ff
86. Hegel PhS § 457/ pp. 274-5

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## Chapter Three (Cont)

87. Deleuze Nietzsche et la Philosophie p. 187  
My translation, hereafter NP
88. Nietzsche The Will to Power § 512, see also  
Human, all too Human No II, Beyond Good and Evil  
No 3, WP § 511.
89. WP § 516
90. Ib
91. Ib § 516
92. Ib
93. Ib § 512
94. Cf also WP §§ 520-1
95. Cf also WP § 715
96. WP § 692
97. Ib § 693
98. Ib § 692
99. Ib
100. Ecce Homo "Why I am so clever" § 10
101. Foucault History of Sexuality Vol I p. 93
102. Nietzsche WP § 619
103. Deleuze and Guattari l'Anti Oedipe p. 34
104. Pautrat Versions du Soleil p. 229
105. Ib
106. Nietzsche Ecce Homo "Why I am a Destiny" § 1
107. 'Contradict' is widersprache and 'spirit' is  
geist in the German text. The text is the Kritische  
Gesamtausgabe published by deGruyter
108. Hegel SL p. 440
109. Ib p. 439
110. Deleuze NPh p. 9
111. Foucault "Theatrum Philosophicum" in Language,  
Counter-Memory, Practice p. 185
112. Nietzsche Ecce Homo III 6 § 6 p. 306
113. WP § 431
114. "The Problem of Socrates"
115. Ecce Homo I 2
116. Derrida Spurs/Eperons pp. 102-3
117. Nietzsche WP § 585b
118. Ib § 28
119. GM Preface § 4, EH Preface
120. WP §§ 13, 15, 22, 28, ftn 69
121. Derrida S/E pp. 102-3
122. Ib
123. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil § 231
124. Derrida S/E p. 103
125. Nietzsche Ecce Homo II 7
126. BGE § 233
127. Ib § 232
128. WP § 807
129. Gay Science § 339

NOTESCHAPTER FOUR: HEIDEGGER AND ADORNO

1. Gadamer "Hegel and Heidegger" in Hegel's Dialectic p. 110
2. Adorno in Mimima Moralia § 29
3. Gadamer HD p. 110
4. Gadamer "Hegel and the Ancients" in HD p. 12
5. Heidegger Being and Time H 286
6. Heidegger "What is Metaphysics?" in Basic Writings p. 107
7. Heidegger On Time and Being pp. 55, 83
8. Ib pp. 62-3
9. "WM?" pp. 91-112
10. Ib p. 97
11. Ib p. 99
12. Ib
13. Ib p. 106
14. Ib p. 100
15. Ib pp. 109-112
16. BT H 167 emphasis original
17. Ib H 50
18. Ib H 188
19. Ib H 189
20. Ib HH 52, 56
21. "WM?" pp. 103, 105
22. Ib p. 106
23. BT H 42
24. "WM?" p. 112
25. Ib p. 110
26. Ib p. 105
27. Ib p. 110
28. Identity and Difference pp. 23-5
29. Ib
30. Ib p. 41
31. Ib p. 23
32. Ib p. 26
33. Ib
34. Ib p. 27
35. Ib
36. Ib pp. 28-9
37. Ib
38. Ib p. 32
39. Ib p. 31
40. Ib pp. 33-7
41. Ib p. 38
42. Ib p. 39
43. Ib pp. 46-7
44. Ib pp. 47-9
45. Ib p. 48
46. Ib
47. Ib p. 51
48. Ib p. 50
49. Ib p. 67



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## Chapter Four (Cont)

50. Ib p. 70
51. Ib
52. Ib pp. 63-4
53. Ib p. 67
54. Ib pp. 62-3
55. Ib p. 65
56. Ib p. 64
57. Ib
58. The End of Philosophy p. xii
59. Identity and Difference p. 71
60. "Letter on Humanism" in Basic Writings pp. 190-242
61. Ib p. 196
62. Ib
63. "Language" in Poetry, Language, Thought pp. 189-210
64. Ib p. 202
65. Ib p. 203
66. Ib p. 202
67. Ib p. 194
68. Ib p. 203
69. Ib p. 202
70. Ib
71. Ib pp. 202-3
72. Ib p. 200
73. Ib pp. 202-3
74. "What is Metaphysics?" in Basic Writings p. 105
75. "On The Essence of Truth" in Basic Writings p. 129
76. Discourse on Thinking p. 61
77. in Basic Writings pp. 283-318
78. The Question of Being p. 87
79. Nietzsche Vol IV p. 22
80. Ib
81. Ib
82. QB p. 87
83. N IV p. 23
84. QB p. 81
85. Derrida OG p. xvii
86. Adorno Negative Dialectics p. 145
87. Nietzsche Daybreak § 195
88. Adorno ND p. 150
89. Ib p. 149
90. Ib
91. Ib p. 158
92. Prisms p. 32
93. ND p. 159
94. Ib p. 158
95. "Metacritique of Epistemology" in Telos No 38, 1978-9, p. 77
96. Buck-Morss The origins of negative dialectics p. 49

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97. Ib
98. "The Idea of Natural History"
99. ND p. 183
100. Buck-Morss TOND pp. 58-9
101. Adorno, in Telos No 31, 1977, p. 120
102. ND pp. 148-51
103. See Gillian Rose The Melancholy Science p. 44 and ND p. 149
104. ND p. 149
105. Ib
106. Ib p. 161
107. Ib p. 150
108. Nietzsche BGE § 20
109. Adorno "The Actuality of Philosophy" in Telos No 31, 1977, p. 127
110. Cf Husserl, for example.
111. It would not be impossible to claim that Nietzsche himself operated such a reversal - Heidegger, for example, would be making a version of this claim in his work on Nietzsche.
112. Nietzsche Zarathustra "The Convalescent", "The Vision and the Riddle" etc.
113. Ecce Homo "Why I am so Clever" § 10
114. See Chapter Two of Deleuze, NPh and the final chapter of WP.
115. Lyotard "Adorno as the Devil" in Telos No 19 1974, pp. 128-37
116. Adorno Minima Moralia § 61, p. 98
117. Ib
118. ND p. 150
119. M. Haar in The New Nietzsche p. 30
120. That is, in that it would involve the institution of the non-identity between concept and object, the bad identity become a good identity.
121. Adorno MM § 96
122. Ib
123. ND p. 160
124. Ib p. 144
125. Ib p. 141
126. Hegel SL p. 581
127. Ib
128. Adorno Against Epistemology p. 5
129. Prisms p. 33
130. Ib
131. Hegel SL p. 581
132. See Heidegger OTB p. 7 for example

NOTESCHAPTER FIVE: DERRIDA

1. Speech and Phenomena p. 145 (Henceforth SP)  
and Positions
2. Dissemination p. 209 (Henceforth Dis)
3. Pos p. 76
4. Ib pp. 43, 62-3
5. In their interview in Pos
6. Dis p. 207 ftn
7. Ib p. 221
8. SP pp. 148-9
9. SP p. 141
10. Ib p. 149
11. Writing and Difference p. 271 (Henceforth WD)
12. In Enclitic II 2 p. 14
13. WD "From Restricted to General Economy" p. 245
14. See Deleuze NPh p. 163
15. WD p. 335
16. WD "RGE" pp. 255-6
17. Dis p. 207
18. Dis p. 6 and Pos passim
19. Spurs/Eperons pp. 117-9 (Henceforth S/E)
20. WD "SSP" p. 284
21. Pos p. 12
22. S/E p. 95
23. From "Ou commence et comment finit un corps enseignant", quoted by Culler On Deconstruction p. 159
24. Hegel SL p. 581
25. Derrida WD p. 36
26. "SSP" in Macksey and Donato eds The structuralist controversy p. 250. And see Heidegger Identity and Difference pp. 73-4 and the "Postscript" to "WM?" in Existence and Being pp. 349-50
27. Derrida Pos p. 12
28. WD p. 254
29. SP p. 142
30. Dis p. 212
31. Ib p. 221
32. In p. 207 ftn
33. S/E p. 99
34. OG p. 151
35. Ib p. 142
36. Ib p. 152
37. WD "FSW" pp. 196-7
38. Dis p. 212
39. Ib p. 20
40. Pos p. 44
41. La Dissemination pp. 248-9 and see WD "RGE" p. 271
42. SP p. 141
43. Pos p. 43
44. Pos p. 43 see also OG pp. 30-44, especially p. 35
45. Jameson Prison House of Language p. 176

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## Chapter Five (Cont)

46. Gasché "Deconstruction as Criticism" in Glyph No 6, pp. 189-90 and Wordsworth "Household Words ..." in DLR Nos 1&2, Vol 5, pp. 80-95
47. Derrida OG p. 20
48. S/E pp. 109-119
49. Ib p. 117
50. OG p. 20
51. Heidegger Poetry, Language, Thought pp. 202-3 and Identity and Difference p. 65
52. "WM?" pp. 96-7 in Basic Writings
53. Derrida Dis p. 212
54. Interview in Literary Review No 14, April/May 1980 pp. 21-2 (Henceforth Lit Rev)
55. David Krell "Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche" in JBSP Vol 14, No 3, p. 276
56. Heidegger N IV p. 60 et passim
57. Derrida S/E pp. 114-5
58. Heidegger What is called thinking? p. 107
59. N IV p. 68
60. Derrida S/E pp. 94-5
61. Ib p. 57
62. Ib
63. Dis p. 6
64. Adorno ND pp. 149, 158-60
65. Ib p. 145
66. Ib
67. Prisms p. 32
68. Buck-Morss TOND p. 49
69. Adorno ND p. 12 et passim
70. Against Epistemology p. 38
71. Derrida Dis p. 6
72. SP p. 148
73. Ib p. 141
74. Buck-Morss TOND pp. 58-9
75. Derrida Pos pp. 44-5
76. Ib
77. Adorno Minima Moralia § 61
78. Deleuze NPh
79. Derrida SP p. 149
80. Ib pp. 148-9
81. OG p. 49, Pos p. 71, Interview in Lit Rev No 14
82. OG p. 49
83. WD p. 271

NOTESCHAPTER SIX: FOUCAULT

1. Derrida "SSP" p. 247 in Macksey and Donato eds  
SC, Pos p. 29
2. SP p. 141, OG p. 166
3. See "Limited Inc" in Glyph 2, 1977, pp. 162-254  
and Pos p. 41
4. Pos p. 71
5. Ib pp. 29, 41
6. "SSP" in Macksey and Donato eds SC p. 247
7. Foucault Power, Truth, Strategy pp. 67-76
8. Ib p. 67
9. Ib p. 69
10. Translation of la Volonte de Savoir
11. Ib p. 83
12. Ib
13. Ib
14. Ib.
15. Ib p. 84
16. Ib
17. Ib
18. Ib
19. Ib p. 95
20. Ib
21. Ib
22. Ib p. 85
23. PTS p. 36
24. Ib See also HS pp. 33-5, 73, 47-9
25. PTS p. 36
26. Ib
27. HS p. 92
28. PTS p. 71
29. Ib p. 70
30. Dreyfus and Rabinow Michel Foucault passim
31. Foucault PTS p. 36
32. Ib
33. HS p. 86
34. PTS p. 39
35. Ib p. 36
36. See also PTS pp. 70-1
37. HS p. 92
38. Ib
39. See also HS p. 95
40. PTS p. 70
41. Ib
42. HS p. 92
43. Ib
44. Ib pp. 92-3
45. PTS p. 36 HS pp. 94-5
46. Ib p. 71

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- 47. HS p. 93
- 48. Ib
- 49. Ib
- 50. Ib
- 51. Ib p. 94
- 52. Ib
- 53. Ib
- 54. Ib
- 55. Ib
- 56. Ib p. 93
- 57. Ib
- 58. Ib
- 59. Ib
- 60. PTS p. 55
- 61. HS p. 95
- 62. Ib
- 63. Ib p. 96
- 64. Ib
- 65. Ib
- 66. PTS p. 52
- 67. Ib p. 36
- 68. Ib pp. 41, 67-8
- 69. Ib p. 71
- 70. HS p. 91
- 71. Ib p. 82
- 72. PTS pp. 36-7
- 73. HS p. 12
- 74. Ib p. 94
- 75. PTS p. 52
- 76. Derrida SP p. 141

CHAPTER SEVEN: DELEUZE AND GUATTARI

- 1. J. Donzelot "An Anti-Sociology" in Semiotext(e) Vol 2, No 3, 1977, p. 27
- 2. V. Descombes Modern French Philosophy p. 174
- 3. Donzelot loc cit p. 37
- 4. C. Clement "A l'ecoute de Derrida" in l'Arc No 54, 1973 pp. 16-19
- 5. Descombes loc cit p. 173, P. Patton "Notes towards a glossary" in I&C No 8, Spring 1977, p. 42
- 6. See Foucault HS p. 86, Deleuze and Guattari Anti Oedipus p. 29E/37F
- 7. AOE p. 29E/36F
- 8. Ib pp. 118-9E/140-1F
- 9. F. Guattari in Semiotext(e) Vol 2, No 3, 1977

NOTESChapter Seven (Cont)

10. Donzelot op cit p. 29
11. AOE p. 296E
12. Ib pp. 28-9E
13. Ib p. 117E
14. Ib and see "Rhizome" in I&C No 8, Spring 1977
15. AOE p. 22E/37F
16. Ib p. 28E
17. Deleuze "Three Group Problems" in Semiotext(e) p. 101
18. Guattari "Every body wants to be a fascist" in Semiotext(e) p. 93
19. AOE pp. 291-3F
20. Ib p. 32E
21. AOE p. 26E Donzelot op cit p. 30
22. AOE p. 29E
23. Ib pp. 25-6E
24. Ib
25. Ib pp. 4-5E
26. Ib
27. Patton op cit p. 43
28. AOE p. 5E
29. Patton op cit p. 42
30. Ib
31. AOE p. 340E
32. Ib p. 302E
33. Ib p. 246E
34. Ib pp. 244-5E
35. Ib pp. 303E/293F
36. Guattari "Everybody wants to be a fascist" in Semiotext(e) loc cit p. 87 and see AOE p. 184E
37. AOE p. 15E
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40. AOE p. 8E
41. Foucault DP p. 25
42. AOE p. 116E/158F
43. Ib p. 176E
44. Ib p. 33E
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- 25. Ib "Female sexuality", p. 377
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- 27. Derrida "SSP" p. 247 in Macksey and Donato eds SC
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- 29. Pos p. 9
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32. S. deBeavoir p. 48 in Marks and deCourtivron (eds) NFF, and Kofman as above
33. Feral loc cit
34. Freud PFL Vol 7, "Sexual theories of children" p. 195
35. L. Irigaray "Des marchandises entre elles", in Marks and deCourtivron (eds) NFF pp. 107-110
36. Freud PFL Vol 9, "A case of homosexuality in a woman", p. 379
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41. PFL Vol 7, "Three essays ..." p. 57
42. Ib pp. 371-92
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44. Ib
45. J. Feral op cit p. 5
46. Ib
47. Derrida "FSW" in Macksey and Donato (eds) p. 197
48. Foucault PTS p. 67
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51. HS p. 92
52. Ib p. 93
53. J. Gallop Psychoanalysis and Feminism pp. xi-xiii Henceforth PF.
54. Ib
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56. But see p. xiii
57. "The ladies' man" pp. 33-7 Henceforth "TLI".
58. Ib p. 34
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60. Ib pp. 34-5
61. Ib p. 35
62. Ib p. 36
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- 82. Ib p. 42
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- 84. Ib
- 85. Ib p. 42
- 86. Ib p. xii
- 87. Ib p. 93
- 88. Ib pp. 28, 31, 41, 49-50 for example.
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- 93. Ib p. xii
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- 98. Ib p. 40
- 99. Ib p. 37
- 100. Ib p. 38
- 101. Ib p. 42
- 102. Ib p. 38
- 103. Ib p. 29
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- 105. Ib p. xii

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- 2. M. Ryan Marxism and deconstruction p. 8
- 3. Derrida SP p. 135
- 4. Foucault HS p. 96
- 5. Derrida "SSP" in Macksey and Donato (eds) SC p.248
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- 8. Leghorn and Parker Woman's Worth pp. 4, 235
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